Leibniz hierarchy by Poças, Jacinta Rodrigues
 Universidade de Aveiro  
2009 
Departamento de Matemática 
Jacinta Rodrigues 
Poças 
 
Hierarquia de Leibniz 
 
Leibniz Hierarchy 
 
 
 
   
  Universidade de Aveiro  
2009 
Departamento de Matemática 
Jacinta Rodrigues 
Poças 
 
 
Hierarquia de Leibniz 
 Dissertação apresentada à Universidade de Aveiro para cumprimento dos 
requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Matemática, realizada 
sob a orientação científica do Doutor Manuel António Gonçalves Martins, 
Professor Auxiliar do Departamento de Matemática da Universidade de Aveiro. 
 
   
 
 
  Universidade de Aveiro  
2009 
Departamento de Matemática 
Jacinta Rodrigues 
Poças 
 
 
Leibniz Hierarchy 
 
 Dissertation presented to the University of Aveiro to fulfil the necessary 
requirements for obtaining a Master´s Degree in Mathematics, written under the 
scientific orientation of Prof. Manuel António Gonçalves Martins, Professor in
the Mathematics Department at the University of Aveiro. 
 
   
 
   
  
 
 
 
Dedico este trabalho aos meus pais e ao meu marido. 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
I dedicate this work at my parents and husband. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
O júri / the jury   
 
presidente / president Prof. Doutor Helmuth Robert Malonek 
Professor Catedrático da Universidade de Aveiro 
  
 
vogais / examiners committee Prof. Doutor Carlos Manuel Costa Lourenço Caleiro 
Professor Auxiliar do Instituto Superior Técnico da Universidade Técnica de Lisboa 
  
 
 Prof. Doutor Manuel António Gonçalves Martins 
Professor Auxiliar da Universidade de Aveiro (Orientador) 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
Agradecimentos 
 
-Ao meu orientador Prof. Doutor Manuel Martins por me ter transmitido o gosto 
desta área da matemática que desconhecia e pelo apoio incondicional. Foi um 
privilégio trabalhar com tanta humanidade e conhecimentos. 
 
-Aos participantes do grupo de lógica, em especial, aos meus colegas 
Alexandre Madeira e Nilde Barreto. Nem sempre temos a oportunidade de 
poder apresentar e assistir a vários assuntos ligados a essa área, afim de 
poder discutir e melhorar o nosso trabalho. 
 
-Aos meus pais, pelo apoio financeiro e moral. 
 
-Aos meus familiares e amigos pelo apoio e incentivo. 
 
-Ao meu marido por tudo… 
 
  
 
 
 
 
J. P.
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
-My supervisor Prof. Manuel Martins for transmitting the taste of this unknown 
area of Mathematics to me and for his unconditional support. It has been a 
privilege to work with so much humanity and knowledge. 
 
-Members of the logistic´s group and especially my colleagues Alexandre 
Madeira e Nilde Barreto. We do not often have the opportunity to present and 
learn about several topics related to this area, in order to discuss and improve
our work. 
 
-My parents for their financial support and moral motivation. 
 
-My friends and family to their support and encouragement. 
 
-My husband for everything… 
 
  
 
 
 
 
J. P.
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Palavras-chave 
 
Lógica; consequência equacional; matriz semântica; semântica algébrica 
equivalente; operador de Leibniz; lógica protoalgébrica; lógica equivalencial; 
lógica algebrizável; lógica não-protoalgébrica; lógica multigénero; operador de 
Leibniz comportamental. 
 
Resumo 
 
 
A Lógica Algébrica Abstracta estuda o processo pelo qual uma classe de 
álgebras pode ser associada a uma lógica. Nesta dissertação, analisamos este 
processo agrupando lógicas partilhando certas propriedades em classes. O 
conceito central neste estudo é a congruência de Leibniz que assume o papel 
desempenhado pela equivalência no processo tradicional de Lindenbaum-
Tarski. 
 
Apresentamos uma hierarquia entre essas classes que é designada por 
hierarquia de Leibniz, caracterizando as lógicas de cada classe por 
propriedades meta-lógicas, por exemplo propriedades do operador de Leibniz. 
 
Estudamos também a recente abordagem comportamental que usa lógicas 
multigénero, lógica equacional comportamental e, consequentemente, uma 
versão comportamental do operador de Leibniz. Neste contexto, apresentamos 
alguns exemplos, aos quais aplicamos esta nova teoria, capturando alguns 
fenómenos de algebrização que não era possível formalizar com a abordagem 
standard.  
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Abstract 
 
Abstract Algebraic logic studies the process by which a class of algebras can 
be associated with a logic. In this dissertation, we analyse this process by 
grouping logics sharing certain properties into classes. The central concept in 
this study is the Leibniz Congruence that assumes the role developed by the 
equivalence in the traditional Lindenbaum-Tarski process.  
 
We show a hierarchy between these classes, designated by Leibniz hierarchy, 
by characterizing logics in each class by meta-logical properties, for example 
properties of the Leibniz operator. 
 
We also study a recent behavioral approach which uses many-sorted logics, 
behavioral equational logic and, consequently, a behavioral version of the 
Leibniz operator. In this context, we provide some examples, to which we apply 
this new theory, capturing some phenomena of algebraization that are not 
possible to formalize using the standard approach. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The general theory of Abstract Algebraic Logic (AAL) studies the mechanism by which
a class of algebras can be associated with a given logic. This theory provides a general
context in which bridge theorems, relating metalogical properties of a logic to algebraic
properties of its algebraic counterpart, can be formulated precisely. These contrast to
the study of algebraic logic whose main setting is to examine the class of algebras that
are canonically associated with a logic. The strong connection between a logic and
its associated class of algebras can be very useful for metalogical investigation. The
paradigm of the Lindenbaum-Tarski process is the way by which the class of Boolean
Algebras (BA) appears from the Classical Propositional Logic (CPL). Actually, given
a theory T , the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra induced by T for CPL, is the quotient
algebra FmL/ ≡T , where ≡T is the congruence on the formula algebra defined by
p ≡T q if and only if (iff) p and q are logically equivalent in T , that is, p ↔ q ∈ T
(the connective↔ denotes the usual classical propositional equivalence). This quotient
algebra is a Boolean algebra. Conversely, every countable Boolean algebra is isomorphic
to an algebra FmL/ ≡T for some theory T of CPL. In this way, the class BA is
associated with CPL. A similar phenomena occurs in the Intuitionistic Propositional
Logic (IPL) with the class of Heyting Algebras (HA). In order to generalize this
process to other logics, the role played by the congruence ≡T is substituted by the
Leibniz congruence and the equivalence connective by a system of equivalence formulas.
Logics with some identical properties have been grouped by classes which can be
characterized by Leibniz operator properties, parameterized system of equivalence for-
mulas and closure properties of the class of reduced matrix models. In this dissertation,
we study these classes for propositional logics and we generalize for many-sorted logics
6using properties of the behavioral Leibniz operator. This generalization can capture
logics that are not algebraizable in the standard approach but are behaviorally alge-
braizable. Nevertheless, this generalization does not trivialize the notion of algebraiza-
tion because there are again logics which are not algebraizable in any way.
In Chapter 2, we introduce some important concepts and results around the central
notions of logic and algebra. A logic is defined as a pair 〈L,⊢〉 where L is a language
and ⊢ is a binary relation between sets of formulas and individual formulas satisfying
reflexivity, cut, weakening and structurality conditions. We present other alternative
definitions, in some concrete case for (finitary) logic (c.f. [BP89] and [Gon08]). We also
introduce the notion of matrix and the notions of Leibniz and Suszko operators, which
are central in a semantical approach. We conclude this chapter by defining equational
logic, which is an important tool in the study of equivalent (algebraic) semantics for a
logic.
In Chapter 3, we consider a wide class of logics which is the class of protoalgebraic
logics. Blok and Pigozzi proved that this class of logics is exactly the class of non-
pathological defined by Czelakowski. We give some characterizations of protoalgebraic
logics using the Leibniz and the Suszko operators. We also show that a logic is pro-
toalgebraic iff it has a parameterized system of equivalence formulas, or equivalently, if
it has the parameterized local deduction-detachment theorem. We illustrate this latter
result, with BCK logic. We also study the relationship between the structural proper-
ties of the class of reduced matrix models and metalogical properties of protoalgebraic
logics. We prove that a logic is protoalgebraic iff the class of reduced matrix models
is closed under subdirect products. As we work with logics for which the finitariness
condition does not hold, we emphasize some results about finitary protoalgebraic logics.
In Chapter 4, we study the class of equivalential logics which are logics that have
a (possibly infinite) system of equivalence formulas. These logics were introduced by
Prucnal and Wron´ski in [PW74] and extensively studied by Czelakowski in [Cze81],
[Cze01, Chapter 3] and [Cze04]. They form a proper subclass of the class of protoalge-
braic logics. We prove a useful theorem, called Herrmann′s Test, which provides some
conditions that a set of formulas built up in two variables must satisfy in order for a
protoalgebraic logic to become equivalential. We also study finitely equivalential logics
which are equivalential logics that have a finite system of equivalence formulas. We
give a characterization of (finitely) equivalential logics by means of the Leibniz operator
properties. The class of equivalential logics is also characterized by closure properties
7of the class of reduced matrix models which is closed under submatrices and direct
products. Furthermore, as we did for protoalgebraic logics, we focus on the finitary
(finitely) equivalential logics. We prove that a logic is finitary and finitely equivalential
iff the class of reduced matrix models is a quasivariety. We conclude this chapter with
the presentation of some examples of modal logics which show that the class of finitely
equivalential logics is a proper subclass of equivalential logics (c.f. [Mal89]).
In Chapter 5, we study the algebraization phenomena in a broad sense. In literature
there are several notions of algebraization. In this Chapter, we will present some of
them. First we define the notion of algebraic semantics. Roughly speaking, a class K
of algebras can be considered as an algebraic semantics of a logic S if the consequence
relation ⊢S can be interpreted in the equational consequence relation K in a natural
way. We show that a logic can has (if any) many algebraic semantics. In addition,
if there exists an inverse interpretation of
K
in ⊢S, then K is called an equivalent
algebraic semantics for S. It is unique up to a quasivariety. If S is finitary then the
equivalent algebraic semantics K is a quasivariety. We consider weakly algebraizable
logics which are logics that have a pair of interpretations which commute with surjective
substitutions and are mutually inverse. We also give a characterization of weakly
algebraizable logics using the Leibniz operator. We define algebraizable logics as logics
which have an equivalent algebraic semantics. The most of familiar deductive systems
have equivalent algebraic semantics. The process of algebraization is related to the
famous Lindenbaum-Tarski method. For instance, this establishes the relationship
between CPL and the class BA. The central idea is to look at the set of formulas as
an algebra with operations induced by the logical connectives. Tarski observed that
logical equivalence is a congruence on the formula algebra, and therefore a quotient
algebra could be built. Many other logics are algebraizable, namely IPL. We give
some characterizations of the class of algebraizable logics. Among them, we have that
K is an equivalent algebraic semantics for a logic S iff there exists an isomorphism
between the theory lattice of S and the equational theory lattice of K that commutes
with inverse substitution. We finalize this chapter by giving some examples of logics
which show that the inclusion among the different classes of algebraizable logics are
proper.
In Chapter 6, we go behind protoalgebraic logics studying the class of truth-
equational logics, which includes the class of weakly algebraizable logics and has been
recently studied by Raftery (c.f. [Raf06b]). We characterize this class of logics by
8properties of the Suszko operator. A logic is truth equational iff the Suszko operator is
injective on the lattice filters for every algebra. We give examples of logics which are
non-protoalgebraic or truth equational, e.g. Intuitionistic Propositional Logic without
implication IPL∗.
In Chapter 7, we study the generalization of the theory of standard AAL to many-
sorted setting. This generalization is important since propositional logics are not
enough expressive when we want to reason about complex systems. Thus we need
logics over rich languages where elements can be distinguished by sorts. For instance,
the First-Order Logic (FOL) is a logic with two sorts (a sort for terms and a sort for
formulas). The predicates can be naturally seen as operations that transform terms
in formulas and the connectives as operations over formulas. A many-sorted logic is
introduced as logic whose language is obtained from a many-sorted signature with a
distinguished sort φ of formulas, and satisfies structurality condition. The notion of
hidden many-sorted signature is a many-sorted signature which is divided in a visible
and in a hidden part. In a hidden algebra, the elements are naturally split into the
visible and the hidden data. Since we cannot access immediately to the hidden data,
it is not possible to reason directly about the equality of two hidden values. Hence,
equational logic needs to be replaced by behavioral equational logic, also called hidden
equational logic, based on the notion of behavioral equivalence. Two values are consider
Γ-behaviorally equivalent if they cannot be distinguished by any experiments (visible
output) that can be built with the operations in the subsignature Γ. The Γ-behavioral
equivalence is the largest equivalence relation compatible with the operations in Γ
whose visible part is the identity relation. Thus there is a natural connection with
the Leibniz congruence. Actually, in the many-sorted AAL approach, the theory was
developed by replacing the role of unsorted equational logic by many-sorted behavioral
equational logic over the same signature and taking as unique visible sort, the sort φ
of formulas. Since the sort φ is considered visible, we have equational reasoning about
formulas, which compels every connective to be congruent. The standard notion of al-
gebraization is a particular case of many-sorted algebraization (we have a unique sort φ
of the signature Σ). And this former is a particular case of behaviorally algebraization
by considering Γ = Σ. At the end of this chapter we give some examples of logics
which are not algebraizable in the standard sense but are behaviorally algebraizable,
e.g. the paraconsistent logic C1 of da Costa (c.f. [Gon08, Chapter 5]). However, there
are many logics that are not algebraizable in any way.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we introduce some important concepts and results around the central
notions of logic and algebra that will be necessary throughout this thesis. For the in-
terested reader, we suggest [ANS01, Chapter 4], [Cze01] and [Wo´j88] for more on these
subjects and for the proofs of the results presented herein. We assume that the reader
is familiar with some notions of universal algebra, as the notions of homomorphism,
equivalence relation, etc (c.f. [BS81]). We allow the reader to become acquainted with
our notations, terminology, conventions and mathematical language. The expression
“iff” is used as an abbreviation for “if and only if”. We describe four alternative ways of
defining a logic which are showing to be equivalent under some conditions (c.f. [BP89]
and [Gon08]). We also define the notion of matrix and the notions of Leibniz and
Suszko operators, which we need for a semantical approach of our subject. We con-
clude this chapter by defining equational logic, which is an important tool in the study
of equivalent (algebraic) semantics for a logic.
2.1 Propositional Language and L-algebra
A propositional (or sentential) language L is a set of propositional connectives (or fun-
damental operations in algebraic context), for each one it is associated a finite natural
number called rank (or arity). We define L-constants as usual, they are connectives
(if any) of L that have rank 0. Given a propositional language L, FmL denotes the set
of propositional L-formulas, also called L-sentences (or L-terms in algebraic context)
built in the usual recursive way from the countably infinite set Var = {p0, p1, . . . } of
propositional variables (or atomic formulas) using the connectives in L: all variables
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and constants are formulas, and if ϕ0, . . . , ϕn−1 are formulas and ω is a connective of
rank n, then ω(ϕ0, . . . , ϕn−1) is a formula. Let ϕ be a formula, we write ϕ(p0, . . . , pn−1)
to indicate that the variables occurring in ϕ are all included in the list p0, . . . , pn−1.
We denote by Var(ϕ) the finite set of variables that actually occur in ϕ. If Γ ⊆ FmL,
then Var(Γ) =
⋃
{Var(ϕ) : ϕ ∈ Γ}. In the sequel, the letters p, q, . . . denote variables
and X, Y, Z, . . . represent arbitrary sets of variables. We represent formulas by lower
case Greek letters and sets of formulas by upper case Greek letters.
By an algebra of type L (an L-algebra for short) we mean a structure A = 〈A, 〈ωA :
ω ∈ L〉〉 where A is a non-empty set called the universe of A and ωA is an operation on
A of arity k for each connective ω of rank k, i.e., a mapping ωA : Ak → A. We represent
L-algebras by boldface roman letters and their universes by the corresponding lightface
letters. We assume that the reader is familiar with notions of universal algebra, as the
notions of subalgebra, direct product of family of algebras, etc. Let A = 〈A, 〈ωA :
ω ∈ L〉〉 be an L-algebra and L′ a sublanguage of L, i.e., L′ ⊆ L. The L′-algebra
〈A, 〈ωA : ω ∈ L′〉〉 is called the L′-reduct of A. The algebra of L-formulas is the
absolutely free algebra FmL (or TeL(Var)) of type L over the set of generators Var.
For any set X of variables, FmL(X) denotes the set of formulas in which only variables
from X occur, and we denote by FmL(X) the corresponding subalgebra of FmL.
Let A be an L-algebra and ϕ ∈ FmL. Depending on the values in A that variables
of ϕ are assigned, the formula ϕ has a unique interpretation in A. Since FmL is
absolutely freely generated by the set of variables, any mapping h : Var → A can be
uniquely extended to a homomorphism h¯ : FmL → A, called assignment (also named
valuation or evaluation). Conversely, if we have a homomorphism g : FmL → A
then there exists a homomorphism h : Var → A such that h¯ = g. Indeed, we can
always consider h := g|Var. In the sequel, we also write h for h¯. Let A be an algebra,
ϕ(p0, . . . , pn−1) ∈ FmL and a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ A. We write ϕ
A(a0, . . . , an−1) = h(ϕ), i.e., it
is the interpretation of ϕ in A when h(pi) = ai for i = 0, . . . , n− 1. An endomorphism
e : FmL → FmL is called a substitution. By a substitution instance of a formula ϕ we
mean a formula of the form e(ϕ) where e is any substitution.
A congruence on an algebra A is an equivalence relation that is compatible with
the operations on A (c.f. [BS81, Definition 5.1 in Chapter II]). Let A be an algebra
and a1, . . . , an ∈ A. We denote by θ(a1, . . . , an) the congruence generated by {(ai, aj) :
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n}, which is the smallest congruence such that a1, . . . , an are in the same
equivalence class. The congruence generated by the pair (a1, a2), θ(a1, a2), is called
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principal congruence. The set of all congruences on an L-algebra A is denoted by
CoA. This set is always closed under arbitrary intersections and unions of directed
sets. Thus, it forms a lattice with set-theoretical inclusion, where the meet operation is
the intersection of congruences and the join operation is defined in the following way:
θ1 ∨ θ2 = θ1 ∪ (θ1 ◦ θ2) ∪ (θ1 ◦ θ2 ◦ θ1) ∪ . . . (c.f. [BS81, Theorem 4.6 in Chapter I]).
Let K be a class of L-algebras. We say that θ is a K-congruence of A if θ ∈ CoA and
A/θ ∈ K. The set of all K-congruences of A is denoted by CoKA. Given any R ⊆ A
2,
the intersection of all K-congruences on A that includes R is denoted by θA
K
R and is
called the K-congruence generated by R. If R = {(a, b)}, we simply write θA
K
(a, b) for
the smallest congruence θ of A such that a ≡ b(θ) and A/θ ∈ K.
2.2 Logic and Deductive System
A logic S (or logical system) over a propositional language L is defined as a pair
S = 〈L,⊢S〉, where ⊢S is a relation between set of formulas and individual formulas,
called the consequence relation of S, which satisfies the following conditions, for all
Γ,∆ ⊆ FmL and ϕ, ψ ∈ FmL:
ϕ ∈ Γ⇒ Γ ⊢S ϕ (Reflexivity)
Γ ⊢S ϕ and Γ ⊆ ∆⇒ ∆ ⊢S ϕ (Cut)
Γ ⊢S ϕ and ∆ ⊢S ψ for every ψ ∈ Γ⇒ ∆ ⊢S ϕ (Weakening)
Γ ⊢S ϕ⇒ e[Γ] ⊢S e(ϕ) for every substitution e (Structurality)
where Γ ⊢S ϕ abbreviates that 〈Γ, ϕ〉 ∈ S and reads Γ entails ϕ in S or ϕ is a
consequence of Γ in S. Note that reflexivity and weakening conditions together imply
cut condition. Let Γ,∆ ⊆ FmL, we write Γ ⊢S ∆ for Γ ⊢S δ for all δ ∈ ∆, and we
write Γ ⊣⊢S ∆ when Γ ⊢S ∆ and ∆ ⊢S Γ hold. In the later case, we say that Γ and ∆
are interderivable.
A very important property of a logic is the finitariness. Indeed, there are logicians
(e.g. Blok and Pigozzi) that defined logic being finitary. We say that ⊢S is finitary if
Γ ⊢S ϕ⇒ Γ
′ ⊢S ϕ for some finite Γ
′ ⊆ Γ.
With this extra property, we obtain stronger results that we will emphasize throughout
the text.
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A formula is called a theorem of S (an S-theorem for short) if ∅ ⊢S ϕ (we write ⊢S ϕ
for short). The set of all theorems is denoted by Thm(S). By the structurality of S,
Thm(S) is closed under substitutions. A set T of formulas is called a theory of S (an
S-theory for short) if it is closed under the consequence relation ⊢S, that is, if, for every
ϕ ∈ FmL, T ⊢S ϕ implies ϕ ∈ T . We represent theories by uppercase Latin letters.
The set of all S-theories is denoted by Th(S) and is closed under inverse substitutions.
Indeed, let e be a substitution, T ∈ Th(S) and ϕ ∈ FmL. Suppose e
−1[T ] ⊢S ϕ.
By structurality of S, e[e−1[T ]] ⊢S e(ϕ). Since we always have that e[e
−1[T ]] ⊆ T ,
by cut condition, T ⊢S e(ϕ). As T is a theory, e(ϕ) ∈ T , i.e., ϕ ∈ e
−1[T ]. Thus
e−1[T ] ∈ Th(S). Observe that the theorems of S belong to every S-theory and it is
not required that this set be nonempty. We say that a theory is consistent if it is not
the set of all formulas. Otherwise, it is called inconsistent. The set Th(S) forms a
complete lattice Th(S) = 〈Th(S),∩,∨S〉, where the meet operation is the intersection
of an arbitrary family of theories and the join operation is defined in the following way:
for any T, T ′ ∈ Th(S), T ∨S T ′ =
⋂
{R ∈ Th(S) : T ∪ T ′ ⊆ R}. The largest theory is
the set FmL and the smallest theory is the set Thm(S). For any Γ ⊆ FmL, we denote
by CnSΓ the smallest S-theory including Γ, i.e., CnSΓ = {ϕ ∈ FmL : Γ ⊢S ϕ} and we
said that Γ generates CnSΓ. It is not difficult to see that T ∨
S T ′ = CnS(T ∪ T
′), i.e.,
T ∨S T ′ is the theory generated by T ∪ T ′. An S-theory T is finitely axiomatized or
finitely generated if T = CnSΓ for some finite Γ ⊆ FmL.
Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ∈ FmL. We have that Γ ⊢S ϕ iff, for all substitutions e and T ∈
Th(S) such that e[Γ] ⊆ T we have e(ϕ) ∈ T . Indeed, suppose that Γ ⊢S ϕ. Let
e be a substitution and T ∈ Th(S) such that e[Γ] ⊆ T . By structurality condition,
e[Γ] ⊢S e(ϕ). And by cut condition, T ⊢S e(ϕ). Since T is a theory, e(ϕ) ∈ T .
Conversely, let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ∈ FmL and consider the substitution e = idFmL . Thus, for
every T ∈ Th(S) such that e[Γ] ⊆ T , we have that e(ϕ) ∈ T . Let T := CnS(Γ). Since
e[Γ] = Γ ⊆ CnS(Γ) = T , we have that ϕ = e(ϕ) ∈ T . We conclude that Γ ⊢S ϕ.
Let S be a logic. We can see CnS as a function on the power set of FmL into itself,
usually called the consequence operator of S. This operator satisfies the following
conditions, for all Γ,∆ ⊆ FmL:
Γ ⊆ CnSΓ (Reflexivity)
Γ ⊆ ∆⇒ CnSΓ ⊆ CnS∆ (Monotonicity)
CnSCnSΓ ⊆ CnSΓ (Idempotency)
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e[CnSΓ] ⊆ CnS(e[Γ]) for every substitution e (Structurality)
In addition, if S is finitary then CnS is finitary in the sense
CnSΓ ⊆
⋃
{CnSΓ
′ for all finite set Γ′ ⊆ Γ}.
Conversely, any function C from power set of FmL into itself satisfying reflexivity,
monotonicity, idempotency and structurality conditions, give rise to a logic S. Indeed,
we defined the relation ⊢S in the following way: for all Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL, Γ ⊢S ϕ
iff ϕ ∈ C(Γ). It is not difficult to see that the relation ⊢S satisfies reflexivity, cut,
weakening and structurality conditions. Thus, we obtain a logic over L, which can be
proved finitary whenever C is finitary.
Theorem 2.2.1. Let C be a set of subsets of FmL. C is the set of theories of some
logic iff the following conditions hold:
(i) C is closed under arbitrary intersection, i.e.,
⋂
X ∈ C for every X ⊆ C;
(ii) C is closed under inverse images of substitutions, i.e., if T ∈ C then e−1[T ] ∈ C
for every substitution e.
Proof. Suppose that C is a set of theories of a logic S, i.e., C = Th(S). Since Th(S) is
always closed under arbitrary intersection and inverse images of substitutions, condi-
tions (i) and (ii) hold.
Conversely, assume conditions (i) and (ii). We define a relation ⊢C between set
of formulas and individual formulas as follows, for all Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL, Γ ⊢C ϕ iff
ϕ ∈
⋂
{T ∈ C : Γ ⊆ T} := CnC(Γ). It is not difficult to see that reflexivity, cut and
weakening conditions hold. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL. Suppose Γ ⊢C ϕ, i.e., ϕ ∈ CnCΓ.
Let e be a substitution. Thus e(ϕ) ∈ e[CnC(Γ)]. We always have Γ ⊆ e
−1[e[Γ]]. Since
e[Γ] ⊆ CnC(e[Γ]), we have that e
−1[e[Γ]] ⊆ e−1[CnC(e[Γ])]. Thus Γ ⊆ e
−1[CnC(e[Γ])].
By condition (ii), e−1[CnC(e[Γ])] ∈ C. Thus CnCΓ ⊆ e
−1[CnC(e[Γ])], which implies that
e[CnCΓ] ⊆ e[e
−1[CnC(e[Γ])]]. Since we always have e[e
−1[CnC(e[Γ])]] ⊆ CnC(e[Γ]), we
deduce that e[CnCΓ] ⊆ CnC(e[Γ]). As e(ϕ) ∈ e[CnC(Γ)], we have that e(ϕ) ∈ CnC(e[Γ]),
i.e., e[Γ] ⊢C e(ϕ). Thus structurality condition holds. We conclude that 〈L,⊢C〉 is a
logic. It only remains to show that C = Th(S). Suppose T ∈ Th(S), then T ⊢C ϕ
implies ϕ ∈ T , i.e., CnCT ⊆ T and as T ⊆ CnCT always holds, we have CnCT = T .
Since C is closed under intersection, T ∈ C. Conversely, assume T ∈ C, i.e., CnCT = T .
If T ⊢C ϕ then ϕ ∈ CnCT = T , so T ∈ Th(S).
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If S is a finitary logic then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2.2. Let C be a set of subsets of FmL. C is the set of theories of some
finitary logic iff the following conditions hold:
(i) C is closed under arbitrary intersection;
(ii) C is closed under inverse images of substitutions;
(iii) C is closed under directed unions, i.e.,
⋃
X ∈ C for every X ⊆ C that is
upward-directed in the sense that, for every pair T, T ′ ∈ X, there is an R ∈ C
such that T, T ′ ⊆ R.
Moreover, condition (ii) can be replaced by
(ii′) C is closed under inverse images of surjective substitutions.
Proof. Suppose that C is a set of theories of a finitary logic S, i.e., C = Th(S). We
see the proof of Theorem 2.2.1 for conditions (i) and (ii). Let {Ti : i ∈ I} be an
upward-directed subset of Th(S). Suppose
⋃
i∈I Ti ⊢S ϕ. Since S is finitary, there
exists a finite Γ′ ⊆
⋃
i∈I Ti such that Γ
′ ⊢S ϕ. As the set of Ti´s is upward-directed,
there is a j ∈ I such that Γ′ ⊆ Tj. By cut condition, Tj ⊢S ϕ, i.e., ϕ ∈ Tj ⊆
⋃
i∈I Ti.
Hence
⋃
i∈I Ti ∈ Th(S).
Conversely, assume conditions (i), (ii′) and (iii) hold. We define the relation ⊢C as
in the proof of Theorem 2.2.1. It is not difficult to see that the relation ⊢C satisfies
reflexivity, cut and weakening conditions. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL. Suppose Γ ⊢C ϕ.
For each finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ, we consider CnCΓ
′ =
⋂
{R ∈ C : Γ′ ⊆ R}. Since C is closed
under intersection, CnCΓ
′ ∈ C. The set {CnCΓ
′ : Γ′ finite and Γ′ ⊆ Γ} is obviously
upward-directed. By condition (iii), U =
⋃
{CnCΓ
′ : Γ′ finite and Γ′ ⊆ Γ} ∈ C. Since
Γ =
⋃
{Γ′ : Γ′ finite and Γ′ ⊆ Γ} ⊆ U , by cut condition, U ⊢C ϕ, i.e., ϕ ∈ U . Hence,
ϕ ∈ CnCΓ
′ for some finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ, i.e., Γ′ ⊢C ϕ. Thus finitary condition holds. Now, let
Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL. Suppose Γ ⊢C ϕ. By finitary condition, there exists a finite Γ
′ ⊆ Γ
such that Γ′ ⊢S ϕ, i.e, ϕ ∈ CnCΓ
′. Let e be substitution. Thus e(ϕ) ∈ e[CnC(Γ
′)]. Since
there are only finitely many variables in Γ′ ∪{ϕ}, there exists a surjective substitution
e′ such that e′(ψ) = e(ψ) for every ψ ∈ Γ′ ∪ {ϕ}. Thus e′(ϕ) ∈ e′[CnC(Γ
′)]. We
always have Γ′ ⊆ e′−1[e′[Γ′]]. Since e′[Γ′] ⊆ CnC(e
′[Γ′]), we have that e′−1[e′[Γ′]] ⊆
e′−1[CnC(e
′[Γ′])]. Thus Γ′ ⊆ e′−1[CnC(e
′[Γ′])]. By condition (ii′), e′−1[CnC(e
′[Γ′])] ∈ C.
Thus CnCΓ
′ ⊆ e′−1[CnC(e
′[Γ′])], which implies that e′[CnCΓ
′] ⊆ e′[e′−1[CnC(e
′[Γ′])]]. By
surjectivity of e′, e′[e′−1[CnC(e
′[Γ′])]] = CnC(e
′[Γ′]). Thus e′[CnCΓ
′] ⊆ CnC(e
′[Γ′]). Since
e′(ϕ) ∈ e′[CnC(Γ
′)], we have that e′(ϕ) ∈ CnC(e
′[Γ′]), i.e., e′[Γ′] ⊢C e
′(ϕ). As Γ′ ⊆ Γ,
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we have that e′[Γ′] ⊆ e′[Γ]. By cut condition, e′[Γ] ⊢C e
′(ϕ), i.e., e[Γ] ⊢C e(ϕ). Thus
structurality condition holds. We conclude that 〈L,⊢C〉 is a finitary logic. To show
that C = Th(S), we see the end of the proof of Theorem 2.2.1.
These two last theorems show that the consequence operator CnS, and hence also
the consequence relation ⊢S, can be defined in terms of the lattice Th(S). Therefore a
logic may be characterized by the properties of its set of theories, i.e, S = 〈L,Th(S)〉.
In the following lemma, we give some properties of Th(S) whenever S is a finitary
logic.
Lemma 2.2.3. [BP89, Lemma 1.1] Let S be a logic. The following conditions are
equivalent:
(i) ⊢S is finitary;
(ii) The compact elements of Th(S) coincide with the finitely generated S-theories;
(iii) ThS is closed under directed unions;
(iv) The lattice Th(S) is algebraic.
Another way of defining a finitary logic is by a set of axioms and a set of inference
rules in the so called Hilbert style. By an inference rule, we mean any pair 〈Γ, ϕ〉
(
also
denoted by
Γ
ϕ
)
where Γ is a finite set of formulas (the premises of the rule) and ϕ
is a single formula (the conclusion of the rule). An axiom, is an inference rule with
Γ = ∅, i.e., a pair 〈∅, ϕ〉, usually just denoted by ϕ. The rules of this type are called
Hilbert-style rules of inference, or H-rules for short.
Let AX be a set of axioms and IR a set of inference rules. We say that a formula
ϕ is directly derivable from a set Γ of formulas by the inference rule 〈∆, ψ〉 if there is
a substitution e such that e(ψ) = ϕ and e[∆] ⊆ Γ. An S-derivation of ϕ from Γ is a
finite sequence ϑ0, . . . , ϑn−1 of formulas such that ϑn−1 = ϕ and, for each i < n, ϑi is
either a member of Γ, a substitution instance of an axiom, or is directly derivable from
{ϑ0, . . . , ϑi−1}. An S-derivation from ∅ is called an S-proof. We can defined a relation
⊢AX,IR between set of formulas and individual formulas such that Γ ⊢AX,IR ϕ iff ϕ is
contained in the smallest set of formulas that includes Γ together with all substitution
instances of the axioms of S and is closed under direct derivability by the inference
rules of S. Clearly, Γ ⊢AX,IR ϕ iff there is an S-derivation of ϕ from Γ, and ⊢AX,IR ϕ
iff there is an S-proof of ϕ. It is not difficult to see that the relation ⊢AX,IR satisfies
reflexivity, cut, weakening, structurality and finitary conditions. Thus 〈L,⊢AX,IR〉 is
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a finitary logic, called the deductive system with the set of axioms AX and the set
of inference rules IR. Conversely, let S = 〈L,⊢S〉 be a finitary logic. By defining
AX := {ϕ : ∅ ⊢S ϕ} and IR := {〈Γ, ϕ〉 : Γ ⊢S ϕ and Γ is finite}, it is not difficult to
see that ⊢AX,IR and ⊢S coincide. The set of axioms and inference rules, 〈AX, IR〉, is
called an axiomatization (or a presentation) of S. Of course, a deductive system may
have several axiomatizations. If both the set of axioms and the set of inference rules
are finite then 〈AX, IR〉 is called a finite axiomatization.
A logic S is trivial if for all Γ 6= ∅, Γ ⊢S ϕ for every ϕ ∈ FmL. There are exactly
two trivial logics for each language L: one has the empty set of theorems, called almost
inconsistent logic, where ∅ and FmL are the only theories, and the other has every
formulas as theorems, called inconsistent logic, where FmL is the only theory. To any
logic we can associate several expansions, extensions, subsystems and fragments. By
an expansion of a logic S we mean any system S ′ = 〈L′,⊢S′〉 such that L ⊆ L
′ and
Γ ⊢S ϕ ⇒ Γ ⊢S′ ϕ for all Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL. An expansion is called an extension if
L = L′. In this case, S is called a subsystem of S ′. A deductive system S ′ is an
axiomatic extension of S if it is obtained by adjoining new axioms but leaving the
inference rules invariant. Let L′ be a sublanguage of L, and ⊢S′ the restriction of ⊢S
to L′ in the sense that, for all Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL′, Γ ⊢S′ ϕ iff Γ ⊢S ϕ. It is not difficult
to see that S ′ = 〈L′,⊢S′〉 is a logic over L
′. S ′ is called the L′-fragment of S and S is
called a conservative expansion of S ′.
2.3 Matrix with Leibniz and Suszko Operators
An L-matrix (or a logical matrix ) is a pair M = 〈A, D〉 where A is an L-algebra and
D is an arbitrary subset of A. The elements of D are called designated elements (or
designated values) of M. If D = A or A is a trivial algebra (that is, A has only one
element), then the matrix M is called trivial. If M is a matrix,
M
is the consequence
relation defined between a (possibly infinite) set Γ of formulas and individual formulas
ϕ, in the following way;
Γ
M
ϕ iff, for every homomorphism h : FmL → A, h[Γ] ⊆ D implies h(ϕ) ∈ D.
Furthermore, the consequence relation
M
satisfies reflexivity, cut, weakening and
structurality conditions. Thus 〈L,
M
〉 is a logic.
If M is a class of matrices,
M
is the consequence relation between a (possibly
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infinite) set Γ of formulas and a single formula ϕ defined as follows;
Γ
M
ϕ iff, for every M ∈M, Γ
M
ϕ.
A matrix M is called a matrix model of S (or an S-matrix for short) if, for all
Γ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL, Γ ⊢S ϕ implies Γ M ϕ. The class of all matrix models of a logic S is
denoted byMod(S). A subset D of A is called a deductive filter or an S-filter (simply
a filter when S is clear from context), if the matrix 〈A, D〉 is an S-matrix. Usually we
denote the S-filter of an S-matrix by the letters F , D and G. If S is a deductive system,
F is an S-filter iff F contains all interpretations of the logical axioms and is closed under
all inference rules of S. More precisely, for every homomorphism h : FmL → A, we
have h(ϕ) ∈ F for each axiom ϕ of S and h[Γ] ⊆ F implies h(ϕ) ∈ F for each inference
rule 〈Γ, ϕ〉 of S. Given an L-algebra A, the set of all S-filters of A, which is denoted
by FiS(A), is closed under arbitrary intersection. Thus it is a complete lattice, denoted
by FiS(A) = 〈FiS(A),
⋂
,
∨
〉, where
∨
i∈I
Fi =
⋂
{G ∈ FiS(A) :
⋃
i∈I
Fi ⊆ G}. Therefore,
given any subset X of A there is always the least S-filter of A that contains X; it
is called the S-filter of A generated by X which we denote by FiAS (X). If X is the
singleton {a}, we write FiAS (a) instead of Fi
A
S ({a}) and it is called principal filter. The
S-filters on the formula algebra are exactly the S-theories and the corresponding matrix
models 〈FmL, T 〉 are called formula matrix models or Lindenbaum matrix models of
S. The class of all Lindenbaum matrix models of a logic S is denoted by L(S). An
S-filter of an S-matrix M = 〈A, D〉 is an S-filter on the algebra A that includes D.
We denote by FiS(M) = {E : E ∈ FiS(A) and D ⊆ E} the set of all S-filters of M
which forms a complete sublattice of FiS(A).
A logic S over the language L is said to be complete relative to a class of S-matrices
M if for all Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL, Γ ⊢S ϕ⇔ Γ M ϕ; when this holds, we say that M is a
matrix semantics for S or that M is strongly adequate for S. The next theorem says
that every logic has a matrix semantics.
Theorem 2.3.1 (Completeness Theorem). Let S be a logic. The class of all matrix
models of S forms a matrix semantics for S. Furthermore, the class of all Lindenbaum
matrix models of S is also a matrix semantics for S.
Proof. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL and M ∈ Mod(S). By definition of matrix model of S,
Γ ⊢S ϕ⇒ Γ M ϕ.
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Conversely, assume Γ
Mod(S)
ϕ. Let T = CnS(Γ) ∈ Th(S). Thus M = 〈FmL, T 〉 ∈
Mod(S). Consider h = idFmL (the identity homomorphism on FmL), then h[Γ] = Γ ⊆
CnS(Γ) = T . Hence h(ϕ) = ϕ ∈ T . Since T = CnS(Γ), Γ ⊢S ϕ.
We may consider an L-matrix 〈A, D〉 as a structure over the first order language
without equality containing the operation connectives of L and one unary predicate. If
we consider the matrix model 〈A, D〉 as a first order structure, the unary predicate is
interpreted as D. It admits the intuitive interpretation “it is true that” and it is often
called the truth predicate (c.f. [BP89]).
Let A be an algebra and D ⊆ A. A (matrix ) congruence on a matrix M = 〈A, D〉
(also called strict congruence of the matrix M) is a congruence on A that is compatible
with D in the sense that, if, for all a, b ∈ A, a ∈ D and 〈a, b〉 ∈ θ then b ∈ D . For
any family (θi)i∈I of congruences on A compatible with D, we have that
∨
i∈I
θi is also
a congruence on A compatible with D (c.f. [BP92, Lemma 5.2]).
Definition 2.3.2. Let 〈A, D〉 be a matrix. Then there is the largest matrix congruence
(i.e., the largest congruence on A compatible with D) called the Leibniz congruence of
D on A and denoted by ΩAD.
Observe that the definition of Leibniz congruence is completely independent of any
logic; it is intrinsic to A and D. The Leibniz congruence is the largest congruence θ
of A such that for all a ∈ A we have either a/θ ⊆ D or a/θ ∩D = ∅. In other words,
the Leibniz congruence does not identify elements inside D with elements outside D.
In the following theorem, we give a characterization of the Leibniz congruence.
Theorem 2.3.3. Let 〈A, D〉 be a matrix. Then,
ΩAD = {(a, b) ∈ A
2 : ϕA(a, c0, . . . , ck−1) ∈ D iff ϕ
A(b, c0, . . . , ck−1) ∈ D,
for all ϕ(p, q0, . . . , qk−1) ∈ FmL, k < ω, and all c0, . . . , ck−1 ∈ A}.
This definition justifies the term “Leibniz congruence” for ΩAD since it formalizes
the Leibniz second order criterion of equality according to which two objects of a
domain are equal iff they share exactly the same properties expressed in the language
of the discourse. For the Leibniz congruence on the formula algebra FmL we simply
write Ω instead of ΩFmL .
The Leibniz operator on A is a function ΩA : P(A) → Co(A), which for any
D ⊆ A associates ΩAD, the largest congruence of A compatible with D. In [Her96],
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Herrmann considered only the Leibniz operator over the formula algebra FmL. For
any T ∈ Th(S), he called ΩT the relation of indiscernibility with respect to T given
by:
α ≡ β(ΩT ) iff for all ϕ ∈ FmL, p ∈ Var, ϕ(p/α) ∈ T ⇔ ϕ(p/β) ∈ T,
where ϕ(p/α) is the formula that results from ϕ replacing p by α.
There are some properties of the Leibniz operator that we need for our study.
Lemma 2.3.4. [BP92, Lemma 5.4] Let A and B be L-algebras, and h : A → B a
surjective homomorphism. Then, for every F ∈ FiS(B), ΩA(h
−1[F ]) = h−1[ΩBF ].
Let A be an algebra. We say that the Leibniz operator is monotone on FiS(A)
(also called compatibility property in [BP86, Definition 2.2] or order -preserving), if, for
all F,G ∈ FiS(A) such that F ⊆ G we have ΩAF ⊆ ΩAG. The Leibniz operator is
said to be commute with inverse substitutions on FiS(A), if, for all F ∈ FiS(A) and all
substitutions e, we have e−1[ΩAF ] = ΩA(e
−1[F ]). If the Leibniz operator Ω is monotone
and commutes with inverse substitutions on Th(S), then e[ΩT ] ⊆ Ω(CnS(e[T ])) for
all substitutions e and T ∈ Th(S). Indeed, let T ∈ Th(S) and e a substitution. Since
e[T ] ⊆ CnS(e[T ]), we have T ⊆ e
−1[CnS(e[T ])] and e
−1[CnS(e[T ])] ∈ Th(S). Hence, by
monotonicity of the Leibniz operator, ΩT ⊆ Ω(e−1[CnS(e[T ])]). Since Ω commutes with
inverse substitution, Ω(e−1[CnS(e[T ])]) = e
−1[Ω(CnS(e[T ]))] which gives that ΩT ⊆
e−1[Ω(CnS(e[T ]))]. Therefore, e[ΩT ] ⊆ Ω(CnS(e[T ])). We say that the Leibniz operator
is meet-continuous on FiS(A), if, for every family (Fi)i∈I of FiS(A), ΩA
(⋂
{Fi : i ∈
I}
)
=
⋂
{ΩAFi : i ∈ I}. And we say that it is continuous on FiS(A), if, for every
directed family (Fi)i∈I of FiS(A) such that
⋃
{Fi : i ∈ I} ∈ FiS(A), ΩA
(⋃
{Fi : i ∈
I}
)
=
⋃
{ΩAFi : i ∈ I}. The Leibniz operator is said to be injective on FiS(A), if, for
all F,G ∈ FiS(A), ΩAF = ΩAG implies F = G.
Lemma 2.3.5. [Raf06b, Lemma 5] If a logic S has no theorem then its Leibniz operator
is non-injective on FiS(A) for every algebra A.
There is another important operator, Ω˜A, called the Suszko operator of S which
maps each S-filter F of an algebra A to the intersection of the Leibniz congruences of
all S-filters containing F . The Suszko operator of S on A is a function with domain
FiS(A) that maps each S-filter F of A to the congruence on A compatible with D
(not necessary the largest) such that Ω˜AF :=
⋂
{ΩAG : F ⊆ G ∈ FiS(A)} which
is called the Suszko congruence. Note that Ω˜AF ⊆ ΩAF , for every S-filter F of an
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algebra A and it is not difficult to see that Ω˜A is always monotone on FiS(A) for every
algebra A. We can characterize the Suszko congruence by the following condition: for
all a, b ∈ A, 〈a, b〉 ∈ Ω˜AF iff for all ϕ(p, q0, . . . , qk−1) ∈ FmL and c0, . . . , ck−1 ∈ A,
FiAS (F ∪ {ϕ
A(a, c0, . . . , ck−1)}) = Fi
A
S (F ∪ {ϕ
A(b, c0, . . . , ck−1)}). Observe that the
Suszko congruence does not only depend on A and F but also on S through the
operator FiAS of S-filter generation on A. In the case of theories, the Suszko operator
is simply characterized in the following way: for all ϕ, ψ, α ∈ FmL and p ∈ Var(α),
ϕ ≡ ψ(Ω˜T ) iff T ∪ {α(p/ϕ)} ⊣⊢S T ∪ {α(p/ψ)}.
Given a matrix M = 〈A, D〉 and a matrix congruence θ of M, the quotient of M
by θ is the matrix 〈A/θ,D/θ〉, called the quotient matrix of M by θ, where A/θ
is the quotient algebra and D/θ is the set of equivalence classes of the elements in
D. There is only one matrix congruence on the quotient of a matrix by its Leibniz
congruence, which is the identity relation, denoted by △A (whereas ∇A denotes the
totally relation). A matrix 〈A, D〉 is said to be reduced (or Leibniz -reduced or simple)
if ΩAD = ∆A. To each matrix M = 〈A, D〉 corresponds 〈A/ΩAD,D/ΩAD〉 the
reduced matrix (also called the reduction of M), denoted by M/ΩM or M∗. We denote
by Mod∗(S) the class of all reduced matrix models of S and by L∗(S) the class of all
reduced Lindenbaum matrix models of S.
The class of algebras that is traditionally associated with a logic S is the class
of algebraic reducts (or algebraic Leibniz -reducts) of the reduced matrix models of S,
denoted by Alg∗(S), i.e.,
Alg∗(S) = {A : there exists F ∈ FiS(A) such that 〈A, F 〉 ∈Mod
∗(S)}.
The class of algebraic reducts of the matrices in L∗ is denoted by LAlg∗(S):
LAlg∗(S) = {FmL : there exists T ∈ Th(S) such that 〈FmL, T 〉 ∈ L
∗(S)}.
The elements of LAlg∗(S) are called the Lindenbaum algebras of S.
We have the corresponding notation for the Suszko operator. A matrix 〈A, D〉 is
said to be Suszko-reduced if Ω˜AD = ∆A. Thus to each matrix M = 〈A, D〉 corresponds
the Suszko-reduced matrix 〈A/Ω˜AD,D/Ω˜AD〉. Obviously, every Leibniz-reduced ma-
trix of S is Suszko-reduced, but the converse is false. We denote byMod∗Su(S), L
∗
Su(S),
Alg∗Su(S) and LAlg
∗
Su(S) the class of Suszko-reduced matrix models of S, the class of
Suszko-reduced Lindenbaum matrix models of S, the class of algebraic Suszko-reducts
21
of the Suszko-reduced matrix models of S and the class of algebraic Suszko-reducts of
the Suszko-reduced Lindenbaum matrix models of S, respectively. Actually, the class
of algebras that AAL canonically associates to a logic S is the class Alg∗Su(S). How-
ever, this class coincides with Alg∗(S) for the protoalgebraic logics which are defined
in the following chapter.
A submatrix of a matrix 〈A, D〉 is a matrix of the form 〈B, E〉, where B is a
subalgebra ofA and E = D∩B. The direct product of a family of matrices (〈Ai, Di〉)i∈I
is defined by 〈
∏
i∈I
Ai,
∏
i∈I
Di〉, where
∏
i∈I
Ai is the usual direct product of the family of
L-algebras (Ai)i∈I and
∏
i∈I
Di is the cartesian product of the family of sets (Di)i∈I .
A submatrix 〈A, D〉 of this direct product is called a subdirect product of the family
of matrices if A is a subdirect product of the family of algebras (Ai)i∈I , that is, if
πi[A] = Ai for each projection function πi : A ⊆
∏
i∈I
Ai → Ai.
Let F be a filter over I and (〈Ai, Di〉)i∈I a family of matrices. We define on the
direct product
∏
i∈I
Ai the binary relation θF by the condition: for all a, b ∈
∏
i∈I
Ai,
a ≡ b(θF ) iff {i ∈ I : a(i) = b(i)} ∈ F.
The relation θF is a congruence relation on the algebra
∏
i∈I
Ai. The quotient algebra
∏
i∈I
Ai/F is called a reduced product of the family of algebras (Ai)i∈I . The set
∏
i∈I
Di/F
of designated elements is defined as follows: for all a ∈
∏
i∈I
Ai,
a/F ∈ D/F iff {i ∈ I : a(i) ∈ Di} ∈ F.
We denote by 〈 〉F the class of the congruence θF . The reduced product of a family
of matrices (〈Ai, Di〉)i∈I is the matrix 〈
∏
i∈I
Ai/F,
∏
i∈I
Di/F 〉. If F consists on the set
I only, the reduced product is isomorphic with the direct product of the family of
matrices (〈Ai, Di〉)i∈I . We say that F is an ultrafilter over I, if F is a filter over I
such that for all X ∈ P(I), X ∈ F iff I \ X /∈ F . If F is an ultrafilter over I, then
〈
∏
i∈I
Ai/F,
∏
i∈I
Di/F 〉 is called an ultraproduct of the family of matrices (〈Ai, Di〉)i∈I .
2.4 Quasivariety
By an L-equation (or simply an equation), we mean a formal expression ϕ ≈ ψ, with
ϕ, ψ ∈ FmL. Sometimes it is useful to see an equation as a pair of formulas 〈ϕ, ψ〉.
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We denote by EqL the set of all L-equations. A quasi -equation is a formal expression
ξ0 ≈ η0 ∧ · · · ∧ ξn−1 ≈ ηn−1 → ϕ ≈ ψ with ξ0, . . . , ξn−1, η0, . . . , ηn−1, ϕ, ψ ∈ FmL.
Similarly, we can see quasi-equation as a pair 〈Γ, λ〉, where Γ is a finite set of equations
and λ is an equation. Equations can be seen as special case of quasi-equations.
Let ϕ ≈ ψ be an equation, Γ a set of equations and A an algebra. We write
Γ
A
ϕ ≈ ψ if, for every homomorphism h : FmL → A,
h(ξ) = h(η) for every ξ ≈ η ∈ Γ implies h(ϕ) = h(ψ).
If Γ = ∅, we write
A
ϕ ≈ ψ instead of ∅
A
ϕ ≈ ψ. An equation ϕ ≈ ψ is an identity
of A if
A
ϕ ≈ ψ. Similarly, a quasi-equation ξ0 ≈ η0 ∧ · · · ∧ ξn−1 ≈ ηn−1 → ϕ ≈ ψ is
a quasi -identity of A if {ξ0 ≈ η0, . . . , ξn−1 ≈ ηn−1} A ϕ ≈ ψ.
LetK be a class of L-algebras. The (semantic) equational consequence relation
K
determined by K is the relation between a set Γ of equations and a single equation
ϕ ≈ ψ, denoted by Γ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ and defined in the following way:
Γ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ iff, for every A ∈ K we have Γ
A
ϕ ≈ ψ.
In this case we say that ϕ ≈ ψ is a K-consequence of Γ. We write
K
ϕ ≈ ψ instead
of ∅
K
ϕ ≈ ψ. If Γ,Γ′ are sets of equations, then we write Γ
K
Γ′ for Γ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ
for all ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ Γ′, and Γ
K
Γ′ when Γ
K
Γ′ and Γ′
K
Γ hold. If K is the class
of the L-algebras that satisfy a given set of equations then it is called a variety and
if they satisfy a set of quasi-equations then it is called a quasivariety. A variety or a
quasivariety is trivial if it contains, up to isomorphism, only the one-element algebra.
Since the intersection of a class of varieties of type L is again a variety and the class
of all L-algebras forms a variety, we can conclude that for every class K of algebras
of a same type there is a smallest variety containing K, denoted by V(K) and called
the variety generated by K. If K has a single member A, we write simply V(A). A
variety V is finitely generated if V = V(K) for some finite set K of algebras. We can
defined the same notions for quasivariety. For example, there is a smallest quasivariety
containing K and denoted by Q(K).
We assume that the reader is familiar with notions of universal algebra, as homo-
morphism, isomorphism, direct product, etc. We introduce the following operators
mapping classes of algebras to classes of algebras (all of the same type):
A ∈ I(K) iff A is isomorphic to some member of K;
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A ∈ S(K) iff A is an isomorphic copy of subalgebra of some member of K;
A ∈ H(K) iff A is a homomorphic image of some member of K;
A ∈ P(K) iff A is an isomorphic copy of direct product of a nonempty family of
algebras in K;
A ∈ PS(K) iff A is an isomorphic copy of subdirect product of a nonempty family of
algebras in K;
A ∈ PR(K) iff A is an isomorphic copy of reduced product of a nonempty family of
algebras in K;
A ∈ PU(K) iff A is an isomorphic copy of ultraproduct of a nonempty family of
algebras in K.
A variety can be characterized as a nonempty class K of L-algebras which is closed
under homomorphic images, subalgebras and direct products.
Theorem 2.4.1. [BS81, Chatper II, Theorem 9.5] Let K be a class of algebras. Then,
V(K) = HSP(K)
Theorem 2.4.2. [BS81, Chapter V, Theorem 2.25] Let K be a class of algebras. Then
the following are equivalent:
(i) K can be axiomatized by quasi-identities;
(ii) K is a quasivariety;
(iii) K is closed under I,S,P and PU and contains a trivial algebra;
(iv) K is closed under ISPR and contains a trivial algebra;
(v) K is closed under ISPPU and contains a trivial algebra.
2.5 Equational Logic
The equational consequence relation
K
satisfies the following conditions:
ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ Γ⇒ Γ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ (Reflexivity)
Γ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ and Γ ⊆ ∆⇒ ∆
K
ϕ ≈ ψ (Cut)
Γ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ and ∆
K
ξ ≈ η for all ξ ≈ η ∈ Γ⇒ ∆
K
ϕ ≈ ψ (Weakening)
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Γ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ ⇒ e[Γ]
K
e(ϕ) ≈ e(ψ) for all substitution e (Structurality)
The relation
K
is called finitary if
Γ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ implies Γ′
K
ϕ ≈ ψ for some finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ.
The equational consequence relation
K
associated with a quasivariety K is an ex-
ample of a 2-deductive system. For more information about k-deductive systems (in a
general case), we point out to [BP92, Chapter 1], [CP99, Definition 2.1] and [CP04a,
Definition 1]. In this context, we deal with an equation ϕ ≈ ψ as a 2-formula 〈ϕ, ψ〉.
We denote by 〈L,
K
〉 the equational logic associated to K. All notions applicable
to deductive systems, which are 1-deductive systems, transfer naturally to 2-deductive
systems, and in particular to equational logic.
A set of equations Γ is called an equational theory of K
(
K
-theory or K-theory
for short
)
if Γ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ implies ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ Γ, i.e., if Γ is closed under K-consequence.
The set of allK-theories is denoted by Th(K). It is closed under arbitrary intersection.
It forms a complete lattice Th(K) = 〈Th(K),∩,∨〉 where the largest theory is the set
EqL and the smallest is the set of identities of K. Let Γ be a set of equations. We
denote by CnKΓ = {ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ EqL : Γ K ϕ ≈ ψ} the smallest K-theory containing Γ.
The notion of generators of a K-theory is defined in the obvious way. We note that the
theories of an equational logic are exactly the K-congruences on the formula algebra
FmL.
Lemma 2.5.1. Let K be a class of algebras. If K is closed under ultraproducts, then
K
is finitary.
Proof. Assume that
K
is closed under ultraproducts. Suppose
K
is not finitary.
Let Γ ∪ {ϕ ≈ ψ} ∈ EqL. Consider Γ K ϕ ≈ ψ. Thus for all finite set Γ
′ ⊆ Γ,
Γ′ 2K ϕ ≈ ψ. Let I be the set of all indices i such that Γi is a finite subset of Γ, i.e.,
I = {i : Γi is a finite subset of Γ}. Consider the set i
∗ := {j ∈ I : Γi ⊆ Γj}, for all
i ∈ I. It is not difficult to see that the family (i∗)i∈I have a finite intersection property,
in the sense that for all I ′ ⊆ I,
⋂
i∈I′
i∗ 6= ∅ (because the propositional language have
a countably infinite set of variables). Thus there exists a proper filter which contains
the family (i∗)i∈I . This proper filter can be extended to an ultrafilter, i.e., there exists
an ultrafilter U such that (i∗)i∈I ⊆ U . By hypothesis, we have that for each i ∈ I,
there exists an L-algebra Ai of K such that Γi 2Ai ϕ ≈ ψ. Thus, for each i ∈ I, there
exists a homomorphism hi : FmL → Ai such that hi(ξ) = hi(η), for all ξ ≈ η ∈ Γi and
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hi(ϕ) 6= hi(ψ). Let A =
∏
i∈I
Ai/U be the ultraproducts of the family (Ai)i∈I . Since K
is closed under ultraproducts, we have that A ∈ K. Let h := 〈hi : i ∈ I〉F : FmL → A.
For all ξ ≈ η ∈ Γ, if h(ξ) = h(η) then hi(ξ) = hi(η) for all i ∈ I. Which implies that
hi(ϕ) 6= hi(ψ) for all i ∈ I, i.e., h(ϕ) 6= h(ψ). Thus, A ∈ K and Γ 2A ϕ ≈ ψ. Hence
we have a contradiction with the hypothesis. Therefore
K
is finitary.
We can also show that if a logic S is finitary then the classMod(S) is closed under
ultraproducts.
In the following lemma, we give some properties of Th(K) whenever
K
is a finitary
equational logic.
Lemma 2.5.2. [BP89, Lemma 3.1] Let K be a class of algebras. Then the following
conditions are equivalent:
(i)
K
is finitary;
(ii)
K
coincides with
Q(K)
;
(iii) The compact elements of Th(K) coincide with the finitely generated K-
theories;
(iv) Th(K) is closed under directed unions;
(v) The lattice Th(K) is algebraic.
An equational logic
K
can be viewed in several ways. Indeed, it can be also
defined by the consequence operator CnK or by the theory lattice ThK.
If K is a quasivariety axiomatized by a set Γ of identities and quasi-identities, then
K
can be viewed as an equational consequence relation over the set of L-equations
defined by axioms and inference rules as follows: for axioms, we have,
p ≈ p
ϕ ≈ ψ, for every equation ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ Γ
And for inference rules,
p ≈ q
q ≈ p
p ≈ q, q ≈ r
p ≈ r
{pi ≈ qi : i < m}
f(p0, . . . , pm−1) ≈ f(q0, . . . , qm−1)
for every f ∈ L with arity m
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{ϕi ≈ ψi : i < n}
ϕ ≈ ψ
for every quasi-equation (ϕ0 ≈ ψ0 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn−1 ≈ ψn−1) → ϕ ≈
ψ ∈ Γ.
For each homomorphism h : FmL → A, the set of equations {ϕ ≈ ψ : h(ϕ) = h(ψ)}
is a congruence called the relation-kernel of h. The relation-kernel of the natural
mapping of FmL onto FmL/θ is θ itself. For any homomorphism h of FmL into
a member of K, the relation-kernel θ of h is a K-theory. More generally, for any
Γ ⊆ EqL, the K-theory CnKΓ generated by Γ can be characterized as the intersection
of the relation-kernels θ of all homomorphisms of FmL into members of K such that
h(ξ) = h(η) for all ξ ≈ η ∈ Γ. If K is a quasivariety then a set of equations Γ is a K-
theory iff θ = {(ϕ, ψ) : ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ Γ} is a K-congruence on FmL, i.e., θ is a congruence
on FmL and FmL/θ ∈ K. A matrix homomorphism (a strict homomorphism) from
M = 〈A, D〉 to N = 〈B, E〉 is an h ∈ Hom(A,B) such that D ⊆ h−1[E] (D = h−1[E]
respectively). We denote by Hom(M,N) the set of all matrix homomorphisms from
M to N, and by HomS(M,N) the set of all strict homomorphisms from M to N. The
kernel of a strict homomorphism from M to N is a matrix congruence on M, and every
matrix congruence θ of a matrix 〈A, D〉 can be obtained as the kernel of the projection
of 〈A, D〉 onto 〈A/θ,D/θ〉.
The class Mod(S) is closed under strict homomorphic pre-image, strict homomor-
phic image, submatrices and direct products (c.f. [Cze01, Corollary 0.3.10]). Moreover,
if S is finitary then Mod(S) is closed under reduced products (c.f. [Cze01, Corollary
0.3.10]). We say that a class of matrices is a matrix -quasivariety if it is closed under
submatrices, direct products and ultraproducts.
Chapter 3
Protoalgebraic Logics
In this chapter, we consider a wide class of logics called protoalgebraic logics. We
give some characterizations of this class using two operators, namely the Leibniz
and the Suszko operators. We show that a logic S is protoalgebraic iff it has an
k-parameterized system of equivalence formulas, or equivalently, if it has the param-
eterized local deduction-detachment theorem (PLDDT for short). We also study the
relationship between the structural properties of the class of reduced matrix models
and metalogical properties of protoalgebraic logics. As we have pointed out in the
introduction, we emphasize some results about finitary protoalgebraic logics. We give
examples to illustrate some results. For more details about protoalgebraic logics, we
suggest [BP86] and [Cze01, Chapter 1 and 2].
3.1 Definitions
Let S be a logic and T an S-theory. Two formulas α and β are said to be T -indiscernible
relative to S (or T -equivalent relative to S in [BP86]) if for every formula ϕ ∈ FmL
and every variable p occurring in ϕ, T ⊢S ϕ(p/α) iff T ⊢S ϕ(p/β), where ϕ(p/α) is the
formula that results from ϕ replacing the variable p by α. Equivalently, α and β are
T -indiscernible iff α and β are congruent modulo the Leibniz congruence ΩT on FmL.
We say that two formulas α and β are T -interderivable relative to S (or inferentially
equivalent in [Mal89]) if T, α ⊢S β and T, β ⊢S α where T, α ⊢S β means T ∪{α} ⊢S β.
The notion of protoalgebraic logic was defined by Blok and Pigozzi in [BP86, Definition
2.1].
28
Definition 3.1.1. A logic S is called protoalgebraic if, for every S-theory T , any two
formulas which are T -indiscernible relative to S are T -interderivable relative to S, i.e.,
for all T ∈ Th(S) and α, β ∈ FmL,
α ≡ β(ΩT ) implies T, α ⊢S β and T, β ⊢S α.
Moreover, if the reverse implication holds, the logic is called selfextensional.
Any conservative expansion of a protoalgebraic logic is also protoalgebraic ([BP86,
Theorem 2.11]).
A logic S is called non-pathological by Czelakowski (c.f. [Her96]) if there is a set
∆(p, q) of formulas in two variables p and q such that
⊢S ∆(p, p) (Reflexivity)
{p} ∪∆(p, q) ⊢S q (Modus Ponens)
The set ∆ is called a system of implication formulas or a protoequivalence system for
S.
The set Tpq := {ϕ(p, q, r1, . . . , rn) : ⊢S ϕ(p, p, r1, . . . , rn)} is a set of all formulas
ϕ(p, q, r1, . . . , rn) which become theorems of S after the identification of the variables
p and q in ϕ. We often use this set because if a logic is protoalgebraic then Tpq is a
protoequivalence system and also an k-parameterized system of equivalence formulas.
Lemma 3.1.2. Let S be a logic. Then,
(i) The set Tpq is closed under any substitution e such that (e(p))(q/p) = (e(q))(q/p).
(ii) p ≡ q(ΩTpq).
Proof. (i) Let ϕ ∈ Tpq and e a substitution such that (e(p))(q/p) = (e(q))(q/p). We
have that ⊢S ϕ(q/p). By structurality of S, ⊢S e(ϕ(q/p)). Note that e(ϕ(q/p)) =
(e(ϕ(q/p))(q/p). Thus ⊢S e(ϕ(q/p))(q/p). This prove that e(ϕ) ∈ Tpq.
(ii) Let ϕ ∈ FmL and r ∈ Var. We have that (ϕ(r/p))(q/p) = (ϕ(r/q))(q/p). Thus
⊢S (ϕ(r/p))(q/p) iff ⊢S (ϕ(r/q))(q/p), i.e., ϕ(r/p) ∈ Tpq iff ϕ(r/q) ∈ Tpq. Which
means that p ≡ q(ΩTpq).
Blok and Pigozzi proved that the protoalgebraic logics are exactly the non-pathological
ones.
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Theorem 3.1.3. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is protoalgebraic;
(ii) S is non-pathological.
Proof. Assume S is protoalgebraic. Let e be a substitution such that e(p) = p, e(q) = q
and e(ri) = p for all i ∈ I. Consider ∆(p, q) = e[Tpq]. Since (e(p))(q/p) = (e(q))(q/p),
by Lemma 3.1.2, ∆(p, q) ⊆ Tpq. Thus reflexivity condition holds. Again, by Lemma
3.1.2, p ≡ q(ΩTpq). Since S is protoalgebraic, we have that Tpq, p ⊢S q and Tpq, q ⊢S p.
Thus Tpq satisfies modus ponens condition. Obviously, ∆(p, q) also satisfies modus
ponens condition. We conclude that ∆(p, q) is a protoequivalence system for S.
Conversely, assume S is non-pathological. There exists ∆(p, q) a protoequivalence
system for S. Let α, β ∈ FmL and T ∈ Th(S). Suppose α ≡ β(ΩT ). Then ϕ(α, α) ≡
ϕ(α, β)(ΩT ) for every formula ϕ(p, q) ∈ ∆(p, q). By compatibility, ∆(α, α) ⊆ T iff
∆(α, β) ⊆ T . Since ∆(p, q) is reflexive, ⊢S ∆(α, α), which implies that ∆(α, α) ⊆ T .
Thus ∆(α, β) ⊆ T . Since ∆(α, β) ∪ {α} ⊆ T ∪ {α}, by modus ponens, T, α ⊢S β. In
an analogous way we have T, β ⊢S α.
Whenever a logic S has a binary connective → for which p → p is a theorem and
modus ponens is an inference rule, then S is protoalgebraic with ∆(p, q) = {p→ q} as
a protoequivalence system. The set ∆ may be empty and in this case the logic have
the rule p ⊢S q for all p, q ∈ FmL, i.e., S is inconsistent or almost inconsistent.
Moreover, if S is a finitary and protoalgebraic logic, then the protoequivalence
system ∆ can be taken to be finite. Indeed, since {p} ∪ ∆(p, q) ⊢S q, the finitariness
of S implies {p} ∪ ∆′(p, q) ⊢S q for some finite ∆
′ ⊆ ∆. Trivially, ⊢S ∆(p, p) implies
⊢S ∆
′(p, p). Thus ∆′ is also a protoequivalence system for S.
Example 3.2 (Orthologic [Mal89]). An algebra A = 〈A,∧,∨,¬〉 is called an ortholat-
tice if the reduct 〈A,∧,∨〉 is a lattice, 0 := x ∧ ¬x and 1 := x ∨ ¬x are distinguished
constant terms in A interpreted as the least and the greatest element of the lattice
〈A,∧,∨〉, and if A satisfies the identities ¬(x ∧ y) ≈ ¬x ∨ ¬y and ¬¬x ≈ x. We
denote by OL the class of all ortholattices. Each ortholattice A can be identified with
the matrix 〈A, {1}〉, where the unit element of the lattice is the only one designated
element.
Let SOL be the minimal orthologic defined in the language L = {∧,∨,¬} by the
structural consequence relation ⊢SOL determined by the class OL in the following way:
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for all Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL,
Γ ⊢SOL ϕ iff, for all A ∈ OL, Γ 〈A,{1}〉 ϕ.
Let p → q := ¬p ∨ q. Since p → p = ¬p ∨ p = 1, we have that ⊢SOL p → p.
By lattices properties, we also have p, p → q ⊢SOL q. Thus ∆(p, q) = {p → q} is a
protoequivalence system for S. By Theorem 3.1.3, SOL is protoalgebraic. ♦
3.3 Leibniz Operator
In this section, we give theorems that characterized the class of protoalgebraic logics
using the Leibniz operator defined in the Chapter 2 and other properties.
Theorem 3.3.1. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is protoalgebraic;
(ii) The Leibniz operator ΩA is monotone on FiS(A) for every algebra A;
(iii) The Leibniz operator Ω is monotone on Th(S).
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) Assume S is protoalgebraic. Let A be an L-algebra and E,F ∈
FiS(A). Suppose E ⊆ F . To prove that ΩAE ⊆ ΩAF , it suffices to show that ΩAE
is compatible with F . Let a, b ∈ A. Suppose a ∈ F and a ≡ b(ΩAE). Since S is
protoalgebraic, by Theorem 3.1.3, there exists a protoequivalence system ∆(p, q) for S.
Let δ(p, q) ∈ ∆. Then δ(a, a) ≡ δ(a, b)(ΩAE). By compatibility with E, ∆
A(a, a) ⊆ E
iff ∆A(a, b) ⊆ E. Since ∆(p, q) is reflexive, ∆A(a, a) ⊆ E. Hence, ∆A(a, b) ⊆ E. Since
a ∈ F and E ⊆ F , we have that {a} ∪∆A(a, b) ⊆ F . By Modus Ponens, we conclude
that b ∈ F , i.e., ΩAE ⊆ ΩAF .
(ii) ⇒ (iii) Assume the Leibniz operator ΩA is monotone on FiS(A), for every
algebra A. Since Th(S) ⊆ FiS(A), Ω is monotone on Th(S).
(iii)⇒ (i) Assume the Leibniz operator Ω is monotone on Th(S). Let T ∈ Th(S)
and α, β ∈ FmL. Suppose α ≡ β(ΩT ). Since T ⊆ T ∪ {α}, by monotonicity of Ω, we
have ΩT ⊆ Ω(CnS(T∪{α})). Thus α ≡ β(Ω(CnS(T∪{α}))). Since α ∈ CnS(T∪{α}),
by compatibility, β ∈ CnS(T ∪ {α}), i.e., T, α ⊢S β. In an analogous way, we obtain
T, β ⊢S α. Therefore S is protoalgebraic.
In the next theorem, we give another characterization of protoalgebraic logics using
again the Leibniz operator.
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Theorem 3.3.2. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is protoalgebraic;
(ii) The Leibniz operator ΩA is meet-continuous on FiS(A) for every algebra A;
(iii) The Leibniz operator Ω is meet-continuous on Th(S).
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) Assume S is protoalgebraic. Let A be an L-algebra. The inclusion
⋂
{ΩAFi : i ∈ I} ⊆ ΩA
(⋂
{Fi : i ∈ I}
)
always holds. Indeed, let a ≡ b
(⋂
{ΩAFi :
i ∈ I}
)
and a ∈
⋂
{Fi : i ∈ I}. Thus, for all i ∈ I, a ≡ b(ΩAFi) and a ∈ Fi. By
compatibility, for all i ∈ I, b ∈ Fi, i.e., b ∈
⋂
{Fi : i ∈ I}. Hence,
⋂
{ΩAFi : i ∈ I} ⊆
ΩA
(⋂
{Fi : i ∈ I}
)
. For the reverse inclusion, we have
⋂
{Fi : i ∈ I} ⊆ Fi for all
i ∈ I. Since S is protoalgebraic, by Theorem 3.3.1, ΩA is monotone on FiS(A). Thus,
ΩA
(⋂
{Fi : i ∈ I}
)
⊆ ΩAFi for all i ∈ I, i.e., ΩA
(⋂
{Fi : i ∈ I}
)
⊆
⋂
{ΩAFi : i ∈ I}.
We conclude that ΩA is meet-continuous on FiS(A).
(ii)⇒ (iii) It is obvious.
(iii) ⇒ (i) Let T1, T2 ∈ Th(S). Suppose T1 ⊆ T2. By assumption, Ω
(
T1 ∩ T2
)
=
ΩT1 ∩ ΩT2. Since T1 ∩ T2 = T1, we have ΩT1 = Ω
(
T1 ∩ T2
)
= ΩT1 ∩ ΩT2. Thus
ΩT1 ⊆ ΩT2. By Theorem 3.3.1, S is protoalgebraic.
A logic S has the correspondence property if, for every strict homomorphism h :
M → N between matrix models of S and every filter F ∈ FiS(M), we have F =
h−1[h[F ]]. We say that S has the compatibility property if, for every algebra A, any
θ ∈ CoA which is compatible with an S-filter F of A, is also compatible with every S-
filter that includes F . In the next theorem, we give a characterization of protoalgebraic
logics using these properties.
Theorem 3.3.3. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is protoalgebraic;
(ii) S has the compatibility property;
(iii) S has the correspondence property.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) Assume S is protoalgebraic. Let A be an S-algebra, F ∈ FiS(A)
and θ ∈ CoA which is compatible with F . Let G ∈ FiS(A) such that F ⊆ G, and
a, b ∈ A such that a ≡ b(θ) and a ∈ G. Since S is protoalgebraic, by Theorem 3.3.1,
θ ⊆ ΩAF ⊆ ΩAG. Thus a ≡ b(ΩAG) and by compatibility, b ∈ G. Therefore θ is
compatible with G.
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(ii) ⇒ (i) Let F,G ∈ FiS(A). Suppose F ⊆ G. Since ΩAF is compatible with F ,
by the compatibility property, ΩAF is also compatible with G. Thus ΩAF ⊆ ΩAG.
By Theorem 3.3.1, S is protoalgebraic.
(i) ⇒ (iii) Since S is protoalgebraic, by Theorem 3.1.3, there exists a protoequiv-
alence system ∆(p, q) for S. Let M = 〈A, D〉 and N = 〈B, E〉 be matrix models of
S, h a strict homomorphism of M into N and F ∈ FiS(M). We always have that
F ⊆ h−1[h[F ]]. For the reverse inclusion, assume a ∈ h−1h[F ], i.e, h(a) ∈ h[F ]. Then,
there exists c ∈ F such that h(a) = h(c). Since E ∈ FiS(B), ∆
B
(
h(c), h(a)
)
⊆ E. As
h is a homomorphism, h
(
∆A(c, a)
)
= ∆B
(
h(c), h(a)
)
. Thus h
(
∆A(c, a)
)
⊆ E. Since h
is strict, ∆A(c, a) ⊆ h−1[E] = D ⊆ F . So {c} ∪ ∆A(c, a) ⊆ F and by modus ponens
a ∈ F . We conclude that F = h−1h[F ].
(iii) ⇒ (i) Assume S has the correspondence property. Let T1, T2 ∈ Th(S). Sup-
pose T1 ⊆ T2. The canonical mapping h : FmL → FmL/ΩT1 is a strict homomorphism
from M := 〈FmL, T1〉 onto N := 〈FmL/ΩT1, T1/ΩT1〉. Since T2 ∈ FiS(M), by as-
sumption, T2 = h
−1[h[T2]]. Thus h is a strict homomorphism from 〈FmL, T2〉 onto
〈FmL/ΩT1, h[T2]〉 = 〈FmL/ΩT1, T2/ΩT1〉 which implies that ΩT1 is compatible with
T2. Thus ΩT1 ⊆ ΩT2. By Theorem 3.3.1, S is protoalgebraic.
3.4 Parameterized System of Equivalence Formulas
We say that E(p, q, r) = {ǫi(p, q, r) : i ∈ I} is an k-parameterized system of formulas
if it is a set of formulas of S built up from the variables p, q and possibly other variables
r = r1, r2, . . . called parameters with k the length of the string r. Note that E(p, q, r)
may be infinite; hence the length of the string r could be ω. In order to define the
notion of parameterized system of equivalence formulas, we need to introduce some
notations. Let ϕ, ψ ∈ FmL, we denote by E(〈ϕ, ψ〉) the set of all substitution instances
e(ǫi(p, q, r)) where i ranges over I and e over all substitutions such that e(p) = ϕ and
e(q) = ψ, i.e.,
E(〈ϕ, ψ〉) := {ǫi(p/ϕ, q/ψ, r/γ) : i ∈ I, γ ∈ (FmL)
k}.
We extend this notation to L-algebras. If A is an L-algebra and a, b ∈ A, we denote
by EA(〈a, b〉) the set of all elements of A of the form h(ǫi(p, q, r)) where i ranges over
I and h over all homomorphisms h : FmL → A such that h(p) = a and h(q) = b, i.e.,
EA(〈a, b〉) := {ǫAi (p/a, q/b, r/c) : i ∈ I, c ∈ A
k}
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where ǫAi := h(ǫi). If 〈A, D〉 is an S-matrix, then EA(D) is a binary relation on
A, called the (universally parameterized) analytical relation in 〈A, D〉 determined by
E(p, q, r), and is defined in the following way:
a ≡ b(EA(D)) iff E
A(〈a, b〉) ⊆ D.
In general, EA(D) need not be an equivalence relation on A.
Definition 3.4.1. Let S be a logic. A set E(p, q, r) is called an k-parameterized system
of equivalence formulas for S (an k-parameterized equivalence for S for short) if the
following conditions hold:
p-(R) ⊢S E(〈p, p〉) (Reflexivity)
p-(S) E(〈p, q〉) ⊢S E(〈q, p〉) (Symmetry)
p-(T) E(〈p, q〉) ∪ E(〈q, t〉) ⊢S E(〈p, t〉) (Transitivity)
p-(MP) E(〈p, q〉) ∪ {p} ⊢S q (Modus Ponens)
p-(RPsim) for each connective f of rank n ≥ 0 (Simple Replacement)
E(〈p1, q1〉) ∪ · · · ∪E(〈pn, qn〉) ⊢S E
(
〈f(p1, . . . , pn), f(q1, . . . , qn)〉
)
Symmetry and transitivity conditions are derivable from the remaining ones and
thus they are redundant (c.f. [Cze01, Corollary 1.2.5]).
A parameterized system of equivalence formulas for S may be empty. In this case
the logic have the rule p ⊢S q for all p, q ∈ FmL, i.e., S is inconsistent or almost
inconsistent.
Simple replacement condition can be substituted by single replacement condition,
that is, for each ϕ ∈ FmL,
E(〈p, q〉) ⊢S E
(
〈ϕ(p), ϕ(q)〉
)
.
Indeed, suppose that simple replacement condition holds. We prove by induction on
formulas. If ϕ is a constant, then single replacement condition holds. Let ϕ = f
(
ϕ1(p),
. . . , ϕn(p)
)
∈ FmL, where f is a connective of rank n. By hypothesis of induction, for
every i = 1 . . . n we have that E(〈p, q〉) ⊢S E
(
〈ϕi(p), ϕi(q)〉
)
. Since simple replacement
condition holds, by structurality condition, we have that E(〈ϕ1(p), ϕ1(q)〉)
⋃
· · ·
⋃
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E(〈ϕn(p), ϕn(q)〉) ⊢S E
(
〈f(ϕ1(p), . . . , ϕn(p)), f(ϕ1(q), . . . , ϕn(q))〉
)
. Thus by consid-
ering ϕ = f(ϕ1(p), . . . , ϕn(p)), we have that E(〈p, q〉) ⊢S E
(
〈ϕ(p), ϕ(q)〉
)
, i.e., single
replacement condition holds. Conversely, suppose that single replacement condition
holds. Let f be a connective of rank n and p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn ∈ Var. By hypothesi
E(〈p1, q1〉) ⊢S E(〈f(p1, . . . , pn), f(q1, p2, . . . , pn)〉) and E(〈p2, q2〉) ⊢S E(〈f(q1, p2, . . . ,
pn), f(q1, q2, p3, . . . , pn)〉). Since E(p, q, r) is transitive, we have that E(〈f(p1, . . . , pn),
f(q1, p2, . . . , pn〉)
⋃
E(〈f(q1, p2, . . . , pn), f(q1, q2, p3, . . . , pn)〉) ⊢S E(〈f(p1, . . . , pn),
f(q1, q2, p3, . . . , pn)〉). And by cut condition, E(〈p1, q1〉)
⋃
E(〈p2, q2〉) ⊢S E(〈f(p1, . . . ,
pn), f(q1, q2, p3, . . . , pn)〉). In a similar way, we can substitute the variables p3, . . . , pn
by q3, . . . , qn. Therefore we obtain simple replacement condition.
Theorem 3.4.2. Let S be a logic and E(p, q, r) an k-parameterized system of formulas.
The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) E(p, q, r) is an k-parameterized system of equivalence formulas for S;
(ii) EA(D) = ΩAD for all 〈A, D〉 ∈Mod(S);
(iii) EA(D) = △A for all 〈A, D〉 ∈Mod
∗(S).
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Suppose E(p, q, r) is an k-parameterized system of equivalence
formulas for S. Let M = 〈A, D〉 be an S-matrix. Reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity
and simple replacement conditions guarantee that the relation EA(D) is a congruence
relation on A and modus ponens condition guarantees that EA(D) is compatible with
D. Thus EA(D) ⊆ ΩAD. For the reverse inclusion, let a, b ∈ A. Assume a ≡ b(ΩAD).
Let ǫ(p, q, r) ∈ E(p, q, r) and c ∈ Ak. We have that ǫA(a, a, c) ≡ ǫA(a, b, c)(ΩAD). By
reflexivity condition, ǫA(a, a, c) ∈ D. Since ΩAD is compatible with D, ǫ
A(a, b, c) ∈ D,
i.e., EA(〈a, b〉) ⊆ D. Thus a ≡ b(EA(D)).
(ii)⇒ (i). Suppose that EA(D) = ΩAD for all 〈A, D〉 ∈Mod(S). Let ϕ, ψ ∈ FmL
and T ∈ Th(S). Since ϕ ≡ ϕ(ΩT ), we have that E(〈ϕ, ϕ〉) ⊆ T , i.e., reflexivity
condition holds. Now suppose E(〈ϕ, ψ〉) ⊆ T . Then ϕ ≡ ψ(ΩT ). Hence ψ ≡ ϕ(ΩT )
and consequently E(〈ψ, ϕ〉) ⊆ T . Since this holds for every T ∈ Th(S) and all ϕ, ψ ∈
FmL, symmetry condition holds. The transitivity and simple replacement conditions
can be shown in a similar way. Now, assume {ϕ} ∪ E(〈ϕ, ψ〉) ⊆ T . Then ϕ ≡ ψ(ΩT )
and ϕ ∈ T . Since ΩT is compatible with T , ψ ∈ T . Thus modus ponens condition
holds.
Therefore, E(p, q, r) is an k-parameterized system of equivalence formulas for S.
(ii)⇒ (iii). This is obvious.
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(iii) ⇒ (ii). Let M = 〈A, D〉 be an S-matrix and a, b ∈ A. We denote by [a]
the equivalence class of a relative to ΩAD. We have a ≡ b(ΩAD) iff [a] = [b] iff (by
assumption) EA/D(〈[a], [b]〉) ⊆ D/ΩAD iff E
A(〈a, b〉) ⊆ D iff a ≡ b(EA(D)). Thus
EA(D) = ΩAD for all 〈A, D〉 ∈Mod(S).
We say that a non-empty k-parameterized system E(p, q, r) defines the leibniz con-
gruences in a logic S if, for every 〈A, D〉 ∈Mod(S), ΩAF = {(a, b) ∈ A
2 : EA(〈a, b〉) ⊆
F}. We can reformulate Theorem 3.4.2 saying that E(p, q, r) is an k-parameterized
system of equivalence formulas for S iff E(p, q, r) defines the Leibniz congruences in S.
In the following theorem, we give a characterization of protoalgebraic logics as the
ones which have an k-parameterized system of equivalence formulas.
Theorem 3.4.3. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is protoalgebraic;
(ii) S has an k-parameterized system of equivalence formulas.
Proof. Let S be a protoalgebraic logic. We can represent Tpq as the k-parameterized
system T (p, q, r) with r the string of all variables distinct from p, q. Let δ(p, q, r1, . . . , rk)
∈ Tpq and γ1, . . . , γk a string of formulas. Consider the substitution e such that e(p) = p,
e(q) = q and e(r1) = γ1, . . . , e(rk) = γk. Since e satisfies the condition (e(p))(q/p) =
(e(q))(q/p), by Lemma 3.1.2, we have δ(p, q, γ1, . . . , γk) = e(δ(p, q, r1, . . . , rk)) ∈ Tpq.
Hence, T (p, q, γ) ⊆ T (p, q, r) for every string γ of length k of formulas of S. It is
not difficult to see that T (p, q, r) satisfies reflexivity condition. Now we verify single
replacement condition. Let δ(p, q, r1, . . . , rk) ∈ T (p, q, r) and e a substitution such that
e(p) = ϕ(p), e(q) = ϕ(q), where ϕ ∈ FmL, and e(r1) = γ1, . . . , e(rk) = γk. Since
(e(p))(q/p) = (e(q))(q/p), by Lemma 3.1.2, we obtain that δ(ϕ(p), ϕ(q), γ1, . . . , γk) =
e(δ(p, q, r1, . . . , rk)) ∈ Tpq, i.e., T (ϕ(p), ϕ(q), γ) ⊆ T (p, q, r) for any formula ϕ and any
string γ of formulas. Thus single replacement condition holds. Moreover, by Lemma
3.1.2, p ≡ q(ΩT (p, q, r)). We always have that CnS(T (p, q, r)) ⊆ CnS(T (p, q, r)∪ {p}).
Since S is protoalgebraic, by Theorem 3.3.1, the Leibniz operator is monotone on
Th(S). Thus, Ω(CnS(T (p, q, r))) ⊆ Ω(CnS(T (p, q, r) ∪ {p})). We deduce that p ≡
q(Ω(CnS(T (p, q, r) ∪ {p})). By compatibility, q ∈ CnS(T (p, q, r) ∪ {p}), i.e., modus
ponens condition holds. We conclude that the set T (p, q, r) is an k-parameterized
system of equivalence formulas for S.
Conversely, suppose that E(p, q, r) is an k-parameterized system of equivalence
formulas for S. It is not difficult to see that E(p, q, p, p, p, p, . . . ) (the set of formulas
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obtained by replacing every parameter by p) is a protoequivalence system for S. By
Theorem 3.1.3, S is protoalgebraic.
This proof is constructive in the sense that it produces an k-parameterized system
of equivalence formulas for any protoalgebraic logic, namely the set Tpq.
Suppose that E(p, q, r) and E ′(p, q, s) are respectively k and l-parameterized sys-
tems of equivalence formulas for a logic S. Then, E(p, q, r) and E ′(p, q, s) are inter-
derivable. Conversely, if E(p, q, r) and E ′(p, q, s) are respectively k and l-parameterized
systems of formulas, which are interderivable, then E(p, q, r) is an k-parameterized
system of equivalence formulas for S iff E ′(p, q, s) is also an l-parameterized system of
equivalence formulas for S.
In Chapter 2, we have defined the Suszko operator and seen that Ω˜T ⊆ ΩT for
every T ∈ Th(S). When the Suszko operator coincides with the Leibniz operator in a
logic S then S is protoalgebraic.
Theorem 3.4.4. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is protoalgebraic;
(ii) The Leibniz operator coincide with the Suszko operator on Th(S), i.e., Ω˜T =
ΩT for every T ∈ Th(S).
Proof. Assume S is protoalgebraic. By Theorem 3.4.3, there exists an k-parameterized
system of equivalence formulas E(p, q, r) for S. Let T ∈ Th(S) and α, β ∈ FmL. Sup-
pose α ≡ β(ΩT ). Then ϕ(p/α) ≡ ϕ(p/β)(ΩT ) for all ϕ ∈ FmL and p ∈ Var(ϕ). Thus
E
(
〈ϕ(p/α), ϕ(p/β)〉
)
⊆ T . By modus ponens condition, we have E
(
〈ϕ(p/α), ϕ(p/β)〉
)
∪{ϕ(p/α)} ⊢S ϕ(p/β). And by cut condition, T ∪ {ϕ(p/α)} ⊢S ϕ(p/β). Furthermore,
by symmetry condition, E
(
〈ϕ(p/β), ϕ(p/α)〉
)
⊆ T . And again by modus ponens, we
obtain T ∪ {ϕ(p/β)} ⊢S ϕ(p/α). Hence ΩT ⊆ Ω˜T . Since the reverse inclusion always
holds, we conclude that Ω˜T = ΩT for every T ∈ Th(S).
Conversely, assume Ω˜T = ΩT for every T ∈ Th(S). Let α, β ∈ FmL and T1, T2 ∈
Th(S). Suppose that T1 ⊆ T2 and α ≡ β(Ω˜T1). By definition of Suszko congruence we
have T1∪{ϕ(p/α)} ⊣⊢S T1∪{ϕ(p/β)} for all ϕ ∈ FmL and p ∈ Var(ϕ). Since T1 ⊆ T2,
we have T2 ∪ {ϕ(p/α)} ⊢S ϕ(p/β) and T2 ∪ {ϕ(p/β)} ⊢S ϕ(p/α) for all ϕ ∈ FmL and
p ∈ Var(ϕ). Thus α ≡ β(Ω˜T2). Therefore the Suszko operator is monotone on Th(S).
Since Ω˜T = ΩT for every T ∈ Th(S), the Leibniz operator is also monotone on Th(S).
By Theorem 3.3.1, S is protoalgebraic.
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3.5 Reduced Matrix Models
Herein, we study the relationship between the structural properties of the class of
reduced matrix models and metalogical properties of protoalgebraic logics.
Theorem 3.5.1. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is protoalgebraic;
(ii) The class Mod∗(S) is closed under subdirect products.
Proof. Assume S is protoalgebraic. By Theorem 3.4.3, there exists an k-parameterized
system E(p, q, r) of equivalence formulas for S. Let M = 〈A, D〉 be a subdirect products
of the family (Mi = 〈Ai, Di〉)i∈I of reduced matrix models of S and a, b ∈ A. Since the
class Mod(S) is closed under submatrices and direct products, it is also closed under
subdirect products. Thus M ∈ Mod(S). Suppose a ≡ b(ΩAD). By Theorem 3.4.2,
a ≡ b(EA(D)), i.e., E
A(〈a, b〉) ⊆ D. Then,
EAi(a(i), b(i), c(i)) ⊆ Di, for all i ∈ I and all c ∈ A
k.
Since the projection πi : A→ Ai is surjective, we have
EAi(a(i), b(i), d) ⊆ Di, for all i ∈ I and all string d ∈ A
k
i .
That is, a(i) ≡ b(i)(EAi(Di)), for all i ∈ I. Since each Mi is reduced, by Theorem
3.4.2, EAi(Di) = ∆Ai . Thus a(i) = b(i) for all i ∈ I. Hence a = b, which implies that
M is reduced. Therefore the class Mod∗(S) is closed under subdirect products.
Conversely, let A be an L-algebra and F,G ∈ FiS(A). Suppose F ⊆ G. Let
f : A → A/F and g : A → A/G be natural homomorphisms and Θ := ΩAF ∩ ΩAG.
Consider M := 〈A/Θ, F/Θ〉, M1 := 〈A/ΩAF, F/ΩAF 〉 and M2 := 〈A/ΩAG,G/ΩAG〉.
It is not difficult to see that M is isomorphic to a subdirect product of M1 and M2
(via the mapping h([a]Θ) := 〈f(a), g(a)〉, for every a ∈ A). The matrices M1 and M2
are reduced and hence members of Mod∗(S). Since by hypothesis Mod∗(S) is closed
under subdirect products, M is reduced as well. This means that Θ is the largest
congruence of A compatible with F , i.e., Θ = ΩAF . Therefore ΩAF ⊆ ΩAG. By
Theorem 3.3.1, S is protoalgebraic.
It follows from the above theorem that the class of reduced matrix models of a
protoalgebraic logic is closed under direct products.
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3.6 Parameterized Local Deduction - Detachment
Theorem
For the Classical Propositional LogicCPL, the Deduction-Detachment Theorem (DDT
for short) has been studied by many logicians. They have proved that for all Γ∪{α, β} ∈
FmL,
Γ ∪ {α} ⊢CPL β iff Γ ⊢CPL α→ β
where the binary connective → is the usual propositional implication. We can gen-
eralize this notion for logics that does not have an implication connective. It still
is possible to find a family of sets of formulas that play the same role of the bi-
nary connective →. This generalization of DDT has been called Parameterized Local
Deduction-Detachment Theorem (PLDDT for short). It was shown that a logic S has
this property iff it is protoalgebraic.
We illustrate this result giving an example, namely the BCK logic, that has the
Local Deduction-Detachment Theorem (LDDT for short), and consequently it is pro-
toalgebraic. We point out to [Cze01, Chapter 2], [CP04a] and [CP04b] for more details
about the relation between the various kinds of DDT and properties of protoalgebraic
logics.
Definition 3.6.1. A logic S has the Parameterized Local Deduction-Detachment The-
orem, PLDDT, with respect to a family of sets of formulas Φ, if, for all Γ ∪ {α, β} ⊆
FmL,
Γ ∪ {α} ⊢S β iff there exists V (p, q, r) ∈ Φ, and exists γ ∈ (FmL)
k, Γ ⊢S V (α, β, γ).
The implication from right to left in the above equivalence is called detachment
property, and the implication in the opposite direction is called the deduction property.
Moreover, if S is finitary then for each V ∈ Φ, we can choose a finite subset Vf ⊆ V
such that the family Φf = {Vf : Vf ⊆ V and V ∈ Φ} also determines PLDDT for S.
The only logics that have the PLDDT with respect to the family {∅} are the trivial
logics.
We say that a logic has the Local Deduction-Detachment Theorem if it has the
PLDDT with an empty set of parameters. More precisely, if there is a family of sets
of formulas Φ in two variables such that for all Γ ∪ {α, β} ⊆ FmL, Γ ∪ {α} ⊢S β iff
there exists V (p, q) ∈ Φ, Γ ⊢S V (α, β). And we say that a logic has the Deduction-
Detachment Theorem if it has the LDDT such that Φ is the family of a single set of
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finite formulas, i.e., if there is a finite set of formulas Φ := V (p, q) in two variables such
that for all Γ ∪ {α, β} ⊆ FmL, Γ ∪ {α} ⊢S β iff Γ ⊢S V (α, β). If the set Φ is unitary
then we say that the logic has the Uniterm Deduction-Detachment Theorem (UDDT for
short). The general case is simply referred as DDT orMultiterm Deduction-Detachment
Theorem (MDDT for short). For more information about these kinds of DDT, the
reader can see [CP04a] and [CP04b], where Czelakowski and Pigozzi described the
MDDT for k-deductive systems in general, and [Cze01, Chapter 2], where Czelakowski
examined in detail the properties of protoalgebraic logics for which the DDT holds.
Theorem 3.6.2. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is protoalgebraic;
(ii) S has the PLDDT with respect to the family Φ.
Proof. Assume S is protoalgebraic. If S is a logic without theorems then we consider
Φ := {∅}. Let S be a logic with Thm(S) 6= ∅ and p, q ∈ Var. Consider Φ = {T ∈
Th(S) : T ∪ {p} ⊢S q}. The family Φ is non-empty because the set {ϕ : q ⊢S ϕ} ∈ Φ.
Since Thm(S) is non-empty, p, q ∈ Var(T ) for every T ∈ Th(S). We show that Φ
determines PLDDT for S. Let Γ∪{α, β} ⊆ FmL. Suppose Γ∪{α} ⊢S β. There exists a
surjective substitution e such that e(p) = α and e(q) = β. Let T := e−1[CnS(Γ)], M :=
〈FmL, T 〉 and N := 〈FmL, CnS(Γ)〉. Since Th(S) is closed under inverse substitution,
T ∈ Th(S). It is not difficult to see that e is a strict homomorphism from M onto
N and CnS(T ∪ {p}) ∈ FiS(M). As S is protoalgebraic, by Theorem 3.3.3, S has
the correspondence property and hence CnS(T ∪ {p}) = e
−1[e[CnS(T ∪ {p})]]. By
surjectivity of e, e[T ] = e[e−1[CnS(Γ)]] = CnS(Γ). We have that CnS(Γ ∪ {α}) =
CnS(CnS(Γ) ∪ {α}) = CnS(e[T ] ∪ {e(p)}) = CnS(e[T ∪ {p}]) and it is not difficult
to prove that CnS(e[Γ ∪ {p}]) = e[CnS(T ∪ {p})]. Since CnS(Γ ∪ {α}) ∈ FiS(N),
e[CnS(T ∪{p})] ∈ FiS(N). Thus e is a strict homomorphism from 〈FmL,CnS(T ∪{p})〉
onto 〈FmL,CnS(Γ∪{α})〉. As e(q) = β ∈ CnS(Γ∪{α}), we have q ∈ CnS(T ∪{p}). So
T = T (p, q, r) ∈ Φ. Furthermore T (α, β, e(r)) = e[T ] = CnS(Γ). Consider V := T , we
have that V ∪{α} ⊢S β implies Γ ⊢S V (α, β, γ) for some string of formulas γ ∈ (FmL)
k.
The reverse implication is obvious by the definition of the family Φ. Therefore S has
the PLDDT with respect to the family Φ.
Conversely, assume that some family Φ determines PLDDT for a logic S. Thus the
sets in Φ have the detachment property, i.e., V ∪ {p} ⊢S q for all V ∈ Φ. Since p ⊢S p,
by PLDDT, there exists a set V (p, q, r) ∈ Φ and a string γ of formulas of S such that
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∅ ⊢S V (p, p, γ). Let e be a substitution such that e(p) = p, e(q) = q, e(r) = p and
e(γ) = p. Consider ∆(p, q) := e[V (p, q, r)]. Since V (p, q, r)∪{p} ⊢S q, by structurality
of S, we have V (p, q, p) ∪ {p} ⊢S q, i.e., ∆(p, q) ∪ {p} ⊢S q modus ponens condition
holds. Moreover, since ⊢S V (p, p, γ), we have ⊢S ∆(p, p), i.e., reflexivity condition
holds. Hence the set ∆(p, q) is a protoequivalence system for S. By Theorem 3.1.3, S
is protoalgebraic.
In the following example, we show that the logic BCK is protoalgebraic since the
LDDT holds.
Example 3.7 (BCK Logic [Cze01]). Let BCK the deductive system defined in the
language L = {→}, where → is a binary connective, by the following axioms:
(p→ q)→ ((q → r)→ (p→ r)) (B)
(p→ (q → r))→ (q → (p→ r)) (C)
p→ (q → p) (K)
and the only inference rule,
p, p→ q
q
(Modus Ponens)
Let Φ := ({p→n q})n∈N, where p→0 q := q, and p→n+1 q := p→ (p→n q) for all
n ∈ N. The (one-element) sets of Φ do not involve parametric variables. We have that
BCK has the LDDT with respect to the family Φ, i.e., for any Γ ∪ {ϕ, ψ} ⊆ FmL,
Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢BCK ψ iff, Γ ⊢BCK ϕ→n ψ for some n ∈ N.
Indeed, suppose that Γ∪{ϕ} ⊢BCK ψ. We show by induction on the length of the proof
of ψ from Γ ∪ {ϕ}. If ψ is an axiom or ψ = ϕ then Γ ⊢BCK ψ → (ϕ→ ψ) since axiom
(K) holds. By modus ponens, we have Γ∪{ψ} ⊢BCK ϕ→ ψ, i.e., detachment property
holds for n = 1. If ψ belongs to Γ ∪ {ϕ} then Γ ⊢BCK ψ, i.e., detachment property
holds for n = 0. If ψ is obtained by modus ponens then there exists a formula ξ such
that applying modus ponens to ξ and ξ → ψ we have ψ. By inductive hypothesis, there
exist i ∈ N such that Γ ⊢BCK ϕ→i ξ and j ∈ N such that Γ ⊢BCK ϕ→j (ξ → ψ). By
induction on i+ j, we can show that
⊢BCK (p→i q)→ ((p→j (q → r))→ (p→i+j r))
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Thus, Γ ⊢BCK (ϕ →i ξ) → ((ϕ →j (ξ → ψ)) → (ϕ →i+j ψ)). Since Γ ⊢BCK ϕ →i ξ,
by modus ponens, we obtain Γ ⊢BCK (ϕ →j (ξ → ψ)) → (ϕ →i+j ψ). And since
Γ ⊢BCK ϕ →j (ξ → ψ), by modus ponens, Γ ⊢BCK ϕ →i+j ψ. Thus, detachment
property holds for n = i+ j.
Conversely, if Γ ⊢BCK ϕ→n ψ for some n ∈ N, applying modus ponens n times we
have that Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢BCK ψ.
Therefore BCK has the LDDT with respect to the family Φ. By Theorem 3.6.2,
BCK is protoalgebraic. ♦
3.8 Finitary and Protoalgebraic Logics
In this section we only present some results of finitary protoalgebraic logics without
their proofs.
Theorem 3.8.1. [Cze01, Theorem 1.4.1] Let S be a finitary and protoalgebraic logic.
Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) The class Mod∗(S) is closed under ultraproducts;
(ii) Every k-parameterized system of equivalence formulas for S contains a finite
k-parameterized system of equivalence formulas for S;
(iii) There exists a finite k-parameterized system of equivalence formulas for S.
The class Mod∗(S) need not be closed under ultraproducts for a finitary and pro-
toalgebraic logic S. Indeed, let S be a deductive system defined as the expansion of the
Intuitionistic Propositional Logic IPL, by adjoining the unary connective 2 and two
axioms 2⊤ and 2(p→ q)→ (2p→ 2q). The only inference rule is modus ponens. It
is not difficult to see that the set ∆(p, q) = {p → q} is a protoequivalence system for
S. By Theorem 3.1.3, S is protoalgebraic. However, the class Mod∗(S) is not closed
under ultraproducts (c.f. [BP92]).
In this chapter, we have seen some theorems in which properties of the Leibniz
operator defined on Th(S) can be transfer on FiS(A) for every algebra A. Indeed,
in Theorem 3.3.1, the fact that the Leibniz operator is monotone on Th(S) transfer
on FiS(A) for every algebra A. The same happens for the property of being meet-
continuous in Theorem 3.3.2 . Furthermore, in Chapters 4 and 5, we will see others
properties on Th(S) of the Leibniz operator that can be transfer on FiS(A) for every
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algebra A. This phenomena can be formalized as a so called transfer principle which
is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.8.2. [Cze01, Theorem 1.7.1] Let S be a finitary and protoalgebraic logic.
A property expressible by a universal formula of elementary lattice theory holds in ThS
iff it holds in FiSA for every algebra A.
A class M of matrix models of a logic S is said to have the S-filter extension
property (FEP for short) if for all M = 〈A, D〉 ∈ M, every S-filter F on an arbitrary
submatrix N = 〈B, G〉 of M can be extend to an S-filter on M, i.e., if F ∈ FiS(N)
then there exists an S-filter E ∈ FiS(M) such that E ∩ B = F . For a finitary and
protoalgebraic logic S, the class Mod(S) has the FEP iff the class Mod∗(S) also has
the FEP iff S has the LDDT (c.f. [Cze01, Theorem 2.3.5]).
Chapter 4
Equivalential Logics
Equivalential logics have been introduced by Prucnal and Wron´ski in [PW74] and ex-
tensively studied by Czelakowski in [Cze81], [Cze01, Chapter 3] and [Cze04]. In this
chapter we define equivalential and finitely equivalential logics, and we give some char-
acterizations using the Leibniz operator. We also study the relationship between the
structural properties of the class of reduced matrix models and metalogical properties
of equivalential logics. Moreover, as we did for protoalgebraic logics we focus on the
finitary logics. We conclude, this chapter, by discussing some examples of logics which
show that the class of finitely equivalential logic is a proper subclass of equivalential
logics and the latter is a proper subclass of protoalgebraic logics.
4.1 Definitions and Characterizations
Equivalential logics are logics which have a system of equivalence formulas without
parameters. Thus, they constitute a subclass of protoalgebraic logics.
Definition 4.1.1. Let S be a logic. A set E(p, q) of formulas of S built-up in two
variables p and q is called a system of equivalence formulas for S (an equivalence for
S for short) if the following conditions are satisfied:
(R) ⊢S E(p, p) (Reflexivity)
(S) E(p, q) ⊢S E(q, p) (Symmetry)
(T) E(p, q) ∪ E(q, r) ⊢S E(p, r) (Transitivity)
(MP) E(p, q) ∪ {p} ⊢S q (Modus Ponens)
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(RPsim) for each connective f of rank n ≥ 0 (Simple Replacement)
E(p1, q1) ∪ · · · ∪E(pn, qn) ⊢S E(f(p1, . . . , pn), f(q1, . . . , qn))
This definition of system of equivalence formulas is the original definition due to
Prucnal and Wron´ski (c.f. [PW74]). However, Wo´jcicki has pointed out that symmetry
and transitivity conditions are derivable from the remaining ones and thus redundant
(c.f. [Wo´j88, Lemma 3.4.3] and [Cze01, Corollary 3.1.4]). Therefore, when we need
to prove that a set E(p, q) is a system of equivalence formulas for S, it is enough to
verify reflexivity, modus ponens and simple replacement conditions. Moreover, we can
substitute simple replacement condition by single replacement condition that is, for
each ϕ ∈ FmL,
E(p, q) ⊢S E
(
ϕ(p), ϕ(q)
)
.
Definition 4.1.2. A logic S is called equivalential (finitely equivalential) if it has a
system (a finite system, respectively) of equivalence formulas.
Every equivalential logic S is protoalgebraic, since any system of equivalence for-
mulas for S is a free parameterized system of equivalence formulas for S. Furthermore,
the system of equivalence formulas E(p, q) may be empty. Indeed, it is not difficult to
see that a logic S has the empty system of equivalence formulas iff S is trivial, i.e., S
is inconsistent or almost inconsistent.
Any extension of (finitely) equivalential logic is also (finitely) equivalential with the
same system of equivalence formulas.
If a logic S is equivalential and E(p, q) is a system of equivalence formulas for S,
then, by Theorem 3.4.2, the Leibniz congruence ΩT for any theory T ∈ Th(S) has a
simple characterization in terms of E(p, q) that is, for any ϕ, ψ ∈ FmL,
ϕ ≡ ψ(ΩT ) iff E(ϕ, ψ) ⊆ T.
If we have two systems of equivalence formulas E(p, q) and E ′(p, q) for an equiv-
alential logic S, then E(p, q) and E ′(p, q) are interderivable relative to S; moreover, if
two sets E(p, q) and E ′(p, q) are interderivable relative to S then, E(p, q) is a system of
equivalence formulas for S iff E ′(p, q) is a system of equivalence formulas for S. Indeed,
since E(p, q) ⊆ CnS(E(p, q)), we have p ≡ q
(
Ω(CnS(E(p, q)))
)
. Let ϕ ∈ E ′(p, q).
Thus ϕ(p, p) ≡ ϕ(p, q)
(
Ω(CnS(E(p, q)))
)
. By compatibility, ϕ(p, p) ∈ CnS(E(p, q))
iff ϕ(p, q) ∈ CnS(E(p, q)). Since ⊢S E(p, p), we have that ϕ(p, q) ∈ CnS(E(p, q)).
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Thus E(p, q) ⊢S E
′(p, q). Analogously, we can show that E ′(p, q) ⊢S E(p, q). Con-
versely, suppose that E(p, q) and E ′(p, q) are sets which are interderivable relative
to a logic S and E(p, q) is a system of equivalence formulas for S. Since E ′(p, p) ⊆
CnS(E
′(p, p)) = CnS(E(p, p)), we have ⊢S E
′(p, p), i.e., reflexivity condition holds. As
E ′(p, q) ⊆ CnS(E
′(p, q)) = CnS(E(p, q)) and E(p, q) ⊆ CnS(E(q, p)) = CnS(E
′(q, p)),
we have E ′(p, q) ⊆ CnS(E
′(q, p)), i.e., symmetry condition is satisfied. In an analogous
way, we show for the remaining conditions.
In the following theorem, we give some conditions that a set E(p, q) must satisfied
in order for a protoalgebraic logic to become equivalential.
Theorem 4.1.3 (Herrmann′s Test). Let S be a protoalgebraic logic. The following
conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is equivalential;
(ii) There exists some set E(p, q) that satisfies the following conditions:
⊢S E(p, p) and p ≡ q
(
Ω
(
CnS(E(p, q))
))
Proof. Assume S is equivalential. Then there exists a system of equivalence formulas
E(p, q) for S. By reflexivity, we have ⊢S E(p, p). Since E(p, q) ⊆ CnS(E(p, q)).
By the characterization of the Leibniz congruence in terms of E(p, q), we have p ≡
q
(
Ω
(
CnS(E(p, q))
))
.
Conversely, assume that there is some set E(p, q) such that ⊢S E(p, p) and p ≡
q
(
Ω
(
CnS
(
E(p, q))
))
. Since ⊢S E(p, p), reflexivity condition holds. We always have
E(p, q) ⊆ E(p, q)∪{p}. As S is protoalgebraic, by Theorem 3.3.1, Ω
(
CnS
(
E(p, q)
))
⊆
Ω
(
CnS
(
E(p, q) ∪ {p}
))
. Thus p ≡ q
(
Ω(CnS(E(p, q) ∪ {p}))
)
, i.e., modus ponens
condition holds. In order to show that single replacement condition is satisfied, we
claim that CnS(Tpq ∩ FmL({p, q})) = CnS(E(p, q)). By reflexivity of E(p, q), we have
E(p, q) ⊆ Tpq ∩ FmL({p, q}). Thus CnS(E(p, q)) ⊆ CnS(Tpq ∩ FmL({p, q})). For the
reverse inclusion, let ϕ ∈ Tpq ∩ FmL({p, q}). Since p ≡ q
(
Ω
(
CnS( E(p, q))
))
, we
have ϕ(p, p) ≡ ϕ(p, q)
(
Ω
(
CnS(E(p, q))
))
. By compatibility, ϕ(p, p) ∈ CnS(E(p, q))
iff ϕ(p, q) ∈ CnS(E(p, q)). By reflexivity, ϕ(p, p) ∈ CnS(E(p, q)). Thus ϕ(p, q) ∈
CnS(E(p, q)). Now, let ϕ ∈ FmL and e a substitution such that e(p) = ϕ(p) and
e(q) = ϕ(q). Since (e(p))(q/p) = (e(q))(q/p), by Lemma 3.1.2, E(ϕ(p), ϕ(q)) =
E(e(p), e(q)) = e(E(p, q)) ⊆ Tpq ∩ FmL({p, q}). Thus, E(ϕ(p), ϕ(q)) ⊆ CnS(Tpq ∩
FmL({p, q})) = CnS(E(p, q)), i.e., E(p, q) ⊢S E(ϕ(p), ϕ(q)). We conclude that E(p, q)
is a system of equivalence formulas for S. Therefore S is equivalential.
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With this proof, it is not difficult to show the following result.
Corollary 4.1.4. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is equivalential;
(ii) Tpq ∩ FmL({p, q}) is a system of equivalence formulas for S.
Proof. Suppose that S is equivalential. Thus S is protoalgebraic. By Theorem 4.1.3,
there exists a set E(p, q) such that ⊢S E(p, p) and p ≡ q
(
Ω
(
CnS(E(p, q))
))
. In the
second part of the proof of Theorem 4.1.3, we show that CnS(E(p, q)) = CnS(Tpq ∩
FmL({p, q})) and that E(p, q) is a system of equivalence formulas for S. Therefore
Tpq ∩ FmL({p, q}) is a system of equivalence formulas for S.
The converse is obvious.
The following theorems give characterizations of equivalential and finitely equiv-
alential logics using the Leibniz operator.
Theorem 4.1.5. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is equivalential;
(ii) The Leibniz operator Ω is monotone and commutes with inverse substitutions
on Th(S).
Proof. Assume S is equivalential. Thus S is protoalgebraic and by Theorem 3.3.1, the
Leibniz operator Ω is monotone on Th(S). On the other hand, since S is equivalen-
tial, there exists a system of equivalence formulas E(p, q) for S. Let T ∈ Th(S) and
e a substitution. As Th(S) is closed under inverse substitutions, e−1[T ] ∈ Th(S).
Let ϕ, ψ ∈ FmL. Suppose that ϕ ≡ ψ(e
−1[ΩT ]). Thus e(ϕ) ≡ e(ψ)(ΩT ), i.e.,
E(e(ϕ), e(ψ)) ⊆ T . Since E(e(ϕ), e(ψ)) = e[E(ϕ, ψ)], we have that e[E(ϕ, ψ)] ⊆ T ,
i.e., E(ϕ, ψ) ⊆ e−1[T ]. Therefore ϕ ≡ ψ(Ωe−1[T ]).
Conversely, assume the Leibniz operator is monotone and commutes with inverse
substitutions on Th(S). Let e be a substitution such that e(p) = p, e(q) = q and
e(r) = p for the remaining variables r. Consider E(p, q) = e[Tpq]. By Lemma 3.1.2,
Tpq is closed with respect to e, i.e, E(p, q) ⊆ Tpq which means that ⊢S E(p, p). Again
by Lemma 3.1.2, p ≡ q(Ω(Tpq)). Thus e(p) ≡ e(q)(e[Ω(Tpq)]), i.e., p ≡ q(e[Ω(Tpq)]).
By hypothesis, e[Ω(Tpq)] ⊆ Ω(CnS(e[Tpq])). Thus p ≡ q(Ω(CnS(e[Tpq]))), i.e., p ≡
q
(
Ω(CnS(E(p, q)))
)
. By Theorem 4.1.3, S is equivalential.
Theorem 4.1.6. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
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(i) S is finitely equivalential;
(ii) ΩA is continuous on FiS(A) for every algebra A;
(iii) Ω is continuous on Th(S).
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Assume S is finitely equivalential. Let E(p, q) be a finite system of
equivalence formulas for S, A an L-algebra and (Di)i∈I an upward directed family of
FiS(A) such that
⋃
{Di : i ∈ I} ∈ FiS(A). We have, Di ⊆
⋃
{Di : i ∈ I} for all i ∈ I.
Since S is also protoalgebraic, by Theorem 3.3.1, ΩA(Di) ⊆ ΩA
(⋃
{Di : i ∈ I}
)
, for
all i ∈ I. Hence,
⋃
{ΩA(Di) : i ∈ I} ⊆ ΩA
(⋃
{Di : i ∈ I}
)
. For the reverse inclusion,
suppose that a ≡ b
(
ΩA
(⋃
{Di : i ∈ I}
))
, i.e., EA(a, b) ⊆
⋃
{Di : i ∈ I}. Since (Di)i∈I
is upward directed and E(p, q) is finite, there exists an i ∈ I such that EA(a, b) ⊆ Di.
Thus, a ≡ b(ΩA(Di)) and therefore ΩA
(⋃
{Di : i ∈ I}
)
⊆
⋃
{ΩA(Di) : i ∈ I}.
(ii)⇒ (iii). This is obvious.
(iii)⇒ (i). Assume Ω is continuous on Th(S). First, we show that Ω is monotone
on Th(S) and the theory Tpq is finitely axiomatizable. Let T1, T2 ∈ Th(S). Suppose
that T1 ⊆ T2. The family (T1, T2) is upward directed and T1 ∪ T2 = T2 ∈ Th(S). By
hypothesis, ΩT2 = Ω(T1 ∪ T2) = ΩT1 ∪ ΩT2. Thus ΩT1 ⊆ ΩT2. By Theorem 3.3.1,
S is protoalgebraic. Now, let (Ti)i∈I be the family of all finitely axiomatizable closed
subtheories of Tpq. Thus each Ti is of the form Ti = CnS(Xi) with Xi a finite subset
of Tpq. The family (Ti)i∈I is upward directed and Tpq =
⋃
{Ti : i ∈ I}. By Lemma
3.1.2, p ≡ q(Ω(Tpq)). Since the Leibniz operator is continuous, p ≡ q(Ω(Ti)) for some
i ∈ I. We have seen that Tpq is an k-parameterized system of equivalence formulas for
S. Thus, Tpq(p, q, δ) ⊆ Ti for every string δ of formulas. In particular, Tpq ⊆ Ti. Hence,
Tpq = Ti = CnS(Xi) with Xi finite, i.e., Tpq is finitely axiomatizable.
In order to proved that S is finitely equivalential, we show that Tpq = CnS(E(p, q))
for some finite set E(p, q) of formulas. We fix an infinite set V = {u1, u2, . . . } of vari-
ables disjoint from the variables in V ar(Xi) ∪ {p, q} and we consider a substitution e
such that e(p) = p, e(q) = q, e(r) = p for every variable r ∈ V ar(Xi) \ {p, q} and
e(u) = u for every u ∈ V . Let E(p, q) = e(Xi). By Lemma 3.1.2, we have e(Tpq) =
CnS(e(Xi)) = CnS(E(p, q)) ⊆ Tpq. For the reverse inclusion, let ϕ(p, q, r1, . . . , rn) ∈ Tpq
where all the variables of ϕ are displayed. If we substitute in ϕ all the variables
r1, . . . , rn by arbitrary formulas, we obtain a formula which belongs to Tpq. In par-
ticular, ϕ(p, q, u1, . . . , un) ∈ Tpq, i.e., ϕ(p, q, u1, . . . , un) ∈ CnS(Xi). Hence by struc-
turality, ϕ(p, q, u1, . . . , un) = ϕ(e(p), e(q), e(u1), . . . , e(un)) = e(ϕ(p, q, u1, . . . , un)) ∈
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CnS(e(Xi)) = CnS(E(p, q)). Replacing the variables u1, . . . , un by r1, . . . , rn, we have
ϕ(p, q, r1, . . . , rn) ∈ CnS(E(p, q)). We conclude that Tpq = CnS(E(p, q)). Now, we
prove that E(p, q) is a finite system of equivalence formulas for S. Since E(p, q) ⊆ Tpq,
reflexivity condition holds. As Tpq is an k-parameterized system of equivalence for-
mulas for S, modus ponens condition holds. Thus, E(p, q) satisfies modus ponens
condition. To prove single replacement condition, we can use the same argument as in
proof of Theorem 4.1.3. Hence E(p, q) is a finite system of equivalence formulas for S.
Therefore S is finitely equivalential.
In the following theorem, we characterize equivalential logics by closure properties
of the class Mod∗(S).
Theorem 4.1.7. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is equivalential;
(ii) The class Mod∗(S) is closed under submatrices and direct products.
Proof. Let S be an equivalential logic. Thus S is protoalgebraic and, by Theorem
3.5.1, Mod∗(S) is closed under subdirect products. Then it is also closed under direct
products. Let N = 〈B, E〉 be a submatrix of a matrix M = 〈A, D〉 ∈ Mod∗(S).
Since Mod(S) is closed under submatrix, N ∈ Mod(S). As S is equivalential, there
exists E(p, q) a system of equivalence formulas for S. Let a, b ∈ B. We prove by
contraposition that if a ≡ b(ΩBE) then a ≡ b(ΩAD). Suppose that (a, b) /∈ ΩAD, i.e.,
EA(a, b) * D. Since EB(a, b) ⊆ EA(a, b), EB(a, b) * D. Thus EB(a, b) * D ∩ B,
i.e., (a, b) /∈ ΩB(D ∩ B). As E = D ∩ B, ΩBE = ΩB(B ∩ D). So (a, b) /∈ ΩB(E).
Now suppose that a ≡ b(ΩBE). Then a ≡ b(ΩAD). Since ΩAD = △A, a = b. Thus
ΩBE = △B.
Conversely, assume thatMod∗(S) is closed under submatrices and direct products.
Thus Mod∗(S) is closed under subdirect products and by Theorem 3.5.1, S is pro-
toalgebraic. By Theorem 3.4.3, there exists an k-parameterized system of equivalence
formulas E(p, q, r) = {ǫi(p, q, r) : i ∈ I} for S. Let E
′(p, q) be the set of all formu-
las of the form ǫi(p, q, ϕ1(p, q), . . . , ϕki(p, q)), where i ∈ I and ϕ1(p, q), . . . , ϕki(p, q)
range over all formulas that contain only the variables p, q. Let 〈A, F 〉 ∈ Mod(S)
and a, b ∈ A. Consider B the subalgebra of A generated by a and b. Thus, each
elements of B is of the form ϕA(a, b) for some ϕ(p, q) ∈ FmL({p, q}). The matrix
〈A/ΩAF, F/ΩAF 〉 ∈Mod
∗(S), since it is the reduction of the matrix 〈A, F 〉. As the
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matrix 〈B/(ΩAF ∩B
2), (F∩B)/(ΩAF ∩B
2)〉 is isomorphic to a submatrix of 〈A, F 〉, by
hypothesis, it is reduced. Hence, ΩAF ∩B
2 is the largest congruence on B compatible
with F ∩B, i.e., ΩB(F ∩ B) = ΩAF ∩B
2. We have that:
a ≡ b(ΩAF ) iff a ≡ b(ΩAF ∩B
2) iff a ≡ b(ΩB(F ∩ B))
iff ǫBi (a, b, c) ∈ F ∩B for all i ∈ I, and c ∈ B
ki
iff ǫBi (a, b, ϕ
B
1 (p, q), . . . , ϕ
B
ki
(p, q)) ∈ F ∩B for all i ∈ I, and ϕ1, . . . , ϕki ∈ FmL({p, q})
iff ǫAi (a, b, ϕ
A
1 (p, q), . . . , ϕ
A
ki
(p, q)) ∈ F for all i ∈ I, and ϕ1, . . . , ϕki ∈ FmL({p, q})
iff E ′
A
(a, b) ⊆ F
By Theorem 3.4.2, E ′(p, q) is a system of equivalence formulas (without parameters)
for S. Therefore, S is equivalential.
As expected, the class of equivalential logics is a proper subclass of the class of
protoalgebraic logics. The next example illustrate this result.
Example 4.2 (Orthologic [Mal89]). In Example 3.2, we have seen that the minimal
orthologic SOL is protoalgebraic. Now we prove that this logic is not equivalential using
the fact that the classMod∗(SOL) is not closed under submatrices. It is not difficult to
prove that if the matrix 〈A, D〉 ∈Mod∗(SOL) then A is an ortholattice and D = {1},
where 1 is the unit element of A. An orthomodular lattice is an ortholattice which
satisfies the orthomodularity law: y ≈ (x ∧ y) ∨ (y ∧ (¬(x ∧ y))). The Benzene Ring
B6 is an ortholattice which is not orthomodular because the orthomodularity law does
not hold. Indeed, a < b but a ∨ (b ∧ ¬a) = a ∨ 0 = a 6= b.
Figure 4.1: The Benzene Ring B6
As, we have seen that any class of ortholattices K can be identified with the class
of matrices {〈A, {1}〉 : A ∈ K}, we have that B6 can be identified with the matrix
〈B6, {1}〉. As ΩB6({1}) = △B6 ∪{(a, b), (b, a), (¬a,¬b), (¬b,¬a)}, the matrix 〈B6, {1}〉
is not reduced. Since SOL is an orthologic which is not orthomodular, there exists a
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matrix 〈A, {1}〉 ∈Mod∗(SOL) such that the ortholatticeA is not orthomodular. Mali-
nowski proved in [Mal89, Theorem 3.3.1] that if an ortholattice A is not orthomodular
then it contains the Benzene Ring B6 as a subortholattice. Thus B6 is a subalgebra
of A and consequently 〈B6, {1}〉 is a submatrix of 〈A, {1}〉. Since 〈B6, {1}〉 is not
reduced, Mod∗(SOL) is not closed under submatrices. By Theorem 4.1.7, SOL is not
equivalential. The reader can see [Mal89, Section 3.3], [Mal90] and [CJ00, Chapter
6] for more information about orthologic and orthomodular logic; for instance, in the
class of orthomodular logics, the DDT fails. ♦
4.3 Finitary and (Finitely) Equivalential Logics
In this section, we focus on some results related to finitary logics.
Theorem 4.3.1. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is finitary and finitely equivalential;
(ii) Mod∗(S) is a matrix-quasivariety.
Proof. Assume S is finitary and finitely equivalential. There exists a finite system of
equivalence formulas E(p, q) for S. Since S is finitary and also protoalgebraic, by Theo-
rem 3.8.1,Mod∗(S) is closed under ultraproducts. Moreover S is also equivalential, by
Theorem 4.1.7, Mod∗(S) is closed under submatrices and direct products. Therefore,
Mod∗(S) is a matrix-quasivariety.
Conversely, assume Mod∗(S) is a matrix-quasivariety, i.e., Mod∗(S) is closed un-
der submatrices, direct products and ultraproducts. Since Mod∗(S) is closed under
ultraproducts, S is a finitary logic. By Theorem 4.1.7, S is equivalential. Thus, there
exists a (possibly infinite) system of equivalence formulas E(p, q) for S. As S is a
finitary protoalgebraic logic and Mod∗(S) is closed under ultraproducts, by Theorem
3.8.1, E(p, q) contains a finite subsystem of equivalence formulas for S. Therefore S is
finitely equivalential.
4.4 Examples
Herein, we study some examples of modal logics with respect to the existence of system
of equivalence formulas. We also discuss the finitariness of the system of equivalence
formulas.
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We begin by defining a large class of logics which are called implicative logics and
which are finitely equivalential. This class of implicative logics have been extensively
studied by Rasiowa (c.f. [Ras74]) and Sikorski.
Definition 4.4.1. A logic S is called implicative if the language only contains a finite
number of connectives of rank at most 2 and if there exists a formula ϕ(p, q), called
implication of S, such that:
(i) ⊢S ϕ(p, p)
(ii) q ⊢S ϕ(p, q)
(iii) {ϕ(p, q)} ∪ {ϕ(q, r)} ⊢S ϕ(p, r)
(iv) {ϕ(p, q)} ∪ {p} ⊢S q
(v) for each connective f of rank n ≥ 0,
{ϕ(p1, q1), ϕ(q1, p1)}∪· · ·∪{ϕ(pn, qn), ϕ(qn, pn)} ⊢S ϕ(f(p1, . . . , pn), f(q1, . . . , qn))
It is not difficult to see that every implicative logic is finitely equivalential. More-
over, if ϕ(p, q) is an implication for a logic S then S is finitely equivalential with
{ϕ(p, q), ϕ(q, p)} its system of equivalence formulas.
Among modal logics, we can find a variety of logics which show that the class
of finitely equivalential logics is a proper subclass of equivalential logics. We present
examples without proof and we give references where the reader can find detailed
discussions.
Example 4.5 (Modal Logic [Mal89]). Let L = {∧,∨,¬,2} be the language of Modal
Logics, where ∧,∨,¬ are the familiar connectives of conjunction, disjunction and nega-
tion, and 2 is a unary connective representing the logical necessity (2ϕ reads: “It is
necessary that ϕ”). The notation 2np is defined recursively, for all n ∈ N, by: 20p = p
and 2n+1p = 2(2np). We adopt the usual notation: the formula ϕ → ψ is an abbre-
viation for ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, and ϕ ↔ ψ is an abbreviation for (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ), for any
ϕ, ψ ∈ FmL. We denote by Sb(X, r1, . . . , rn) the least invariant set of modal formulas
that includes the set X ⊆ FmL and is closed under the inference rules r1, . . . , rn. We
list some axioms and inference rules that we need to define some modal systems.
(MP )
p, p→ q
q
(Modus Ponens)
(RE)
p↔ q
2p↔ 2q
(Extensionality)
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(NR)
p
2p
(Necessitation)
(Kr) 2(p→ q)→ (2p→ 2q)
(T ) 2p→ p
(S4n) 2
np→ 2n+1p, for all n ∈ N
We also defined CL as the least invariant set in FmL containing all classical tautolo-
gies. By a Modal System we mean an invariant set of FmL that contains all classical
tautologies and is closed under modus ponens. In the sequel, we define some interesting
modal systems:
E = Sb(CL, (MP ), (RE)) is the least classical modal system;
Kr = Sb(E, (Kr), (MP ), (NR)) is the least normal classical modal system, called
Kripke system;
T = Sb(K, (T ), (MP ), (NR));
S4n = Sb(T, (S4n), (MP ), (NR)) for n ∈ N.
If L is a modal system, we denote by
−→
L the Modal Logic defined in the language FmL
by the set of axioms L and the inference rule modus ponens. All modal logics are
protoalgebraic because the DDT holds: for any Γ ∪ {ϕ, ψ} ⊆ FmL,
Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢−→
L
ψ iff Γ ⊢−→
L
ϕ→ ψ
Malinowski has shown, in [Mal89, Corollary 2.1.3] and in [Mal86, Corollary II.3], that
the logic
−→
E is not equivalential. But the Kripke logic
−→
Kr is finitary and equivalential
with the set of equivalence formulas E(p, q) := {2n(p ↔ q) : n ∈ N}. Since the
modal logic
−→
T is an axiomatic extension of
−→
Kr, it is also equivalential. Malinowski has
also shown, in [Mal89, Theorem 2.2.1] and in [Mal86, Theorem III.1], that
−→
T is not
finitely equivalential. We deduced that
−→
Kr is not finitely equivalential. Furthermore,
the modal logic
−−→
S4n is finitely equivalential, for all n ∈ N with E(p, q) = {2
n(p↔ q)}
as the finite system of equivalence formulas. ♦
Chapter 5
Algebraizable Logics
The general theory of AAL studies the mechanism by which a class of algebras can be
associated with a given logic. This contrasts to the study of algebraic logic where the
main setting is to examine the class of algebras that are canonically associated with
a logic. Boole could be considered as the first logician who studied the relationship
between CPL and the class BA. The paradigm of the Lindenbaum-Tarski process is
the way by which the class BA appears from CPL. In [BP89], Blok and Pigozzi give
a precise meaning of the notion of finitary finitely algebraizable logics which are logics
that have equivalent algebraic semantics with a finite set of equivalence formulas and
a finite set of defining equations.
In this chapter, we study the algebraization phenomena in a wide sense. First we
define the notion of algebraic semantics. Roughly speaking, a class K of algebras can
be considered as an algebraic semantics of a logic S if the consequence relation ⊢S can
be interpreted in the equational consequence relation
K
in a natural way. In addition,
if there exists an inverse interpretation of
K
in ⊢S, then K is called an equivalent
algebraic semantics for S (it is unique up to a quasivariety). We study the class of
weakly algebraizable logics which are logics that have a pair of interpretations that
commute with surjective substitutions and are mutually inverse. We characterized this
class using Leibniz operator properties. We also define algebraizable logics as logics
which have an equivalent algebraic semantics and give some characterizations. Among
them, we have that K is an equivalent algebraic semantics for S iff there exists an
isomorphism between the theory lattice of S and the equational theory lattice of K
that commutes with inverse substitution. We finalize by giving examples of logics which
show that the inclusion among different classes of algebraizable logics are proper.
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5.1 Algebraic Semantics
The reader should not confuse the notion of algebraic semantics presented in this
chapter with the notion of matrix semantics defined in Chapter 2. Although every
logic has a matrix semantics, it can does not have an algebraic semantics. We give
an example to illustrate this result. Furthermore, if the logic is finitary, then it has
(if any) a quasivariety semantics which can be axiomatized by a set of axioms and
a set of inference rules. We point out to [BR03], where Blok and Rebagliato have
studied sufficient conditions for a logic to have an algebraic semantics and presented
some examples that illustrate their results.
Definition 5.1.1. Let S be a logic and K a class of L-algebras. We say that ⊢S is
interpretable in
K
if there exists a mapping τ : FmL → P(EqL) such that for all
Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL,
Γ ⊢S α iff τ [Γ] K τ(α)
The mapping τ is called an interpretation of ⊢S in K.
We say that ∆(p, v) = {δi(p, v) ≈ ǫi(p, v) : i ∈ I} is an l-parameterized system of
equations if it is a set of equations in a single variable p and possibly other variables
v = v1, v2, . . . called parameters with l the length of the string v. Note that ∆(p, v)
may be infinite; hence the length of the string v, could be ω. Let α ∈ FmL, we denote
by ∆(〈α〉) the set of all substitution instances e(δi(p, v)) ≈ e(ǫi(p, v)) where i ranges
over I and e over all substitutions such that e(p) = α, i.e.,
∆(〈α〉) := {δi(p/α, v/ξ) ≈ ǫi(p/α, v/ξ) : i ∈ I, ξ ∈ (FmL)
l}.
We extend this notation to L-algebras. If A is an L-algebra and a, b ∈ A, we denote
by ∆A(〈a〉) the set of all elements of A of the form h(δi(p, v)) ≈ h(ǫi(p, v)) where i
ranges over I and h over all homomorphisms h : FmL → A such that h(p) = a, i.e.,
∆A(〈a〉) := {δAi (p/a, v/c) ≈ ǫ
A
i (p/a, v/c) : i ∈ I, c ∈ A
l},
where ǫAi := h(ǫi) and δ
A
i := h(δi).
In the following propositions, the mapping τ can be represented, with some as-
sumptions, by a particular set of equations.
Proposition 5.1.2. Let τ : FmL → P(EqL) be an arbitrary mapping. The following
conditions are equivalent:
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(i) τ commutes with surjective substitutions;
(ii) There exists an l-parameterized system of equations ∆(p, v) such that for all
α ∈ FmL, τ(α) = ∆(〈α〉).
Proof. Assume τ commutes with surjective substitutions. We fix a variable p and
define ∆(p, v) := τ(p). Let l be the length of v. Clearly, τ(p) ⊆ {δ(p, ξ) ≈ ǫ(p, ξ) :
δ(p, v) ≈ ǫ(p, v) ∈ ∆(p, v), ξ ∈ (FmL)
l}. For the reverse inclusion, let ξ ∈ (FmL)
l and
e a surjective substitution such that e(p) = p, e(v) = ξ. For all δ(p, v) ≈ ǫ(p, v) ∈
∆(p, v), we have that δ
(
e(p), e(v)
)
≈ ǫ
(
e(p), e(v)
)
∈ e[τ(p)]. By hypothesis, e[τ(p)] =
τ(e(p)) = τ(p). Thus for all δ(p, v) ≈ ǫ(p, v) ∈ ∆(p, v), δ(p, ξ) ≈ ǫ(p, ξ) ∈ τ(p), i.e.,
{δ(p, ξ) ≈ ǫ(p, ξ) : δ(p, v) ≈ ǫ(p, v) ∈ ∆(p, v), ξ ∈ (FmL)
l} ⊆ τ(p). We conclude
that τ(p) = {δ(p, ξ) ≈ ǫ(p, ξ) : δ(p, v) ≈ ǫ(p, v) ∈ ∆(p, v), ξ ∈ (FmL)
l}. Now, let
α ∈ FmL and e a surjective substitution such that e(p) = α. We have that τ(α) =
τ(e(p)) = e[τ(p)] = e[{δ(p, ξ) ≈ ǫ(p, ξ) : δ(p, v) ≈ ǫ(p, v) ∈ ∆(p, v), ξ ∈ (FmL)
l}] =
{δ
(
e(p), e(ξ)
)
≈ ǫ
(
e(p), e(ξ)
)
: δ(p, v) ≈ ǫ(p, v) ∈ ∆(p, v), ξ ∈ (FmL)
l} = {δ
(
α, e(ξ)
)
≈
ǫ
(
α, e(ξ)
)
: δ(p, v) ≈ ǫ(p, v) ∈ ∆(p, v), ξ ∈ (FmL)
l}. Since e is surjective, τ(α) =
{δ(α, η) ≈ ǫ(α, η) : δ(p, v) ≈ ǫ(p, v) ∈ ∆(p, v), η ∈ (FmL)
l} = ∆(〈α〉).
Conversely, let e be a surjective substitution and α ∈ FmL. We have that e[τ(α)] =
e[∆(〈α〉)] = ∆(〈e(α)〉) = {δi(e(α), e(ξ)) ≈ ǫi(e(α), e(ξ)) : i ∈ I, ξ ∈ (FmL)
l}. By
surjectivity of e, e[τ(α)] = {δi(e(α), η) ≈ ǫi(e(α), η) : i ∈ I, η ∈ (FmL)
l} = τ(e(α)).
Proposition 5.1.3. Let τ : FmL → P(EqL) be an arbitrary mapping. The following
conditions are equivalent:
(i) τ commutes with arbitrary substitutions;
(ii) There exists a set ∆(p) = {δi(p) ≈ ǫi(p) : i ∈ I} of equations in a single
variable p such that for all α ∈ FmL, τ(α) = ∆(α).
Proof. Assume τ commutes with arbitrary substitutions. We fix a variable p and
define ∆(p) := τ(p). Suppose Var(∆(p)) ⊆ {p, r1, r2, . . . }. Let e be a substitution
such that for every q ∈ Var(∆(p)), e(q) = p. Then {δ(p, p, p, . . . ) ≈ ǫ(p, p, p, . . . ) :
δ(p, v) ≈ ǫ(p, v) ∈ ∆(p)} = e[{δ(p) ≈ ǫ(p) : δ(p) ≈ ǫ(p) ∈ ∆(p)}] = e[τ(p)] =
τ
(
e(p)
)
= τ(p) = {δ(p, r1, r2, . . . ) ≈ ǫ(p, r1, r2, . . . ) : δ(p, v) ≈ ǫ(p, v) ∈ ∆(p)}. Hence,
{r1, r2, . . . } ⊆ {p}. Thus Var(∆(p)) ⊆ {p}. Now, let α ∈ FmL and e a substitution
such that e(p) = α. Then τ(α) = τ
(
e(p)
)
= e[τ(p)] = e[∆(p)] = ∆
(
e(p)
)
= ∆(α).
The converse is obvious.
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In [Cze01, Definition 4.2.1], Czelakowski defined the notion of interpretation in
more general sense (between two arbitrary logics) and used the term “transformer”.
When an interpretation commutes with arbitrary substitutions and is defined by a finite
set of equations then it coincides with the notion of “translation” introduced by Blok
and Pigozzi in [BP01, Definition 4.1]. There are others logicians that study mappings
between logic (Feitosa and Ottaviano have described in [FD01, Definition 1.10] a more
general notion of translation. They have studied the conservative translation and
established some logical properties that may be preserved via translations).
The following definition of algebraic semantics is due to Blok and Pigozzi in [BP89,
definition 2.2] but with the requirement that the set of equations is finite and the logic
is finitary.
Definition 5.1.4. Let S be a logic and K a class of L-algebras. We say that K is
an algebraic semantics of S if ⊢S is interpretable in K in the following sense: there
exists ∆(p) a set of equations such that for all Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL,
Γ ⊢S α iff ∆(Γ) K ∆(α)
where ∆(Γ) = {δi(p/γ) ≈ ǫi(p/γ) : i ∈ I, γ ∈ Γ}.
The equations in ∆(p) are called the defining equations for ⊢S and K.
In other words, K is an algebraic semantics of S iff there exists an interpretation
τ : FmL → P(EqL) of ⊢S in K that commutes with arbitrary substitutions. The
algebraic semantics K is also called τ -algebraic semantics of S by Raftery in [Raf06b,
Definition 1].
If τ is an interpretation of ⊢S in K, that commutes with arbitrary substitutions,
then for every algebra A ∈ K, we write F τ
A
:= {a ∈ A : δAi (a) = ǫ
A
i (a), i ∈ I}.
Theorem 5.1.5. Let S be a logic, K a class of L-algebras and τ : FmL → P(EqL)
an arbitrary mapping that commutes with arbitrary substitutions. Then the following
conditions are equivalent:
(i) K is an algebraic semantics of S with the set of defining equations τ(p);
(ii) The class M = {〈A, F τ
A
〉 : A ∈ K} is a matrix semantics of S.
Proof. Let M = {〈A, F τ
A
〉 : A ∈ K} be a class of matrices and Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL. We
have that
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Γ
M
α iff, for all M = 〈A, F τ
A
〉 ∈ M, Γ
M
α iff, for all A ∈
K and all homomorphism h : FmL → A, h[Γ] ⊆ F
τ
A
implies h(α) ∈ F τ
A
iff, for all A ∈ K, all homomorphism h : FmL → A and all i ∈ I; δ
A
i (γ) =
ǫAi (γ) for all γ ∈ Γ implies δ
A
i (α) = ǫ
A
i (α) iff, for all A ∈ K, all homomorphism h :
FmL → A and all i ∈ I; h(δi(γ)) = h(ǫi(γ)) for all γ ∈ Γ implies h(δi(α)) = h(ǫi(α))
iff, for all A ∈ K, ∆(Γ)
A
∆(α) iff ∆(Γ)
K
∆(α).
Now, assume that the class K is an algebraic semantics of S. Let Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL.
We have that Γ
M
α iff ∆[Γ]
K
∆(α). By assumption, ∆[Γ]
K
∆(α) iff Γ ⊢S α.
Thus M is a matrix semantics of S.
Conversely, assume that the classM is a matrix semantics of S. Let Γ∪{α} ⊆ FmL.
By assumption, Γ ⊢S α iff Γ M α. Since, Γ M α iff ∆[Γ] K ∆(α), we have that
K is an algebraic semantics of S.
We give an example of logic that has an algebraic semantics.
Example 5.2 (Classical Propositional Logic [BP01]). LetCPL be the Classical Propo-
sitional Logic defined in the language L = {→,∧,∨,¬,⊥,⊤} by the following axioms:
A1 p→ (q → p)
A2 (p→ (q → r))→ ((p→ q)→ (p→ r))
A3 (¬q → ¬p)→ (p→ q)
A4 (p ∧ q)→ p
A5 (p ∧ q)→ q
A6 (r → p)→ ((r → q)→ (r → (p ∧ q)))
A7 p→ (p ∨ q)
A8 q → (p ∨ q)
A9 (p→ r)→ ((q → r)→ ((p ∨ q)→ r))
A10 ⊥ → p
A11 p→ ⊤
and the inference rule:
p, p→ q
q
(Modus Ponens)
We define Boolean algebra as an L-algebra A = 〈A,→A,∧A,∨A,¬A,⊥A,⊤A〉 such
that 〈A,∧A,∨A,¬A,⊥A,⊤A〉 is a bounded, complemented, distributive lattice with
smallest element ⊥A, largest element ⊤A and complementation ¬A, while →A is rel-
ative complementation (a →A b = ¬Aa ∨A b). We denote by BA the class of all
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Boolean algebras. Since {〈A, {⊤A}〉 : A ∈ BA} is a matrix semantics of CPL, by
Theorem 5.1.5, the class BA is an algebraic semantics of CPL with the set of defining
equation {p ≈ ⊤}. Therefore, for all Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ FmL, Γ ⊢CPL ϕ iff Γ ≈ ⊤ BA ϕ ≈ ⊤.
However, the logic CPL has another algebraic semantics which is the class of Heyting
algebras (HA) with the defining equation {¬¬p ≈ ⊤} (c.f. [BR03, Proposition 2.6]).♦
We say that an algebra A is a τ -model of a logic S if for all Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL,
Γ ⊢S α implies τ [Γ] |=A τ(α).
We denote by K(S, τ) the class of all τ -models of S.
With the above example, we can note that if a logic has an algebraic semantics then
it is not unique. Nevertheless, in the following proposition, we prove that if a logic has
an algebraic semantics then it has the largest one.
Proposition 5.2.1. Let S be a logic and τ : FmL → P(EqL) an arbitrary mapping
that commutes with arbitrary substitutions. If S has an algebraic semantics with the
set of defining equations τ(p), then K(S, τ) is the largest algebraic semantics.
Proof. Let K be an algebraic semantics of S with the set of defining equations τ(p)
and Γ ∪ {α} ∈ FmL. By the definition of K(S, τ), we have that Γ ⊢S α implies
τ [Γ]
K(S,τ)
τ(α). Since K is an algebraic semantics, all the algebras A ∈ K are τ -
models. Thus K ⊆ K(S, τ). Hence τ [Γ]
K(S,τ)
τ(α) implies τ [Γ]
K
τ(α). Since K is
an algebraic semantics of S, Γ ⊢S α. We conclude thatK(S, τ) is an algebraic semantics
of S. It is not difficult to see that for all K algebraic semantics of S, K ⊆ K(S, τ).
Thus K(S, τ) is the largest algebraic semantics of S.
Moreover, if S is a deductive system, i.e, is axiomatized by a set of axioms and a
set of inference rules, then the largest algebraic semantics is also axiomatized.
Proposition 5.2.2. [BR03, Proposition 2.9] Let S be a deductive system axiomatized
by a set AX of axioms and a set IR of inference rules, and τ : FmL → P(EqL)
an arbitrary mapping that commutes with arbitrary substitutions which is defined by
a finite set of defining equations. Then, the algebraic 2-deductive system
K(S,τ)
is
axiomatized by the axioms,
(i) p ≈ p
(ii) τ(α) i.e., δi(α) ≈ ǫi(α), for all i ∈ I, and all α ∈ AX
and the inference rules,
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(iii)
p ≈ q
q ≈ p
(iv)
p ≈ q, q ≈ r
p ≈ r
(v)
{pi ≈ qi : i < m}
f(p0, . . . , pm−1) ≈ f(q0, . . . , qm−1)
, for all connectives f of rank m
(vi)
⋃
{τ(αj) : j < n}
τ(β)
i.e.,
{δi(αj) ≈ ǫi(αj) : i ∈ I, j < n}
δi(β) ≈ ǫi(β)
, for all i ∈ I, all 〈{αj :
j < n}, β〉 ∈ IR and n ∈ N.
If a finitary logic S has an algebraic semantics K with the set of defining equations
∆(p) then it has a quasivariety semantics Q(K) with the same set of defining equations.
We give an example of logic that has a quasivariety semantics.
Example 5.3 (Classical Propositional Logic [BP01]). Let 2 = 〈{0, 1},→2,∧2,∨2,¬2,
⊥2,⊤2〉 be the two-element Boolean algebra where ⊥2 = 0 and ⊤2 = 1 denote respec-
tively “false” and “true”, and→2,∧2,∨2 : {0, 1}2 → {0, 1} and ¬2 : {0, 1} → {0, 1} are
given by the usual truth tables. We have that, for all Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ FmL, Γ ⊢CPL ϕ iff Γ ≈
⊤
2
ϕ ≈ ⊤. Thus the class of two-element Boolean algebras is an algebraic semantics
for CPL with the set of defining equations ∆(p) = {p ≈ ⊤}. The variety of Boolean
algebras is generated by the two-element Boolean algebra, i.e., BA = HSP (2). We
also have that the variety of Boolean algebras is generated by 2 as a quasivariety, i.e.,
BA = SP (2). ♦
If a logic S has an algebraic semantics, then any fragment of S, whose language
includes the connectives occurring in the set of defining equations, has an algebraic
semantics; and any extension of S, also has an algebraic semantics with the same set
of defining equations. Blok and Pigozzi proved this result, in [BP89, Corollary 2.5], for
finitary logic and finite set of defining equations.
Theorem 5.3.1. Let S be a logic, τ : FmL → P(EqL) an arbitrary mapping that
commutes with arbitrary substitutions, K an algebraic semantics of S with the set
of defining equations τ(p) and L′ a sublanguage of L that contains all the primitive
connectives occurring in τ(p). Then the class K′ of all L′-reducts of members of K
is an algebraic semantics of any L′-fragment S ′ of S. Furthermore, if K(S, τ) is a
quasivariety, then K′(S ′, τ) is a quasivariety semantics for S ′.
In order to prove that any extension of logic, which has an algebraic semantics, also
has an algebraic semantics, we need the following lemmas.
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Let τS,K : ThS → ThK be the mapping defined by τS,K[T ] = CnK(τ [T ]), for all
T ∈ ThS.
Lemma 5.3.2. Let S be a logic, τ : FmL → P(EqL) an arbitrary mapping that com-
mutes with arbitrary substitutions and K ⊆ K(S, τ) a class of τ -models of S. Then the
following conditions are equivalent:
(i) K is an algebraic semantics of S with the set of defining equations τ(p).
(ii) τS,K is injective.
Proof. Let T1, T2 ∈ ThS. Suppose τS,K[T1] = τS,K[T2]. Let α ∈ T1. We have that
τ(α) ⊆ τ [T1] ⊆ τS,K[T1] = τS,K[T2]. Hence, τ [T2] K τ(α). Since K is an algebraic
semantics of S, we have T2 ⊢S α, i.e., α ∈ T2. In an analogous way, we can prove that
T2 ⊆ T1. Therefore τS,K is injective.
Conversely, let Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL. Since K is a class of τ -models of S, we have
that Γ ⊢S α implies τ [Γ] K τ(α). Now, suppose τ [Γ] K τ(α). Thus, CnK(τ [Γ]) =
CnK(τ [Γ∪ {α}]). Since Γ ⊆ CnS(Γ), we have that τ [Γ] ⊆ τ [CnS(Γ)]. So, CnK(τ [Γ]) ⊆
CnK(τ [CnS(Γ)]) = τS,K[CnS(Γ)]. For the reverse inclusion, let α ≈ β ∈ τS,K[CnS(Γ)],
i.e., τ [CnS(Γ)] K α ≈ β. Thus {τ(ξ) : Γ ⊢S ξ} K α ≈ β. As K is a class of τ -models
of S, for all ξ ∈ FmL we have that Γ ⊢S ξ implies τ [Γ] K τ(ξ). Therefore, τ [Γ] K
α ≈ β, i.e., α ≈ β ∈ CnK(τ [Γ]). We conclude that for all Γ ∈ FmL, τS,K[CnS(Γ)] =
CnK(τ [Γ]). By these results, we have that τS,K[CnS(Γ)] = τS,K[CnS(Γ ∪ {α})]. Since
τS,K is injective, CnS(Γ) = CnS(Γ ∪ {α}) and so, Γ ⊢S α.
Lemma 5.3.3. Let S be a deductive system and τ : FmL → P(EqL) an arbitrary
mapping that commutes with arbitrary substitutions. Suppose that K = K(S, τ) is
an algebraic semantics of S with the finite set of defining equations τ(p). If S ′ is an
extension of S and K′ = K′(S ′, τ) then τS′,K′ equals τS,K restricted to ThS
′.
Proof. Let T ∈ ThS ′. Since S ′ is an extension of S, K′ ⊆ K, so
K′
is an extension
of
K
. Hence CnK(τ [T ]) ⊆ CnK′(τ [T ]), i.e., τS,K[T ] ⊆ τS′,K′[T ]. For the reverse
inclusion, by Proposition 5.2.2, K′ can be axiomatized by a set of axioms and a set
of inference rules. It is not difficult to see that CnK(τ [T ]) contains all substitution
instances of the axioms of
K′
and is closed under the inference rules of
K′
. Indeed,
it is obvious that CnK(τ [T ]) contains all substitution instances of the axiom (i) and is
closed under the inference rules (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 5.2.2 . Let α ∈ Thm(S ′)
and e a substitution. Since Thm(S ′) is closed under substitutions, ⊢S′ e(α). Thus for
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all T ∈ ThS ′, we have that e(α) ∈ T . As τ commutes with arbitrary substitutions,
e[τ(α)] = τ [e(α)] ⊆ τ [T ] ⊆ CnK(τ [T ]). Thus CnK(τ [T ]) contains all substitution
instances of axioms of K′. Now, let {αi : i < n} ⊢S′ β be an inference rule of S
′
and e a substitution such that {e[τ(αi)] : i < n} ⊆ CnK(τ [T ]), i.e., τ [T ] K e[τ(αi)]
for all i < n. Since τ commutes with arbitrary substitutions, e[τ(αi)] = τ [e(αi)] for
all i < n, i.e., τ [T ]
K
τ [e(αi)] for all i < n. As K is an algebraic semantics of S,
it follows that T ⊢S e(αi) for all i < n, i.e., {e(αi) : i < n} ⊆ T . By structurality
of S ′, {e(αi) : i < n} ⊢S′ e(β). Since T ∈ ThS
′, we have that e(β) ∈ T . Thus
e[τ(β)] = τ [e(β)] ⊆ τ [T ] ⊆ CnK(τ [T ]). Therefore CnK(τ [T ]) is closed under the
inference rules of K′. By the characterization of a theory in a deductive system, we
have proved that CnK(τ [T ]) ∈ Th(K
′). Since τ [T ] ⊆ CnK(τ [T ]) and CnK′(τ [T ]) is
the least S ′-theory that contains τ [T ], we have that CnK′(τ [T ]) ⊆ CnK(τ [T ]), i.e.,
τS′,K′[T ] ⊆ τS,K[T ].
Theorem 5.3.4. Let S be a deductive system. If S has an algebraic semantics, then
any extension of S also has an algebraic semantics with the same set of defining equa-
tions.
Proof. Assume that S has an algebraic semantics K with the set of defining equations
τ(p). Let S ′ be an extension of S and K′ = K(S ′, τ). By Proposition 5.2.1, the
class K(S, τ) is an algebraic semantics of S with the set of defining equations τ(p).
Since, by Lemma 5.3.2, the mapping τS,K is injective, we have, by Lemma 5.3.3, that
the mapping τS′,K′ is also injective. Again by Lemma 5.3.2, we have that K
′ is an
algebraic semantics of S ′ with the set of defining equations τ(p).
In Example 5.2, we see that a logic can have several algebraic semantics. Now, we
give an example of logic which does not have any algebraic semantics.
Example 5.4. [BR03, Theorem 2.19] Let L = {→} be the language with just one
binary connective and S the deductive system over L with the single axiom,
p→ p
and the single inference rule, Modus Ponens,
p, p→ q
q
The set ∆(p, q) = {p → q} is a protoequivalence system for S. By Theorem 3.1.3, S
is protoalgebraic. In order to prove that S does not have an algebraic semantics, we
argue by contradiction and we need the following Lemmas.
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Lemma 5.4.1. [BR03, Theorem 2.16] Let S be a deductive system which has an al-
gebraic semantics with the set of defining equations ∆(p) = {δi(p) ≈ ǫi(p) : i < n}.
Then
{p, γ(δi(p), ψ0, . . . , ψk−1)} ⊢S γ(ǫi(p), ψ0, . . . , ψk−1) for all i < n
and
{p, γ(ǫi(p), ψ0, . . . , ψk−1)} ⊢S γ(δi(p), ψ0, . . . , ψk−1) for all i < n
for every ψ0, . . . , ψk−1, γ(p, q0, . . . , qk−1) ∈ FmL, where k < ω.
Lemma 5.4.2. [BR03, Lemma 2.18] Let p, q be distinct variables and ϕ, ψ ∈ FmL.
Then {p, q → ϕ} ⊢S ψ iff ψ ∈ {p, q → ϕ} ∪ {γ → γ : γ ∈ FmL}.
Suppose that S has an algebraic semantics, denoted by K, with the set of defining
equations ∆(p) = {δi(p) ≈ ǫi(p) : i < n}. Let q ∈ Var such that q 6= p. By Lemma
5.4.1, {p, q → δi(p)} ⊢S q → ǫi(p) for all i < n. By Lemma 5.4.2, q → ǫi(p) ∈ {p, q →
δi(p)} ∪ {γ → γ : γ ∈ FmL}. Since ∆(p) is a set in only one variable p, q 6= ǫi(p) and
since q 6= p, q → ǫi(p) 6= p. Thus, q → ǫi(p) = q → δi(p). Hence δi(p) is equal to ǫi(p)
for all i < n, i.e.,
K
∆(ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ FmL. As K is an algebraic semantics of S,
⊢S ϕ for all ϕ ∈ FmL. Therefore S is a trivial logic which is a contradiction. ♦
This example prove that not every logic has an algebraic semantics. There are
many other examples of logics which have no algebraic semantics, for instance the
deducibility relation of the formal system from relevance logic, denoted by P−W (c.f.
[Raf06b, Proposition 38]).
5.5 Equivalent Algebraic Semantics
Herein, we define the notion of equivalent algebraic semantics of a logic which is a
useful tool for the study of the class of algebraizable logics.
Definition 5.5.1. Let S be a logic and K a class of L-algebras. We say that ⊢S is
equivalent to
K
iff
1. ⊢S is interpretable in K, i.e., there exists an interpretation τ : FmL → P(EqL)
such that for all Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL,
(i) Γ ⊢S α iff τ [Γ] K τ(α)
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2.
K
is interpretable in ⊢S, that is, there exists a mapping ρ : EqL → P(FmL),
called interpretation of
K
in ⊢S, such that for all Σ ∪ {ϕ ≈ ψ} ⊆ EqL,
(ii) Σ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ iff ρ[Σ] ⊢S ρ(ϕ ≈ ψ)
3. and, the interpretations τ and ρ are mutually inverse, that is,
(iii) ϕ ≈ ψ
K
τ [ρ(ϕ ≈ ψ)]
(iv) α ⊣⊢S ρ[τ(α)]
Let S be a logic, K a class of L-algebras and τ : FmL → P(EqL) and ρ : EqL →
P(FmL) arbitrary mappings. Conditions (i) and (iii) are equivalent to conditions (ii)
and (iv). Indeed, assume conditions (i) and (iii) hold. Let Σ ∪ {ϕ ≈ ψ} ⊆ EqL.
We have that Σ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ iff (by (iii)) τ [ρ[Σ]]
K
τ [ρ(ϕ ≈ ψ)] iff (by (i)) ρ[Σ] ⊢S
ρ(ϕ ≈ ψ). Thus (ii) holds. Now let α ∈ FmL. Applying (iii) to τ(α) ⊆ EqL, we
have τ(α)
K
τ [ρ[τ(α)]]. Since τ [ρ[τ(α)]]
K
τ(α), by (i), ρ[τ(α)] ⊢S α. And since
τ(α)
K
τ [ρ[τ(α)]], by (i), α ⊢S ρ[τ(α)]. Thus (iv) holds. In an analogous way we can
prove the converse.
Like for the mapping τ , we can represent the mapping ρ, with some assumptions,
by a particular set of formulas.
Proposition 5.5.2. Let ρ : EqL → P(FmL) be an arbitrary mapping. The following
conditions are equivalent:
(i) ρ commutes with surjective substitutions;
(ii) There exists an k-parameterized system of formulas E(p, q, r) such that for all
ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ EqL, ρ(ϕ ≈ ψ) = E(〈ϕ, ψ〉).
Proof. Assume ρ commutes with surjective substitutions. We fix two variables p, q and
define E(p, q, r) := ρ(p ≈ q). Let k be the length of r. Clearly, ρ(p ≈ q) ⊆ {ǫ(p, q, γ) :
ǫ(p, q, r) ∈ E(p, q, r), γ ∈ (FmL)
k}. For the reverse inclusion, let γ ∈ (FmL)
k and e a
surjective substitution such that e(p) = p, e(q) = q, e(r) = γ. We have that for all
ǫ(p, q, r) ∈ E(p, q, r), ǫ
(
e(p), e(q), e(r)
)
∈ e[ρ(p ≈ q)]. By assumption, e[ρ(p ≈ q)] =
ρ(e(p) ≈ e(q)) = ρ(p ≈ q). Thus, for all ǫ(p, q, r) ∈ E(p, q, r), ǫ(p, q, γ) ∈ ρ(p ≈ q),
i.e., {ǫ(p, q, γ) : ǫ(p, q, r) ∈ E(p, q, r), γ ∈ (FmL)
k} ⊆ ρ(p ≈ q). Hence, ρ(p ≈ q) =
{ǫ(p, q, γ) : ǫ(p, q, r) ∈ E(p, q, r), γ ∈ (FmL)
k}. Now, let ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ EqL and e a
surjective substitution such that e(p) = ϕ and e(q) = ψ. We have thatρ(ϕ ≈ ψ) =
ρ(e(p) ≈ e(q)) = e(ρ(p ≈ q)) = e
(
{ǫ(p, q, γ) : ǫ(p, q, r) ∈ E(p, q, r), γ ∈ (FmL)
k}
)
=
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{ǫ
(
e(p), e(q), e(γ)
)
: ǫ(p, q, r) ∈ E(p, q, r), γ ∈ (FmL)
k} = {ǫ
(
ϕ, ψ, e(γ)
)
: ǫ(p, q, r) ∈
E(p, q, r), γ ∈ (FmL)
k}. Since e is surjective, ρ(ϕ ≈ ψ) = {ǫ(ϕ, ψ, ξ) : ǫ(p, q, r) ∈
E(p, q, r), ξ ∈ (FmL)
k} = E(〈ϕ, ψ〉).
Conversely, let e be a surjective substitution and ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ EqL. We have that
e[ρ(ϕ ≈ ψ)] = e[E(〈ϕ, ψ〉)] = E
(
〈e(ϕ), e(ψ)〉
)
. By surjectivity of e, e[ρ(ϕ ≈ ψ)] =
{ǫi
(
e(ϕ), e(ψ), ξ
)
: i ∈ I, ξ ∈ (FmL)
k} = ρ(e(ϕ) ≈ e(ψ)). Thus, ρ commutes with
surjective substitutions.
If the consequence relation of a logic is equivalent to an equational consequence
relation of a class of algebras then, with some conditions on the interpretations, the
logic is protoalgebraic.
Proposition 5.5.3. Let S be a logic and K a class of L-algebras. Suppose that
K
is equivalent to ⊢S by means of interpretations τ and ρ which commute with surjec-
tive substitutions and are determined, respectively, by an l-parameterized system of
equations ∆(p, v) and by an k-parameterized system of formulas E(p, q, r). Then S is
protoalgebraic and E(p, q, r) is an k-parameterized system of equivalence formulas for
S.
Proof. We show that E(p, q, r) satisfies reflexivity, modus ponens, and simple replace-
ment conditions. Since
K
p ≈ p, by condition (ii) of Definition 5.5.1, ⊢S ρ(p ≈ p),
i.e., ⊢S E(〈p, p〉). Thus reflexivity condition holds.
Since ∆(p, v) ∪ {p ≈ q}
K
∆(q, v) is satisfied by any equational consequence
relation, by condition (ii) of Definition 5.5.1, ρ[∆(p, v)] ∪ ρ(p ≈ q) ⊢S ρ[∆(q, v)], i.e,
E
(
〈∆(p, v)〉
)
∪ E(〈p, q〉) ⊢S E
(
〈∆(q, v)〉
)
. And by condition (iv) of Definition 5.5.1,
{p} ∪ E(〈p, q〉) ⊢S q. Thus modus ponens condition holds.
Let f be a connective of S of rank n. Since {p1 ≈ q1} ∪ · · · ∪ {pn ≈ qn} K
f(p1, . . . , pn) ≈ f(q1, . . . , qn), by condition (ii) of Definition 5.5.1, ρ(p1 ≈ q1) ∪ · · · ∪
ρ(pn ≈ qn) ⊢S ρ
(
f(p1, . . . , pn) ≈ f(q1, . . . , qn)
)
, i.e., E(〈p1, q1〉) ∪ · · · ∪ E(〈pn, qn〉) ⊢S
E(〈f(p1, . . . , pn), f(q1, . . . , qn)〉). Thus simple replacement condition holds.
We conclude that E(p, q, r) is an k-parameterized system of equivalence formulas
for S. By Theorem 3.4.3, S is protoalgebraic.
Proposition 5.5.4. Let ρ : EqL → P(FmL) be an arbitrary mapping. The following
conditions are equivalent:
(i) ρ commutes with arbitrary substitutions;
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(ii) There exists a set E(p, q) of formulas in two variables p, q such that for all
ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ EqL, ρ(ϕ ≈ ψ) = E(ϕ, ψ).
Proof. Assume ρ commutes with arbitrary substitutions. We fix p, q distinct variables
and define E(p, q) := ρ(p ≈ q). Suppose Var(E(p, q)) ⊆ {p, q, r1, r2, . . . }. Let e
be a substitution such that e(p) = p, e(q) = q and e(ri) = p for all i ∈ I. By
assumption, E(p, q, p, . . . ) = e(E(p, q)) = e
(
ρ(p ≈ q)
)
= ρ
(
e(p) ≈ e(q)
)
= ρ(p ≈ q) =
E(p, q, r1, r2, . . . ). Hence, {r1, r2, . . . } ⊆ {p, q}. Thus Var(E(p, q)) ⊆ {p, q}. Now, let
ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ EqL and e a substitution such that e(p) = ϕ and e(q) = ψ. We have that
ρ(ϕ ≈ ψ) = ρ
(
e(p) ≈ e(q)
)
= e
(
ρ(p ≈ q)
)
= e
(
E(p, q)
)
= E
(
e(p), e(q)
)
= E(ϕ, ψ).
The converse is obvious.
If the consequence relation of a logic is equivalent to an equational consequence
relation of a class of algebras then, with some conditions on the interpretations, the
logic is equivalential.
Proposition 5.5.5. Let S be a logic and K a class of L-algebras. Suppose that
K
is equivalent to ⊢S by means of interpretations τ and ρ which commute with arbitrary
substitutions and are determined, respectively, by set of equations ∆(p) and a set of for-
mulas E(p, q). Then S is equivalential and E(p, q) is a system of equivalence formulas
for S.
Proof. We show that E(p, q) satisfies reflexivity, modus ponens, and simple replacement
conditions. Since
K
p ≈ p, by condition (ii) of Definition 5.5.1, ⊢S ρ(p ≈ p), i.e.,
⊢S E(p, p). Thus reflexivity condition holds.
Since ∆(p) ∪ {p ≈ q}
K
∆(q) is satisfied by any equational consequence relation,
by condition (ii) of Definition 5.5.1, ρ[∆(p)] ∪ ρ(p ≈ q) ⊢S ρ[∆(q)], i.e, E
(
∆(p)
)
∪
E
(
p, q
)
⊢S E
(
∆(q)
)
. And by condition (iv) of Definition 5.5.1, {p} ∪ E
(
p, q
)
⊢S q.
Thus modus ponens condition holds.
Let f be a connective of S of rank n. Since {p1 ≈ q1} ∪ · · · ∪ {pn ≈ qn} K
f(p1, . . . , pn) ≈ f(q1, . . . , qn), by condition (ii) of Definition 5.5.1, ρ(p1 ≈ q1) ∪ · · · ∪
ρ(pn ≈ qn) ⊢S ρ
(
f(p1, . . . , pn) ≈ f(q1, . . . , qn)
)
, i.e., E(p1, q1) ∪ · · · ∪ E(pn, qn) ⊢S
E(f(p1, . . . , pn), f(q1, . . . , qn)). Thus simple replacement condition holds.
We conclude that E(p, q) is a system of equivalence formulas for S. By Theorem
4.1.1, S is equivalential.
Now, we define the notion of equivalent algebraic semantics.
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Definition 5.5.6. Let S be a logic and K a class of L-algebras. We say that K is an
equivalent algebraic semantics for S if ⊢S is equivalent to K in the following sense:
there exist ∆(p) a set of equation in a single variable and E(p, q) a set of formulas in
two variables such that, for every Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL and Σ ∪ {ϕ ≈ ψ} ⊆ EqL,
(i) Γ ⊢S α iff ∆(Γ) K ∆(α)
(ii) Σ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ iff E(Σ) ⊢S E(ϕ, ψ)
(iii) ϕ ≈ ψ
K
∆(E(ϕ, ψ))
(iv) α ⊣⊢S E(∆(α))
The set E(p, q) is called a set of equivalence formulas and ∆(p) a set of defining
equations for S and K.
In other words, K is an equivalent algebraic semantics for S iff there exists a
pair of interpretations τ : FmL → P(EqL) and ρ : EqL → P(FmL) that commute
with arbitrary substitutions and are mutually inverse. It is not difficult to see that
conditions (i) and (iii) are equivalent to conditions (ii) and (iv).
We have seen, in Example 5.2, that the class BA is an algebraic semantics of CPL.
Now, we show that it is an equivalent algebraic semantics.
Example 5.6 (Classical Propositional Logic [BP01]). The interpretation τ of ⊢CPL
in
BA
commutes with arbitrary substitutions and is defined in the following way:
for all α ∈ FmL, τ(α) = {α ≈ ⊤}. There exists an interpretation ρ of BA in ⊢CPL
that commutes with arbitrary substitutions and is defined in the following way: for
all ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ EqL, ρ(ϕ ≈ ψ) = {ϕ → ψ, ψ → ϕ}. We can prove that conditions (i)
and (iii) hold. Therefore, the class of BA forms an equivalent algebraic semantics for
CPL, ∆(p) = {p ≈ ⊤} is the set of defining equations and E(p, q) = {p → q, q → p}
the set of equivalence formulas for CPL and BA. ♦
5.7 Weakly Algebraizable Logics
In this section, we define the class of weakly algebraizable logics which is a proper
subclass of the class of protoalgebraic logics. We also characterized weakly algebraizable
logics using the Leibniz operator. We point out to [CJ00] for more details about these
logics.
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Definition 5.7.1. A logic S is called weakly algebraizable if there exist a class K of L-
algebras, an l-parameterized system of equations ∆(p, v) and an k-parameterized system
of formulas E(p, q, r) such that the following conditions hold, for every Γ∪{α} ⊆ FmL
and Σ ∪ {ϕ ≈ ψ} ⊆ EqL:
(i) Γ ⊢S α iff ∆(〈Γ〉) K ∆(〈α〉);
(ii) Σ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ iff E(〈Σ〉) ⊢S E(〈ϕ, ψ〉);
(iii) ϕ ≈ ψ
K
∆(〈E(〈ϕ, ψ〉)〉);
(iv) α ⊣⊢S E(〈∆(〈α〉)〉).
In other words, a logic S is weakly algebraizable iff there exists an equational
consequence relation
K
on EqL equivalent to ⊢S, and the equivalence between ⊢S and
K
is established by means of interpretations τ and ρ that commute with surjective
substitutions and are mutually inverse.
In order to prove the theorem that gives a characterization of weakly algebraizable
logics using the Leibniz operator, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 5.7.2. [Cze01, Lemma 1.6.2] Let S be a protoalgebraic logic and E(p, q, r) an
k-parameterized system of equivalence formulas for S. Then the following conditions
are equivalent:
(i) Ω is injective on Th(S);
(ii) p ⊣⊢S
⋃
{E(〈ϕ, ψ〉) : ϕ ≡ ψ(Ω(CnS(p)))};
(iii) There exists a set ∆(p) of equations in a single variable p such that p ⊣⊢S
⋃
{E(〈ϕ, ψ〉) : ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(p)}.
Theorem 5.7.3. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is weakly algebraizable;
(ii) The Leibniz operator Ω is monotone and injective on Th(S);
(iii) The Leibniz operator ΩA is monotone and injective on FiS(A) for every
algebra A.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) Assume S is weakly algebraizable. There exists a class K of L-
algebras, an l-parameterized system of equations ∆(p, v) and an k-parameterized sys-
tem of formulas E(p, q, r) such that they satisfy conditions in Definition 5.7.1. By
Proposition 5.5.3, S is protoalgebraic and E(p, q, r) is an k-parameterized system of
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equivalence formulas for S. By Theorem 3.3.1, the Leibniz operator Ω is monotone on
Th(S). Now, let T1, T2 ∈ Th(S). Suppose ΩT1 = ΩT2. Let α ∈ T1, i.e, T1 ⊢S α. By
condition (iv) of Definition 5.7.1, α ⊣⊢S E(〈∆(〈α〉)〉). Hence T1 ⊢S E(〈∆(〈α〉)〉), i.e.,
E(〈∆(〈α〉)〉) ⊆ CnS(E(〈∆(〈α〉)〉)) ⊆ T1. Thus, for all ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(〈α〉), ϕ ≡ ψ(ΩT1).
Since Ω(T1) = Ω(T2); for all ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(〈α〉), ϕ ≡ ψ(ΩT2), i.e., E(〈∆(〈α〉)〉) ⊆ T2. So,
T2 ⊢S E(〈∆(〈α〉)〉). By condition (iv) of Definition 5.7.1, T2 ⊢S α, i.e., α ∈ T2. In an
analogous way, we can prove that T2 ⊆ T1. Therefore T1 = T2.
(ii) ⇒ (iii) Since the Leibniz operator is monotone on Th(S), by Theorem 3.3.1,
it is also monotone on FiS(A) for every algebra A. Now let A be an algebra and
F1, F2 ∈ FiS(A). Suppose that ΩAF1 = ΩAF2. Let a ∈ F1. Then Fi
A
S (a) ⊆ F1.
Since the Leibniz operator is monotone on Th(S), by Theorem 3.3.1, S is protoalge-
braic. By Theorem 3.4.3, S has an k-parameterized system of equivalence formulas
E(p, q, r). As Ω is injective on Th(S), by Lemma 5.7.2, there exists a set ∆(p) of
equations in a single variable p such that p ⊣⊢S
⋃
{E(〈ϕ, ψ〉) : ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(p)}.
We fixe ϕ(p) ≈ ψ(p) ∈ ∆(p). We have that EA(〈ϕA(a), ψA(a)〉) ⊆ FiAS (a). Hence,
FiAS (
⋃
{EA(〈ϕA(a), ψA(a)〉) : ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(p)}) ⊆ FiAS (a). We also have that for every
homomorphism h : FmL → A such that h(p) = a, a ∈ Fi
A
S (
⋃
{EA(〈h(ϕ), h(ψ)〉) : ϕ ≈
ψ ∈ ∆(p)}), i.e., a ∈ FiAS (
⋃
{EA(〈ϕA(a), ψA(a)〉) : ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(p)}). Thus FiAS (a) ⊆
FiAS (
⋃
{EA(〈ϕA(a), ψA(a)〉) : ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(p)}). Therefore FiAS (a) = Fi
A
S (
⋃
{EA(〈ϕA(a),
ψA(a)〉) : ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(p)}).
a ∈ F1 iff Fi
A
S (a) ⊆ F1 iff E
A(〈ϕA(a), ψA(a)〉) ⊆ F1 for all ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(p)
iff ϕA(a) ≡ ψA(a)(ΩAF1) for all ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(p)
iff ϕA(a) ≡ ψA(a)(ΩAF2) for all ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(p)
iff EA(〈ϕA(a), ψA(a)〉) ⊆ F2 for all ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(p)
iff FiAS (
⋃
{EA(〈ϕA(a), ψA(a)〉) : ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(p)}) ⊆ F2 iff Fi
A
S (a) ⊆ F2 iff a ∈ F2.
Hence F1 = F2.
(iii)⇒ (i) Assume that the Leibniz operator is monotone and injective on FiS(A)
for every algebra A. By Theorem 3.3.1, S is protoalgebraic. And by Theorem 3.4.3,
there exists E(p, q, r) an k-parameterized system of equivalence formulas for S. On the
other hand, since the Leibniz operator is injective on FiS(A) for every algebra A, it
is also injective on Th(S). By Lemma 5.7.2 and structurality of S, there exists a set
∆(p) of equations such that for all α ∈ FmL, α ⊣⊢S
⋃
{E(〈ϕ, ψ〉) : ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(α)},
i.e., α ⊣⊢S E(〈∆(α)〉). Let K be the class of L-algebras. We define the relation K
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on P(EqL) as follows: for all Σ ⊆ EqL, Σ K ϕ ≈ ψ iff E(〈Σ〉) ⊢S E(〈ϕ, ψ〉). It is not
difficult to see that
K
is an equational consequence relation on EqL. Therefore S is
weakly algebraizable.
A class M of matrices has its filters equationally definable by a set of equations
∆(p) = {δi(p) ≈ ǫi(p) : i ∈ I} in a single variable p, if for any matrix 〈A, F 〉 ∈ M and
any a ∈ A; a ∈ F iff δAi (a) = ǫ
A
i (a). We say that a class of matrices M has its filters
implicitly definable if; for any algebra A if 〈A, F 〉, 〈A, G〉 ∈ M then F = G, i.e., the
matrices in M are uniquely determined by their algebraic reducts. Obviously, if the
filters are equationally definable in M by a set of equations ∆(p) then they are also
implicitly definable.
Theorem 5.7.4. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is weakly algebraizable;
(ii) the Leibniz operator is monotone on FiS(A) for every algebra A and the class
Mod∗(S) has its filters equationally definable;
(iii) the Leibniz operator is monotone on Th(S) and the class L∗(S) has its filters
equationally definable;
(iv) the Leibniz operator is monotone on FiS(A) for every algebra A and the class
Mod∗(S) has its filters implicitly definable;
(v) the Leibniz operator is monotone on Th(S) and the class L∗(S) has its filters
implicitly definable.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) Assume S is weakly algebraizable. By Theorem 5.7.3, the Leibniz
operator is monotone on FiS(A) for every algebra A. And by Theorem 3.3.1, S is
protoalgebraic. Thus by Theorem 3.4.3, there exists E(p, q, r) an k-parameterized
system of equivalence formulas for S. Since S is weakly algebraizable, by Theorem 5.7.3,
the Leibniz operator is injective on Th(S). And so, by Lemma 5.7.2, there exists a set
of equations ∆(p) in a single variable such that p ⊣⊢S
⋃
{E(〈ϕ, ψ〉) : ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(p)},
i.e., p ⊣⊢S E(〈∆(p)〉). Let 〈A, F 〉 ∈Mod
∗(S) and a ∈ F . Since, p ⊣⊢S E(〈∆(p)〉), we
have that EA(〈∆(a)〉) ⊆ F . Thus
⋃
{EA(〈ϕA(a), ψA(a)〉 : ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(p)}) ⊆ F , i.e.,
ϕA(a) ≡ ψA(a)(ΩAF ) for all ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(p). Since 〈A, F 〉 ∈ Mod
∗(S), ΩAF = △A.
Hence for all ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ∆(p), ϕA(a) = ψA(a).
(ii)⇒ (iii) It is obvious, since L∗(S) ⊆Mod∗(S).
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(ii) ⇒ (iv) It is obvious, since the property equationally definable implies the
property implicitly definable.
(iii)⇒ (v) It is obvious.
(iv)⇒ (v) It is obvious.
(v) ⇒ (i) Let T1, T2 ∈ Th(S). Suppose that ΩT1 = ΩT2. The respective reduction
matrices 〈FmL/ΩT1, T1/ΩT1〉 and 〈FmL/ΩT2, T2/ΩT2〉 are in L
∗(S). Since ΩT1 =
ΩT2, we have that FmL/ΩT1 = FmL/ΩT2. By assumption, T1/ΩT1 = T2/ΩT2, i.e.,
T1/ΩT1 = T2/ΩT1. Thus, by compatibility, T1 = T2. Hence the Leibniz operator is
injective on Th(S). Since the Leibniz operator is monotone on Th(S), by Theorem
5.7.3, S is weakly algebraizable.
In the Examples 3.2 and 4.2, we have seen that the minimal orthologic SOL is
protoalgebraic but not equivalential. Now, we prove that SOL is weakly algebraizable
using Theorem 5.7.4 .
Example 5.8 (Orthologic [Mal89]). Since SOL is protoalgebraic, by Theorem 3.3.1, the
Leibniz operator is monotone on Th(SOL). Consider a set of equation ∆(p) = {p ≈ 1},
where 1 denotes an arbitrary but fixed theorem of SOL (e.g., 1 := p ∨ ¬p). If we prove
that for any T ∈ Th(SOL) and any α ∈ FmL, α ∈ T iff α ≡ 1(ΩT ); then we have shown
that the class L∗(S) has its filters equationally definable by the set ∆(p).
Let T ∈ Th(S) and α ∈ FmL. Suppose that α ∈ T . Let ϕ ∈ FmL. Since
1 ∈ Thm(S), 1 ∈ T . As α, ϕ(α) ⊢SOL ϕ(1) (because it is an inference rule of SOL),
we have that ϕ(α) ∈ T implies ϕ(1) ∈ T . Since α, ϕ(1) ⊢SOL ϕ(α) (because it is also
an inference rules of SOL), we have that ϕ(1) ∈ T implies ϕ(α) ∈ T . Therefore for
all ϕ ∈ FmL, ϕ(α) ∈ T iff ϕ(1) ∈ T . Thus α ≡ 1(ΩT ). Conversely, suppose that
α ≡ 1(ΩT ). Since 1 ∈ Thm(S), 1 ∈ T . By compatibility, α ∈ T .
Since the class L∗(S) has its filters equationally definable by the set ∆(p) and the
Leibniz operator is monotone on Th(SOL), by Theorem 5.7.4, the minimal orthologic
SOL is weakly algebraizable. ♦
5.9 Algebraizable Logics
In [BP89], Blok and Pigozzi have defined the notion of “algebraizable logic” for finitary
logic. They are logics that have an equivalent algebraic semantics. The idea underlying
the definition is the following: a logic is algebraizable if there exists a class of algebras
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that can be associated to the logic in the same way as the class of BA has been
associated to CPL.
Definition 5.9.1. A logic S is called algebraizable (also called possibly infinitely
algebraizable in [Her96]) if there exist a class K of L-algebras, a set of equations
∆(p) and a set of formulas E(p, q) such that the following conditions hold, for every
Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL and Σ ∪ {ϕ ≈ ψ} ⊆ EqL:
(i) Γ ⊢S α iff ∆(Γ) K ∆(α);
(ii) Σ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ iff E(Σ) ⊢S E(ϕ, ψ);
(iii) ϕ ≈ ψ
K
∆(E(ϕ, ψ));
(iv) α ⊣⊢S E(∆(α)).
The class K is called an equivalent algebraic semantics; and E(p, q) the set of equiv-
alence formulas and ∆(p) the set of defining equations for S and K.
In other words, a logic S is algebraizable iff there exists an equational consequence
relation
K
on EqL equivalent to ⊢S, and the equivalence between ⊢S and K is
established by means of interpretations τ and ρ that commute with arbitrary substi-
tutions and are mutually inverse. That is, if there exists a class K of L-algebras that
is an equivalent algebraic semantics for S with τ(p) the set of defining equations and
ρ(p ≈ q) the set of equivalence formulas for S and K.
We note that the difference between weakly algebraizable logic and algebraizable
logic is that in the latter, the set of equations and the set of formulas do not have
parameters. Thus, if a logic S is algebraizable, then it is weakly algebraizable.
Theorem 5.9.2. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is algebraizable;
(ii) The Leibniz operator Ω is monotone, injective and commutes with inverse
substitutions on Th(S).
Proof. Assume S is algebraizable. Hence S is weakly algebraizable and by Theorem
5.7.3, the Leibniz operator Ω is monotone and injective on Th(S). Let K be a class of
L-algebras, ∆(p) a set of equations and E(p, q) a set of formulas such that conditions of
Definition 5.7.1 hold. By Proposition 5.5.5, S is equivalential and E(p, q) is a system of
equivalence formulas for S. And by Theorem 4.1.5, the Leibniz operator Ω commutes
with inverse substitutions on Th(S).
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Conversely, suppose Ω is monotone, injective and commutes with inverse substi-
tutions on Th(S). By Theorem 4.1.5, S is equivalential. There exists a system of
equivalence formulas E(p, q) for S. Consider the class of algebras K = {FmL/ΩT :
T ∈ Th(S)}. It is not difficult to see that for every Σ ∪ {ϕ ≈ ψ} ⊆ EqL, Σ K ϕ ≈ ψ
iff E(Σ) ⊢S E(ϕ, ψ). Let T = CnS(p) and e a substitution such that e(r) = p for
every r ∈ Var. Consider ∆(p) = e[ΩT ]. As we can see pair of formulas as equations,
∆(p) is a set of equations. Let ϕ, ψ ∈ FmL. We have that ϕ ≡ ψ
(
Ω(CnS(E(ΩT )))
)
iff
E(ϕ, ψ) ⊆ CnS(E(ΩT )) iff E(ΩT ) ⊢S E(ϕ, ψ) iff ΩT K ϕ ≈ ψ iff ϕ ≡ ψ(ΩT ). Thus
Ω(CnS(E(ΩT ))) = ΩT . Since the Leibniz operator is injective, CnS(E(ΩT )) = T . As
T = CnS(p), p ⊣⊢S T . Thus p ⊣⊢S E(ΩT ). By structurality of S, e(p) ⊣⊢S e[E(ΩT )].
Since e[E(ΩT )] = E(e[ΩT ]) = E(∆(p)) and e(p) = p, we have that p ⊣⊢S E(∆(p)).
Thus S is algebraizable.
By the above characterization of algebraizable logics, it is not difficult to prove the
following Corollary.
Corollary 5.9.3. The class of algebraizable logics is the intersection of the class of
equivalential logics and the class of weakly algebraizable logics.
If a deductive system is algebraizable then any fragment, whose language includes
the connectives occurring in the set of defining equations and the set of equivalence
formulas; and any extension are algebraizable with the same set of defining equations
and set of equivalence formulas.
Corollary 5.9.4. Let S be a deductive system. If S is algebraizable, then any extension
of S is itself algebraizable with the same set of equivalence formulas and set of defining
equations.
Thus, any axiomatic extension of an algebraizable deductive system is itself alge-
braizable.
Corollary 5.9.5. Let S be an algebraizable deductive system. Then any L′-fragment
of S, where L′ contains all primitive connectives that occur in the set of equivalence
formulas and set of defining equations, is algebraizable with the same set of equivalence
formulas and set of defining equation.
A logic may have (if any) many algebraic semantics, but the equivalent algebraic
semantics associated with an algebraizable logic is unique in a following sense.
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Theorem 5.9.6. Let S be an algebraizable logic, K and K′ two equivalent algebraic
semantics for S such that E(p, q) is the set of equivalence formulas and ∆(p) the set
of defining equations for S and K, and similarly E ′(p′, q′) and ∆′(p′) for S and K′.
Then
K
=
K′
, E(p, q) ⊣⊢S E
′(p′, q′) and ∆(p)
K
∆′(p′).
Therefore, there is (if any) one equivalent algebraic semantics that can be canoni-
cally associated with the logic. We write the equivalent algebraic semantics when we
want to refer to the largest equivalent algebraic semantics.
The duality of this result fails to hold. There are distinct logics with the same
equivalent algebraic semantics. In [BP89, Theorem 5.12], Blok and Pigozzi have given
an example of two distinct finitely algebraizable deductive systems with the same
equivalent quasivariety semantics.
Theorem 5.9.7. Let S be a logic. A sufficient condition for S to be algebraizable is
that is equivalential with a set of equivalence formulas E(p, q) that satisfies:
p, q ⊢S E(p, q) (G-rule)
In this case E(p, q) and ∆(p) = {p ≈ E(p, p)} are, respectively, the set of equiva-
lence formulas and the set of defining equations. If the sufficient condition of the above
theorem is satisfied the logic is said to be regularly algebraizable (or 1-equivalential in
[Her96]). That is, a logic is regularly algebraizable if there exists a set E(p, q) of for-
mulas such that conditions of reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, simple replacement,
modus ponens and G-rule hold (c.f. [CP04b, Definition 2.3]). Moreover, if the set of
equivalence formulas is finite then we say that the logic is finitely regularly algebraiz-
able. Thus, every (finitely) regularly algebraizable logic is (finitely) algebraizable. We
point out to [Cze01, Chapter 5] and [CP04a] for a detailed study of this class of logics.
5.10 Finitely Algebraizable Logics
In this section, we study the class of finitely algebraizable logics that is a proper subclass
of algebraizable logics.
Definition 5.10.1. A logic S is said to be finitely algebraizable if there exist a class
K of L-algebras, a finite set of equations ∆(p) and a finite set of formulas E(p, q) such
that the following conditions hold, for every Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL and Σ ∪ {ϕ ≈ ψ} ⊆ EqL:
(i) Γ ⊢S α iff ∆(Γ) K ∆(α);
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(ii) Σ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ iff E(Σ) ⊢S E(ϕ, ψ);
(iii) ϕ ≈ ψ
K
∆(E(ϕ, ψ));
(iv) α ⊣⊢S E(∆(α)).
The class K is called an equivalent algebraic semantics; and E(p, q) the set of equiv-
alence formulas and ∆(p) the set of defining equations for S and K.
In other words, a finitely algebraizable logic is an algebraizable logic where the set
of defining equations and the set of equivalence formulas are finite.
In the following theorem, we give a characterization of this class of logics using the
Leibniz operator.
Theorem 5.10.2. Let S be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is finitely algebraizable;
(ii) The Leibniz operator ΩA is injective and continuous on FiS(A) for every
algebra A.
(iii) The Leibniz operator Ω is injective and continuous on Th(S).
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) Assume S is finitely algebraizable. There exist a class K of L-
algebras, a finite set of equations ∆(p) and a finite set of formulas E(p, q) that satisfy
conditions of Definition 5.10.1. Thus S is weakly algebraizable. By Theorem 5.7.3,
the Leibniz operator is injective on FiS(A) for every algebra A. And by Theorem
5.5.5, S is equivalential and E(p, q) is a system of equivalence formulas for S. Since
E(p, q) is finite, S is finitely equivalential. By Theorem 4.1.6, the Leibniz operator Ω
is continuous on FiS(A) for every algebra A.
(ii)⇒ (iii) It is obvious.
(iii) ⇒ (i) Since the Leibniz operator is continuous on Th(S), by Theorem 4.1.6,
S is finitely equivalential. Thus S is equivalential and by Theorem 4.1.5, the Leibniz
operator is monotone and commutes with inverse substitutions on Th(S). By assump-
tion, the Leibniz operator is also injective on Th(S). Thus by Theorem 5.9.2, S is
algebraizable, i.e, there exists a class K of L-algebras which is an equivalent alge-
braic semantics for S with ∆(p) the set of defining equations and E(p, q) the set of
equivalence formulas. By Theorem 5.5.5, S is equivalential with E(p, q) the system of
equivalence formulas for S. Since S is finitely equivalential, the set E(p, q) must be
finite. Thus the set ∆(p) must be also finite. Therefore S is finitely algebraizable.
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We prove that if a finitely algebraizable logic S is finitary then the equational
consequence relation which is equivalent to ⊢S is also finitary.
Proposition 5.10.3. Let S be a finitely algebraizable logic with the correspondent
equivalent algebraic semantics K. If S is finitary, then
K
is also finitary.
Proof. Assume S is a finitary finitely algebraizable logic. Let K be the equivalent
algebraic semantics for S; and ∆(p) the finite set of defining equations and E(p, q) the
finite set of equivalence formulas for S and K. Let Σ ∪ {ϕ ≈ ψ} ⊆ EqL. By condition
(ii) of Definition 5.5.1, Σ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ iff E(Σ) ⊢S E(ϕ, ψ). Since S is finitary and E(p, q)
is finite, there exists a finite Σf ⊆ Σ such that E(Σ) ⊢S E(ϕ, ψ) iff E(Σf ) ⊢S E(ϕ, ψ).
And by condition (ii) of Definition 5.5.1, E(Σf ) ⊢S E(ϕ, ψ) iff Σf K ϕ ≈ ψ. Thus
Σ
K
ϕ ≈ ψ iff Σf K ϕ ≈ ψ for some finite Σf ⊆ Σ. Therefore K is finitary.
Now, we define the notion of algebraization as Blok and Pigozzi have studied in
[BP89].
Definition 5.10.4. A logic S is said to be algebraizable in the sense of Blok and
Pigozzi if it is finitary and has an equivalent algebraic semantics K with ∆(p) the
finite set of defining equations and E(p, q) the finite set of equivalence formulas for S
and K.
I.e., S is algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi iff S is finitary and finitely
algebraizable.
We show that there is (if any) an equivalent algebraic semantics which is a quasi-
variety for algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi logic.
Theorem 5.10.5. Let S be an algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi logic; and
K and K′ two equivalent algebraic semantics for S. Then Q(K) = Q(K′), i.e., K and
K′ generate the same quasivariety, and Q(K) is also an equivalent algebraic seman-
tics called equivalent quasivariety semantics (it is unique and is the largest equivalent
algebraic semantics for S).
If S is an algebraizable logic whose algebraic counterpart is a variety, we say that
S is strongly algebraizable.
In the following theorem, we give a characterization for logics which are algebraiz-
able in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi.
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Theorem 5.10.6. [Cze01, Theorem 4.6.5] Let S be a finitary logic andK a quasivariety
of L-algebras. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is finitely algebraizable with equivalent quasivariety semantics K;
(ii) For every L-algebra A, not necessarily in K, the Leibniz operator ΩA estab-
lished an isomorphism between the lattices FiS(A) of S-filters and CoK(A) of
K-congruences of A.
Corollary 5.10.7. Let S be an algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi logic and
K the equivalent quasivariety semantics. Then K is the class of all algebraic reducts
of Mod∗(S), i.e., K = Alg∗(S).
Proof. Let M = 〈A, D〉 ∈ Mod∗(S). By assumption and Theorem 5.10.6, ΩAD ∈
CoK(A). Thus A/ΩAD ∈ K. Since M is reduced, ΩAD = △A. Therefore A ∈ K.
For the reverse inclusion, suppose that A ∈ K. Thus △A ∈ CoK(A). By Theorem
5.10.6, there exists a unique D ∈ FiS(A) such that △A = ΩAD. Therefore the matrix
〈A, D〉 ∈Mod∗(S).
An expansion S ′ of an algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi logic S is
not necessarily finitely algebraizable. In [Cai04, Example 1], Caicedo has given an
example of an expansion of the IPL that is not finitely algebraizable. Nevertheless,
if an expansion of S is finitely algebraizable, then it is not necessarily with the same
set of equivalence formulas and set of defining equations as S. Indeed, in [Cai04,
Example 2], we can find an expansion of the CPL that is finitely algebraizable with
the set of equivalence formulas E(p, q) = {2(p→ q),2(q → p)} and the set of defining
equations ∆(p) = {¬¬p ≈ ⊤} which are different that the ones for CPL. However,
if the axioms and inference rules of S ′ define implicitly the new connectives then S ′
is finitely algebraizable with the same set of equivalence formulas and set of defining
equations as S and its equivalent quasivariety semantics is the class of algebras that is
increased algebras of Alg∗(S) (c.f. [Cai04, Theorem 1]).
We have seen that we can characterized all the classes of logics until studied by
properties of the Leibniz operator. Thus, in the following figure, we present the relation
between these different classes which is called the Leibniz hierarchy.
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Figure 5.1: A view of the Leibniz Hierarchy
5.10.1 Bridge Theorems
The relationship between the class of algebras that we associate to algebraizable logic
and a logic itself is very strong. We can find in the literature, several relations between
properties of finitary finitely algebraizable logic S and its equivalent quasivariety se-
mantics Alg∗(S). These relations are important because sometimes it is easier to
understand a problem concerning logic S by translating it to correspondent property
of the algebra in Alg∗(S). In this section, we only enunciate some bridge theorems
without their proofs.
A class K of algebras has the amalgamation property if for any pair of embedding
mappings f : C → A and g : C → B with A,B,C ∈ K, there exists D ∈ K and
embedding mappings h : A → D and k : B → D such that h ◦ f = k ◦ g. A logic
S has the Craig´s interpolation property if for any two formulas ϕ and ψ such that
ϕ ⊢S ψ, there exists a third formula α, called an interpolant, such that every variable
in α occurs both in ϕ and ψ, and we have that ϕ ⊢S α and α ⊢S ψ. A finitary
finitely algebraizable logic S has the Craig´s interpolation property iff Alg∗(S) has the
amalgamation property (c.f. [ANS01, Theorem 6.15] and [CP99, Theorem 3.5]).
A logic S has the Beth´s definability property if implicit definability equals explicit
definability (c.f. [BH06, Definition 3.3]). Let K be a class of algebras and A,B ∈ K.
A morphism h : A → B is called an epimorphism of K if; for every C ∈ K and
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every f, g ∈ Hom(B,C), we have that f ◦ h = g ◦ h implies f = g. A finitary finitely
algebraizable logic S has the Beth´s definability property iff all the epimorphisms of
Alg∗(S) are surjective (c.f. [ANS01, Theorem 6.11] and [BH06, Theorem 3.17]).
We can state that CPL has the Craig´s interpolation property and the Beth´s
definability property. Thus the class BA has the amalgamation property and all epi-
morphisms in BA are surjective.
We say that a class of algebras K has equationally definable principal relative con-
gruence (EDPRC for short) if there is a finite set of equations in at most four variables
{εi(x0, x1, y0, y1) ≈ δi(x0, x1, y0, y1) : i ≤ n} such that for every algebra A ∈ K and
all a, b, c, d ∈ A, c ≡ d
(
θA
K
(a, b)
)
iff εAi (a, b, c, d) = δ
A
i (a, b, c, d) for all i ≤ n. A fini-
tary finitely algebraizable logic S has the DDT iff its equivalent quasivariety semantics
Alg∗(S) has the EDPRC property (c.f. [BP01, Theorem 5.5]). We have a generaliza-
tion of this result in [CP04b, Theorem 3.3], where Czelakowski and Pigozzi described
the relation between the MDDT and the EDPRC property.
5.11 Examples
Example 5.12 (Classical Propositional Logic [BP01]). In Example 5.6, we have seen
that CPL has an equivalent algebraic semantics, which is the class BA, with ∆(p) =
{p ≈ ⊤} the set of defining equation and E(p, q) = {p → q, q → p} the set of equiva-
lence formulas for CPL and BA. Thus CPL is finitary and finitely algebraizable.
Furthermore, CPL has the DDT, that is, for every Γ∪{ϕ, ψ} ⊆ FmL, we have that
Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢CPL ψ iff Γ ⊢CPL ϕ→ ψ.
Thus the class BA has the EDPRC property (c.f. [BP01, Theorem 5.6]). Indeed, for
every A ∈ BA and a, b, c, d ∈ A, we have that
c ≡ d(θA
BA
(a, b)) iff (a↔ b) ∧ c = (a↔ b) ∧ d,
where a↔ b abbreviates (a→ b) ∧ (b→ a). ♦
Example 5.13 (Intuitionistic Propositional Logic [BP01]). The Intuitionistic Propo-
sitional Logic, IPL, has the same language as CPL. It is defined by the following
axioms: (A1),(A2),(A4)− (A11), together with
(A12) ¬p→ (p→ ⊥)
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(A13) (p→ ⊥)→ ¬p
and by the only inference rule, modus ponens.
A Heyting algebra is an algebra A = 〈A,→A,∧A,∨A,¬A,⊥A,⊤A〉 such that
〈A,∧A,∨A, ⊥A,⊤A〉 is a bounded (where ⊥ is the minimum and ⊤ the maximum),
distributive lattice and for a, b ∈ A, a →A b is the largest element c (with respect to
the lattice order) such that a ∧A c ≤ b and ¬Aa = a →A ⊤A. Thus →A is a binary
operation with the property, for all a, b, c ∈ A; c ≤ a→A b iff a∧A c ≤ b. The operation
→A is called relative pseudo-complementation. Each finite distributive lattice admits
a unique relative pseudo-complementation operation. Hence every finite distributive
lattice is the reduct of a unique Heyting algebra. In contrast with the class of Boolean
algebras, the variety of Heyting algebras, HA, is not generated by a finite algebra.
The class HA forms an equivalent algebraic semantics for IPL with the same set
of defining equations and set of equivalence formulas as for CPL, i.e., ∆(p) = {p ≈ ⊤}
and E(p, q) = {p→ q, q → p}. Thus IPL is finitary and finitely algebraizable.
Furthermore, IPL has the DDT. Indeed, for every Γ∪{ϕ, ψ} ⊆ FmL, we have that
Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢IPL ψ iff Γ ⊢IPL ϕ→ ψ.
Thus the class HA has the EDPRC property (c.f. [BP01, Example 5.2.2]). Actually,
for every A ∈ HA and a, b, c, d ∈ A, we have that
c ≡ d(θA
HA
(a, b)) iff (a↔ b) ∧ c = (a↔ b) ∧ d,
where a↔ b abbreviates (a→ b) ∧ (b→ a). ♦
The various implication fragments of CPL and IPL are all finitely algebraizable.
Since the equivalent algebraic semantics of CPL and IPL are the varieties BA and
HA, respectively, the equivalent algebraic semantics of each fragment of CPL or IPL
that contains either → or ↔ is the class of all subalgebras of the appropriate reducts
of Boolean or Heyting algebras, respectively. In particular, the equivalent algebraic
semantics of the {∧,→}, the {∧,↔}, the {→}, and the {↔} fragments are called
the varieties of Brouwerian semilattices, Skolem semilattices, Hilbert algebras, and
equivalential algebras.
Example 5.14 (Logic of Andre´ka and Ne´meti [CJ00]). The finitary logic of Andre´ka
and Ne´meti, denoted by SAN, is defined in the language L = {↔, ∗} (where ↔ is a
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binary connective and ∗ is unary), by the axioms:
∗p and p↔ p
and the infinite family of inference rules:
(i) p, p↔ q ⊢AN q;
(ii) p ⊢AN ϕ↔ ϕ(p/ ∗ p), for each ϕ ∈ FmL;
(iii) p ⊢AN ϕ(p/ ∗ p)↔ ϕ, for each ϕ ∈ FmL.
Theorem 5.14.1. SAN is weakly algebraizable but not algebraizable.
Proof. We show that the Leibniz operator is monotone on Th(SAN) and the class
L∗(SAN) has its filters equationally definable. Let ∆(p, q) = {p ↔ q}. Since p ↔ p
is an axiom and modus ponens can be deduce by the inference rules, ∆(p, q) is a
protoequivalence system for SAN. By Theorem 3.1.3, SAN is protoalgebraic. And by
Theorem 3.3.1, the Leibniz operator is monotone on Th(SAN). Now, let {p ≈ ∗p} be
a set of equation in a single variable p. We have that for every T ∈ Th(SAN), α ∈ T
iff α ≡ ∗α(ΩT ). Indeed, let α ∈ T . By the inference rules (ii) and (iii), we have
that ϕ(p/α) ↔ ϕ(p/ ∗ α) ∈ T and ϕ(p/ ∗ α) ↔ ϕ(p/α) ∈ T , for all ϕ ∈ FmL and
p ∈ Var. And, by the inference rule (i), ϕ(p/α) ∈ T iff ϕ(p/ ∗ α) ∈ T , for all ϕ ∈ FmL
and p ∈ Var. Thus α ≡ ∗α(ΩT ). Conversely, suppose that α ≡ ∗α(ΩT ). Since ΩT
is a congruence, α ↔ α ≡ ∗α ↔ α(ΩT ). By the second axiom, α ↔ α ∈ T . And
by compatibility, ∗α ↔ α ∈ T . Moreover, by the first axiom, ∗α ∈ T . And by the
inference rule (i), we have that α ∈ T . Therefore L∗(SAN) has its filters equationally
definable by {p ≈ ∗p}. By Theorem 5.7.4, SAN is weakly algebraizable.
Finally, we show that the class Mod∗(SAN) is not closed under submatrices. Let
M = 〈A, F 〉 be the matrix where F = {1, 2} and A is a four-element algebra, A =
{0, 1, 2, 3} with ↔A given by the table
↔A 0 1 2 3
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
2 0 1 2 3
3 0 0 3 2
The operation ∗A is defined, for every a ∈ A, by ∗Aa := a↔A a. It is not difficult to
prove that the matrix M ∈Mod∗(SAN). Let N = 〈B,B∩F 〉 be a submatrix of M where
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B = {0, 1, 2}. Since Mod(SAN) is closed under submatrices, N ∈ Mod(SAN). And
as 1 ≡ 2(ΩB(B ∩ F )), N is not reduced. By Theorem 4.1.7, SAN is not equivalential.
Therefore SAN is not algebraizable.
♦
Example 5.15 (Last Judgement [Her96]). The finitary logic Last Judgement, denoted
by LJ, is defined in the modal language L = {→,¬,∧,∨,2}, where→,∧,∨ are binary
connectives and ¬,2 are unary, by the following axioms:
(i) all classical tautologies;
(ii) 2nφ for all intuitionistic tautologies φ and n ≥ 0;
(iii) 2n(2(p→ q)→ (2p→ 2q)), for all n ≥ 0;
(iv) (p→ q)→ 2n(¬q → ¬p), for all n ≥ 0.
and the inference rule modus ponens.
Theorem 5.15.1. LJ is algebraizable but not finitely algebraizable.
Proof. We show that E(p, q) = {2n(p → q) : n ≥ 0} ∪ {2n(q → p) : n ≥ 0}
is a system of equivalence formulas for LJ. We prove by induction on n ≥ 0 that
2
n(p → q) ⊢LJ 2
np → 2nq. If n = 0, then p → q ⊢LJ p → q, which is always true.
Now assume that it is true for n and we show for n+1. Let e be a substitution such that
e(p) = 2(p→ q) and e(q) = 2p→ 2q. By structurality of LJ and induction hypothesi,
e(2n(p → q)) ⊢LJ e(2
np → 2nq), i.e., 2n(e(p) → e(q)) ⊢LJ 2
ne(p) → 2ne(q). Thus,
2
n(2(p → q) → (2p → 2q)) ⊢LJ 2
n(2(p → q)) → 2n(2p → 2q). By axiom
(iii), we have that ⊢LJ 2
n(2(p → q)) → 2n(2p → 2q). And by modus ponens,
2
n+1(p → q) ⊢LJ 2
n(2p → 2q). Let e′ be another substitution such that e′(p) = 2p
and e′(q) = 2q. By structurality of LJ and induction hypothesi, e′(2n(p → q)) ⊢LJ
e′(2np → 2nq), i.e., 2n(e′(p) → e′(q)) ⊢LJ 2
ne′(p) → 2ne′(q). Thus, 2n(2p →
2q) ⊢LJ 2
n
2p → 2n2q. Since we have proved that 2n+1(p → q) ⊢LJ 2
n(2p → 2q),
we obtain that 2n+1(p → q) ⊢LJ 2
n
2p → 2n2q, i.e., the hypothesi is true for n + 1.
Now, we proved that the set E(p, q) satisfies the conditions of Definition 4.1.1. From
axiom (ii), we have that reflexivity condition holds and by the inference rule, modus
ponens condition is satisfied. We verify simple replacement condition for all connectives
in the language L.
For 2 : We proved above that 2n+1(p → q) ⊢LJ 2
n(2p → 2q). Thus we have
E(p, q) ⊢LJ E(2p,2q).
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For ¬ : We have by axiom (iv) that E(p, q) ⊢LJ E(¬p,¬q).
For →,∧,∨ : It suffices to show that2n(p1 → q1),2
n(q1 → p1),2
n(p2 → q2),2
n(q2 →
p2) ⊢LJ 2
n(p1 · p2 → q1 · q2) for each n ≥ 0 where · ∈ {→,∧,∨}. Since
p1 → q1, q1 → p1, p2 → q2, q2 → p2 ⊢IPL p1 · p2 → q1 · q2, we have that
E(p1, q1), E(p2, q2) ⊢LJ E(p1 · p2, q1 · q2).
Therefore E(p, q) is a system of equivalence formulas for LJ. Then LJ is equivalential.
We show that L∗(LJ) has its filters equationally definable. Let ∆(p) = {¬p ≈ 0},
where 0 := ¬(p → p). Since p → (q → p) is an intuitionistic tautology, by axiom (ii),
⊢LJ 2
n(p → (p → p)) for all n ≥ 0. And by axiom (iv), (p → p) → p ⊢LJ 2
n(¬p →
(¬(p → p))) for all n ≥ 0. Thus p ⊢LJ 2
n(¬p → (¬(p → p))) for all n ≥ 0, i.e.,
p ⊢LJ 2
n(¬p → 0) for all n ≥ 0. Since ¬(p → p) → ¬p is an intuitionistic tautology,
by axiom (ii), ⊢LJ 2
n(¬(p → p) → ¬p) for all n ≥ 0. So p ⊢LJ 2
n(0 → ¬p) for all
n ≥ 0. We have proved that p ⊢LJ E(¬p, 0). As (¬p → ¬(p → p)) → p is a classical
tautology, by axiom (i), ⊢LJ (¬p→ ¬(p→ p))→ p, i.e., ⊢LJ (¬p→ 0)→ p. By modus
ponens, we have that ¬p → 0 ⊢LJ p, i.e., E(¬p, 0) ⊢LJ p. Therefore p ⊣⊢LJ E(¬p, 0).
Thus L∗(LJ) has its filters equationally definable. Since we have proved that LJ is
equivalential, by Theorem 4.1.5, the Leibniz operator is monotone on Th(LJ). And
by Theorem 5.7.4, LJ is weakly algebraizable. As the intersection of the classes of
equivalential and weakly algebraizable logics is the class of algebraizable logics, we
have that LJ is algebraizable.
Now, we show by contradiction that LJ is not finitely equivalential. Suppose that
LJ is finitely equivalential, i.e., there exists a finite set of equivalence formulas Ef (p, q).
Since two systems of equivalence formulas are interderivable, we have that Ef(p, q) ⊢LJ
E(p, q). Let 1 := p → p and e a substitution such that e(p) = 1 and e(q) = p.
By structurality, e[Ef (p, q)] ⊢LJ e[E(p, q)], i.e., Ef (e(p), e(q)) ⊢LJ E(e(p), e(q)). Thus
Ef(1, p) ⊢LJ E(1, p), i.e., {p,2p, . . . ,2
n−1p} ⊢LJ 2
np for some n. Let A = 〈{0, . . . , n+
1},→,∧,∨,¬,2〉 be the (n + 2)-element linearly ordered Heyting algebra, where 0 is
the smallest element and n + 1 the largest element. The operation 2 satisfies the
following conditions: 20 = 0, 2(n + 1) = n + 1 and 2k = k − 1 for 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Let D := {1, . . . , n + 1}. It is not difficult to see that 〈A, D〉 ∈ Mod∗(LJ). Let h :
FmL → A be a homomorphism such that h(p) = n. Then h[{p,2p, . . . ,2
n−1p}] ⊆ D
while h(2np) = 0 /∈ D. Hence, p,2p, . . . ,2n−1p 0LJ 2np and we have a contradiction.
Therefore LJ is not finitely equivalential.
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♦
Example 5.16 (Relevance [FR94]). The Relevance logic R is defined in the language
L = {¬,→,∧}, where →,∧ are binary connectives and ¬ is unary. We admit that
the formula ϕ ∨ ψ is an abbreviation for ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), ϕ ↔ ψ an abbreviation for
(ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ), and ϕ ∗ ψ an abbreviation for ¬(ϕ → ¬ψ), for any ϕ, ψ ∈ FmL.
The binary connective ∗ is commonly called intensional conjunction or fusion. The
Relevance logic is defined by the following axioms,
R1 ϕ→ ϕ
R2 (ϕ→ ψ)→
(
(ψ → η)→ (ϕ→ η)
)
R3 ϕ→
(
(ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ
)
R4
(
ϕ→ (ϕ→ ψ)
)
→ (ϕ→ ψ)
R5 (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ϕ
R6 (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ψ
R7
(
(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ϕ→ η)
)
→
(
ϕ→ (ψ ∧ η)
)
R8 ϕ→ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
R9 ψ → (ϕ ∨ ψ)
R10
(
(ϕ→ η) ∧ (ψ → η)
)
→
(
(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ η
)
R11
(
ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ η)
)
→
(
(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ η
)
R12 (ϕ→ ¬ψ)→ (ψ → ¬ϕ)
R13 ¬¬ϕ→ ϕ
and inference rules,
ϕ, ψ ⊢R ϕ ∧ ψ (Adjunction)
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ ⊢R ψ (Modus Ponens)
An algebra A = 〈A,¬,→,∧〉 is a De Morgan semigroup when the following condi-
tions hold, for any a, b, c ∈ A:
(i) 〈A,∧,¬〉 is a De Morgan lattice, whose ordering relation is denoted by ≤ and
the supremum operation is a ∨ b = ¬(¬a ∧ ¬b);
(ii) a→ (b→ c) ≤ b→ (a→ c);
(iii) a ≤
(
(a→ b) ∧ c
)
→ b;
(iv) a→ ¬a ≤ ¬a;
(v) a→ b ≤ ¬b→ ¬a.
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We say that an algebraA is anR-algebra ifA = 〈A,¬,→,∧〉 is a De Morgan semigroup
such that, for any a, b, c ∈ A,
(
(a→ a)∧ (b→ b)
)
→ c ≤ c. The class of all R-algebras
constitute a variety denoted by R.
Theorem 5.16.1. The Relevance logic R is finitely algebraizable with the class R as
the equivalent algebraic semantics, E(p, q) = {p → q, p → q} the set of equivalence
formulas and ∆(p) = {p ∧ (p → p) ≈ (p → p)} the set of defining equation for R and
R.
Proof. By the axioms R1 and R2, the inference rule of modus ponens and the defini-
tion of E(p, q), conditions of reflexivity, transitivity, modus ponens and symmetry are
satisfied, respectively. It is not difficult to see that simple replacement condition holds.
Thus E(p, q) is a system of equivalence formulas for R.
Now, we show that p ⊣⊢R E(∆(p)). By axiom R3, ⊢R p → ((p → p) → p). And
by modus ponens, we have that p ⊢R (p → p) → p. On the other hand, by axiom
R1, ⊢R (p → p) → (p → p). And by the inference rule adjunction, we have that
p ⊢R ((p → p) → p) ∧ ((p → p) → (p → p)). Which gives, by axiom R7 and modus
ponens, p ⊢R (p → p) → (p ∧ (p → p)). Thus we obtain that p ⊢R E(∆(p)). For
the inference in the other direction, by axiom R1 and modus ponens, we have that
(p → p) → (p ∧ (p → p)) ⊢R p ∧ (p → p). And by axiom R5 and modus ponens,
p ∧ (p → p) ⊢R p. Thus E(∆(p)) ⊢R p. We can conclude that the logic R is finitely
algebraizable.
Furthermore, since the logic RM is an axiomatic extension of R (by the mingle
axiom p→ (p→ p)), it is also algebraizable with the same set of equivalence formulas
and defining equation (c.f. [BP89, Theorem 5.8]). ♦
Example 5.17 (BCK Logic [BP01]). In Example 3.7, we have defined the logicBCK.
We say that A = 〈A, ∗, 1,≤〉 is a partially ordered monoid if A = 〈A, ∗, 1〉 is a monoid,
≤ is a partially order on A and for all x, y, z ∈ A; if x ≤ y then x ∗ z ≤ y ∗ z and
z ∗ x ≤ z ∗ y. A structure A is called integral if x ≤ 1, for all x ∈ A, and is called
residuated if; for all x, y ∈ A, the set {z : x ∗ z ≤ y} contains a largest element called
the residual of x relative to y and denoted by x → y. Since the partial order ≤ can
be recovered via x ≤ y iff x→ y = 1, a partially ordered commutative, residuated and
integral monoid 〈A, ∗, 1,≤〉 can be treated as an algebra 〈A, ∗,→, 1〉, called pocrim.
The class PO of all procrims is a quasivariety definable by:
85
(PO1) x ∗ 1 ≈ x
(PO2) x ∗ y ≈ y ∗ x
(PO3) x→ 1 ≈ 1
(PO4) 1→ x ≈ x
(PO5) (z → x)→ ((x→ y)→ (z → y)) ≈ 1
(PO6) x→ (y → z) ≈ (x ∗ y)→ z
(PO7) x→ y ≈ 1 and y → x ≈ 1⇒ x ≈ y
A BCK algebra is defined as an algebras A = 〈A,→, 1〉 satisfying PO3, PO4, PO5
and PO7 together with
(PO8) x→ x ≈ 1
(PO9) x→ (y → z) ≈ y → (x→ z)
We denoted by BCK, the class of all BCK algebras.
Theorem 5.17.1. The logic BCK is finitely algebraizable with BCK the equivalent
algebraic semantics, E(p, q) = {p → q, q → p} the set of equivalence formulas and
∆(p) = {p ≈ p→ p} the set of defining equations for BCK and BCK.
Proof. By axiom (B), modus ponens and the definition of E(p, q); reflexivity, transi-
tivity, modus ponens and symmetry conditions are satisfied, respectively. We verify
simple replacement condition for the connective →. By axiom (B), we have that
⊢BCK (p1 → q1) → ((q1 → p2) → (p1 → p2)) and ⊢BCK (q1 → p1) → ((p1 → p2) →
(q1 → p2)). And by modus ponens, E(p1, q1) ⊢BCK E(p1 → p2, q1 → p2). Thus
E(p1, q1), E(p2, q2) ⊢BCK E(p1 → p2, q1 → q2). Therefore E(p, q) is a system of equiv-
alence formulas for BCK. Now, we show that p ⊣⊢BCK E(∆(p)). By axiom (K),
p ⊢BCK p → (p → p). Since ⊢BCK p → p, by modus ponens and axiom (B), we have
that ⊢BCK (p → p) → (p → p). Using axiom (C), ⊢BCK p → ((p → p) → p) and by
modus ponens, we have that p ⊢BCK (p → p) → p. Thus, p ⊢BCK E(∆(p)). For the
inference in the other direction, we have that ⊢BCK ((p→ p) → p) → ((p→ p) → p).
By axiom (C) and modus ponens, we have p→ p ⊢BCK ((p→ p)→ p)→ p. Again by
modus ponens, (p → p) → p ⊢BCK p. Thus E(∆(p)) ⊢BCK p. We can conclude that
the logic BCK is finitely algebraizable.
♦
Chapter 6
Non-Protoalgebraic Logics
Protoalgebraic logics have been considered by logicians as the largest class of logics
for which an interesting algebraic theory can be evolved. We have seen, in previous
chapters, that some meta-properties of a logic, can be characterized intrinsically by
properties of the Leibniz operator, obtaining, by this way, a hierarchy of classes of
logics called “Leibniz hierarchy”. When S is not protoalgebraic, its Suszko operator
still monotone on Th(S) and the class Mod∗Su(S) play the role of Mod
∗(S). Some
non-protoalgebraic logics have been investigated individually. In this chapter, we will
provide some well known examples of non-protoalgebraic logics. We study the class of
truth-equational logics which contains the class of weakly algebraizable logics and some
non-protoalgebraic logics by discussing some examples and presenting its introductory
theory. This class has been investigated by Raftery (c.f. [Raf06b]).
Definition 6.0.2. A logic S is truth-equational if the class L∗Su(S) has its filters
equationally definable.
By Theorem 5.7.4, we note that the class of truth-equational logics encompass the
class of weakly algebraizable logics. Indeed, the latter is the intersection of the class
of truth-equational logics and the class of protoalgebraic logics.
Theorem 6.0.3. [Raf06b, Theorem 28] Let S be a logic. The following conditions are
equivalent:
(i) S is truth-equational;
(ii) The class Mod∗Su(S) has its filters equationally definable;
(iii) The Suszko operator is injective on FiS(A) for every algebra A.
88
It is not difficult to see that if the Suszko operator is injective on FiS(A) for every
algebra A then the Leibniz operator is also injective, but the converse is false [Raf06b,
example 2]. Thus truth-equational logics do not encompass all logics which Leibniz
operator is injective on FiS(A) for every algebra A. The Leibniz operator´s injectivity
by itself was investigated in [DM05].
In this thesis, when the logic is finitary, we use the Hilbert systems (defined in
Chapter 2). However, a logic can be also defined in a Gentzen style, which informally
consist on an axiomatization of the consequence relation. These two systems tend to
serve different purposes. In spite of this difference, there exists a relation between
Gentzen and Hilbert systems that we do not explain here. Nevertheless, the reader
can see [Raf06a], where Raftery proved that a logic described in Hilbert system, can
be always seen as Gentzen system (c.f. [Raf06a]). But if a logic is defined by Gentzen
system, it may not have a Hilbert system (c.f. [Raf06a]). He also defined analogous
classes of logics studied in this thesis using Gentzen system. Obviously, these new
classes are different from ours, but the main idea is the same. Furthermore, he proved
that if a logic is algebraizable with Hilbert system (i.e., algebraizable in our sense)
then it is also algebraizable as a Gentzen system (called Gentzen algebraizable), but
the converse is false. We also refer to [GR06], where Gil and Rebagliato give more
details about finitely equivalential Gentzen system, and [Pig97].
Example 6.1 (Intuitionistic Propositional Logic without Implication [BP89]). Intu-
itionistic Propositional Logic without Implication, denoted by IPL∗, is the {∨,∧,¬,⊤,
⊥}-fragment of IPL.
In example 5.13, we have defined a Heyting algebra A = 〈A,→A,∧A,∨A,¬A,⊥A,
⊤A〉. The binary operation, which for all pair of elements x, y correspond the ele-
ment x → y, is called implication. A pseudocomplementation is an operation which
for all x associates x∗ = x → 0; the element x is called pseudocomplemented. Let
A = 〈{⊤, a, b,⊥},∨,∧,¬,⊤,⊥〉 be the four-element chain pseudocomplemented lat-
tice: ⊥ < b < a < ⊤, ¬⊤ = ¬a = ¬b = ⊥, and ¬⊥ = ⊤. Let F1 = {⊤} and
F2 = {⊤, a}. The algebra A is the reduct of the four-element chain Heyting algebra,
and F1 and F2 are filters of the Heyting algebra. Since the class HA is an equivalent
algebraic semantics for IPL, we have that F1 and F2 are IPL-filters. Thus, they are
also IPL∗-filters of A. It is not difficult to see that ΩAF1 = △A ∪ {(a, b), (b, a)} and
ΩAF2 = △A ∪ {(a,⊤), (⊤, a)}. Although F1 ⊆ F2, we have that ΩAF1 * ΩAF2. By
Theorem 3.3.1, IPL∗ is not protoalgebraic.
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Furthermore, it is not difficult to prove that IPL∗ is truth-equational (c.f. [Raf06b,
Example 7]). Since IPL∗ is not protoalgebraic, it is also not algebraizable. However,
Font, Jansana and Pigozzi have proved in [FJP03] that IPL∗ is Gentzen algebraizable.
♦
Example 6.2 ({∧,∨}-fragment of Classical Propositional Logic [FV91]). The {∧,∨}-
fragment of Classical Propositional Logic, denoted by {∧,∨}-CPL, is defined in the
usual Hilbert-style with no axioms and with the following inference rules:
R1 ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢{∧,∨}−CPL ϕ
R2 ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢{∧,∨}−CPL ψ ∧ ϕ
R3 {ϕ, ψ} ⊢{∧,∨}−CPL ϕ ∧ ψ
R4 ϕ ⊢{∧,∨}−CPL ϕ ∨ ψ
R5 ϕ ∨ ψ ⊢{∧,∨}−CPL ψ ∨ ϕ
R6 ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∨ ψ) ⊢{∧,∨}−CPL ϕ ∨ ψ
R7 ϕ ∨ (ψ ∨ ξ) ⊢{∧,∨}−CPL (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ ξ
R8 (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ ξ ⊢{∧,∨}−CPL ϕ ∨ (ψ ∨ ξ)
R9 ϕ ∨ (ψ ∧ ξ) ⊢{∧,∨}−CPL (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ ξ)
R10 (ϕ∨ψ)∧ (ϕ∨ ξ) ⊢{∧,∨}−CPL ϕ∨ (ψ ∧ ξ)
R11 ϕ∧ (ψ ∨ ξ) ⊢{∧,∨}−CPL (ϕ∧ψ)∨ (ϕ∧ ξ)
R12 ϕ ∨ ϕ ⊢{∧,∨}−CPL ϕ
We note that rules (R6), (R8) and (R11) are derivable from the remaining ones (c.f.
[FGV91]). We denote byD2 the two-element distributive lattice on the set D2 = {0, 1}.
It is well-know that 〈D2, {1}〉 is a matrix model for {∧,∨}-CPL. Consider the algebra
D2, there are three {∧,∨}-filters on it, namely ∅, {1} and {0, 1}. It is not difficult
to see that ΩD2(∅) = ∇D2 and ΩD2({1}) = △D2. Thus we have ∅ ⊆ {1} while
ΩD2(∅) * ΩD2({1}). By Theorem 3.3.1, {∧,∨}-CPL is not protoalgebraic.
Moreover, the Leibniz operator is non-injective on FiS(A) for every algebra A.
Indeed, it is not difficult to see that ΩD2({0, 1}) = ∇D2 . And we have ΩD2(∅) =
ΩD2({0, 1}), while ∅ 6= {0, 1}. Thus the Suszko operator is non-injective on FiS(A) for
every algebra A. By Theorem 6.0.3, the logic {∧,∨}-CPL is not truth-equational.
Since {∧,∨}-CPL is not protoalgebraic, it is not algebraizable. However, in [FJP03],
Font, Jansana and Pigozzi have shown that {∧,∨}-CPL is Gentzen algebraizable. ♦
Example 6.3 (Minimum System of Positive Modal Logic [Jan02]). The minimum
system of Positive Modal logic, denoted by PML, is the restriction of the minimum
normal modal logic K with the local consequence relation to the positive, or negation-
free, modal language with connectives ∧,∨,⊤,⊥,2 and ⋄. The reader can find a
representation of the Gentzen system of this logic in [Jan02, Chapter 3].
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A positive modal algebra A = 〈A,∧,∨,2, ⋄, 0, 1〉 is an algebra such that 〈A,∧,∨, 0, 1〉
is a bounded distributive lattice and for any a, b ∈ A,
2(a ∧ b) = 2a ∧ 2b
⋄(a ∨ b) = ⋄a ∨ ⋄b
2a ∧ ⋄b ≤ ⋄(a ∧ b)
2(a ∨ b) ≤ 2a ∨ ⋄b
21 = 1
⋄0 = 0
The class of positive modal algebras forms a variety. Consider the four element
chain distributive lattice with universe A = {0, b, a, 1} ordered by 0 < b < a < 1. We
define the operations 2 and ⋄ by:
2p = p if p ∈ {0, 1} ⋄ p = p if p ∈ {0, 1}
2p = b if p ∈ {a, b} ⋄ p = a if p ∈ {a, b}
The sets {1} and {1, a} are PML-filters. It is not difficult to see that ΩA({1}) =
IdA ∪ {〈a, b〉, 〈b, a〉, 〈a, 0〉, 〈0, a〉, 〈0, b〉, 〈b, 0〉} and ΩA({1, a}) = IdA ∪ {〈1, a〉, 〈a, 1〉}.
Although {1} ⊆ {1, a}, we have ΩA({1}) * ΩA({1, a}). By Theorem 3.3.1, PML is
not protoalgebraic.
Thus it is not algebraizable in our sense. However, Jansana proved in [Jan02,
Theorem 26] that the logic PML is Gentzen algebraizable and its equivalent algebraic
semantics is the variety of positive modal algebras. Moreover, he proved in [Jan02,
Theorem 10] that the variety of positive modal algebras is not the equivalent algebraic
semantics, in our sense, of any algebraizable logic. ♦
Example 6.4 (Belnap’s four valued logic [Fon97]). Belnap’s four valued logic, denoted
by B is a finitary logic B = 〈FmL,⊢B〉 which has no axioms and is defined by the
following inference rules:
R1 ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢B ϕ
R2 ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢B ψ
R3 ϕ, ψ ⊢B ϕ ∧ ψ
R4 ϕ ⊢B ϕ ∨ ψ
R5 ϕ ∨ ψ ⊢B ψ ∨ ϕ
R6 ϕ ∨ ϕ ⊢B ϕ
R7 ϕ ∨ (ψ ∨ η) ⊢B (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ η
R8 ϕ ∨ ψ ⊢B ¬¬ϕ ∨ ψ
R9 ϕ ∨ (ψ ∧ η) ⊢B (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ η)
R10 (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ η) ⊢B ϕ ∨ (ψ ∧ η)
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R11 ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ η ⊢B (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∨ η
R12 ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ η ⊢B (¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) ∨ η
R13 ¬¬ϕ ∨ ψ ⊢B ϕ ∨ ψ
R14 (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∨ η ⊢B ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ η
R15 (¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) ∨ η ⊢B ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ η
A De Morgan lattice is an algebra A = 〈A,∧,∨,¬〉 such that:
(DM1) the reduct 〈A,∧,∨〉 is a distributive lattice;
(DM2) The unary operation ¬ satisfies the following equations:
p ≈ ¬¬p , ¬(p ∨ q) ≈ (¬p ∧ ¬q) , ¬(p ∧ q) ≈ (¬p ∨ ¬q)
The variety of De Morgan lattices, denote by DM, is generated, as a variety, by the
four-element De Morgan lattice M4 with the universe M4 = {f, n, b, t} and with the
algebraic structure specified by the Hasse diagram and negation table as follows:
Figure 6.1: Hasse Diagram and Negation Table
It can be proved that the sets ∅ and Fn = {t, n} are B-filters (c.f. [Fon97, Theorem
2.11]). It is not difficult to see that ΩM4∅ = ∇M4 and ΩM4Fn = ∆M4 . Although
∅ ⊆ Fn, we have that ΩM4∅ * ΩM4Fn. By Theorem 3.3.1, B is not protoalgebraic.
Thus it is not algebraizable in our sense. However, Font proved in [Fon97, Theorem
4.11] that B is Gentzen algebraizable and its equivalent algebraic semantics is the
variety DM of De Morgan lattices. The reader can see [FJ96, Chapter 5] for more
information about the relation between the logic B and the four-element De Morgan
lattice M4. ♦
Example 6.5 (Weaker Relevance Logic [FR94]). The Weaker Relevance Logic, de-
noted by WR, is defined in the same language as the logic R (c.f. Example 5.16), i.e,
L = {∧,→,¬}. The consequence relation, ⊢WR, is defined in the following way: for
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any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL,
Γ ⊢WR ϕ iff there are ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Γ such that ⊢R (ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn)→ ϕ.
ThusWR is finitary, has no theorems and for every ϕ, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ FmL, {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}
⊢WR ϕ iff ⊢R (ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn) → ϕ. By Lemma 2.3.5, the Leibniz operator is non-
injective on FiS(A) for every algebra A. Thus the Suszko operator is non-injective on
FiS(A) for every algebra A. And by Theorem 6.0.3, WR is not truth-equational.
Since the only protoalgebraic logic without theorems are the trivial logic, we have
that WR is not protoalgebraic (c.f. [FR94, Proposition 3.7]). Indeed, the set of
theorems of R is nonempty and constitutes a proper theory of WR. Thus WR is
neither inconsistent nor almost inconsistent, i.e., it is not a trivial logic. For more
information about the logic WR, the reader can see [FJ96, Chapter 5] and [FR94,
Chapter 3]. ♦
Chapter 7
Generalizations with Many-Sorted
Logic
In this chapter, we study the generalization of the theory of standard AAL to many-
sorted setting. This generalization is important since propositional logics are not
enough expressive when we want to reason about complex systems. Thus we need
logics over rich languages where elements can be distinguished by sorts. Herein, we
study the theory in which logics that lack an algebraic counterpart become algebraiz-
able in a behavior context. Actually, in the many-sorted AAL approach, the theory was
developed by replacing the role of unsorted equational logic by many-sorted behavioral
equational logic over the same signature and taking as unique visible sort, the sort φ
of formulas. The paradigmatic examples are the Paraconsistent logic C1 of da Costa
and the Carnap-style presentation of modal logic S5 which are not algebraizable in the
standard sense but they are behaviorally algebraizable. However, there are many logics
that are not algebraizable in any way. All the notations, notions, proofs and examples
can be found in [Gon08], [CGM09] or in [CG07].
7.1 Basic Notions
Given a set A, we denote by A∗, the set of all finite strings with elements in A. If S
is a set, A = {As}s∈S is an S-sorted or S-indexed set. Given w = s1s2 . . . sn ∈ S
∗,
we denote by Aw the product As1 × As2 × · · · × Asn. A many-sorted signature is a
pair Σ = 〈S, F 〉 where S is a set of sorts and F = {Fws}w∈S∗,s∈S is an indexed family
of sets of operations. We say that a many-sorted signature Σ = 〈S, F 〉 is n-sorted if
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n = |S|. We write f : s1 . . . sn → s ∈ F for an element f of Fs1...sns. We denote
by TΣ(X) = {TΣ,s(X)}s∈S the S-indexed family of carrier sets of the free Σ-algebra
TΣ(X) with generators taken from a sorted family X = {Xs}s∈S of variable sets. We
write x : s for x ∈ Xs. An element of TΣ,s(X) is called a Σ-term of sort s (an s-term
for short). A term without variables is called a closed term. A many-sorted signature
Σ = 〈S, F 〉 is called standard if, for every s ∈ S, there exists a closed s-term. If the
set of variables of a terms is finite then we often write t ∈ TΣ(x1 : s1, . . . , xn : sn) (or
simply t(x1 : s1, . . . , xn : sn)). Moreover, if T is a set whose elements are all terms of
this form, we write T (x1 : s1, . . . , xn : sn).
Given a many-sorted signature Σ = 〈S, F 〉, a substitution over Σ is an S-indexed
family of functions e = {es : Xs → TΣ,s(X)}s∈S. As usual, e(t) denotes the term
obtained by uniformly applying e to each variable in t. Given a term t(x1 : s1, . . . , xn :
sn) and terms t1 ∈ TΣ,s1(X), . . . , tn ∈ TΣ,sn(X), if e is a substitution such that es1(x1) =
t1, . . . , esn(xn) = tn then we write e(t) = t(t1, . . . , tn). We extend this notion to any
set, given T (x1 : s1, . . . , xn : sn) and U ∈ TΣ,s1(X) × · · · × TΣ,sn(X), we write T [U ] =⋃
〈t1,...,tn〉∈U
T (t1, . . . , tn), where T (t1, . . . , tn) := {t(t1, . . . , tn) : t ∈ T}.
A derived operation of type s1, . . . , sn → s over Σ is a term in TΣ,s({x1 : s1, . . . , xn :
sn}) for some n. We denote by DerΣ,s1...sns the set of all derived operations of type
s1, . . . , sn → s. A general many-sorted subsignature of Σ = 〈S, F 〉 is a many-sorted
signature Γ = 〈S, F ′〉 such that, for each w ∈ S∗, F ′w ⊆ DerΣ,w. Let Γ be a subsignature
of Σ, we say that Σ is Γ-standard if, for every s ∈ S there exists a closed Γ-term of
sort s, that is, a Γ-term of sort s without variables.
We assume fixed a signature Σ = 〈S, F 〉 with a distinguished sort φ for formulas and
a set of variablesX. We define the induced set of formulas LΣ(X) to be the carrier set of
sort φ of the free algebra TΣ(X) with generators taken from X. We define a structural
many-sorted logic as a pair L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 where Σ is a many-sorted signature and ⊢ is a
consequence relation, such that 〈LΣ(X),⊢〉 is a logic (i.e., ⊢ satisfies reflexivity, cut and
weakening conditions) that satisfies, for every Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ LΣ(X) and every substitution
e: if Γ ⊢ ϕ then e[Γ] ⊢ e(ϕ) (c.f. [Gon08, Examples 2.1.1.5]). Propositional logics are
a particular case of many-sorted logics which are called single-sorted logics, that is,
logics over one sorted signature (i.e., Σ = 〈S, F 〉 with S = {φ}).
The notion of standard universal algebra is the same for many sorted signatures.
However, we describe some definitions to remind the reader. Given a many-sorted
signature Σ = 〈S, F 〉, a Σ-algebra is a pair A = 〈{As}s∈S, A〉 where each As is a
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non-empty set, the carrier of sorts s, and
A
assigns to each symbol f : s1 . . . sn → s
of Σ a function f
A
: As1 × · · · × Asn → As. The set of all Σ-algebras is denoted by
AlgΣ. When the signature is clear from the context we just write algebra instead of
Σ-algebra. A Σ-algebra is trivial if each of its carriers contains exactly one element.
A Σ-algebra B is a subalgebra of A, in symbols B ⊆ A, if B is non-empty subuniverse
of A and for each operation f : s1 . . . sn → s and every b1 ∈ Bs1, . . . , bn ∈ Bsn we have
that f
B
(b1, . . . , bn) = f
A
(b1, . . . , bn). Given a subsignature Γ of Σ and a Σ-algebra A =
〈(As)s∈S, A〉, the reduct of A to Γ, denoted by AΓ, is a Γ-algebra AΓ = 〈(As)s∈S, AΓ〉
where
AΓ
is the restriction of
A
to the operations in Γ. We can defined as usual
direct product, subdirect product, reduced product, ultraproduct, etc (c.f. [MT92]).
A homomorphism h : A → B from the Σ-algebra A to the Σ-algebra B is
an S-sorted set {hs : As → Bs}s∈S, such that for all f ∈ Fs1...sns, we have that
hs(f
A
(a1, . . . , an)) = f
B
(hs1(a1), . . . , hsn(an)). We can defined as usual epimorphism,
embedding, isomorphism, etc. An assignment of X over a Σ-algebra A is a family
h = {hs}s∈S such that, for every s ∈ S, hs : Xs → As. The interpretation of terms
(or denotation of terms) is the free extension of h to TΣ(X), that we also denote by
h. Given a term t(x1 : s1, . . . , xn : sn) and 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ As1 × · · · × Asn, we denote by
tA(a1, . . . , an) the denotation of t in A when the variables x1, .., xn are interpreted by
a1, . . . , an, respectively. Algebraically, tA(a1, . . . , an) = h(t), where h is any assignment
such that h(xi) = ai for all i ≤ n.
Now, we define all the notions that we need to describe many-sorted equational
logic. Given a many-sorted signature Σ, we denote an equation over Σ by t1 ≈ t2
where t1, t2 ∈ TΣ,s(X) for some s ∈ S. The sets EqΣ,s(X) = {t1 ≈ t2 : t1, t2 ∈ TΣ,s(X)},
EqΣ(X) = {t1 ≈ t2 : t1, t2 ∈ TΣ,s(X) and s ∈ S} and QEqΣ(X) denote, respectively,
the set of all equations over Σ of sort s, the set of all equations over Σ and the set of all
quasi -equations (or conditional equations) over Σ. Given a Σ-algebraA, an assignment
h over A and t1 ≈ t2 ∈ EqΣ(X), we write A, h  t1 ≈ t2 if h(t1) = h(t2). We say
that A satisfies (or, is a model of) t1 ≈ t2 if A  t1 ≈ t2, that is, if A, h  t1 ≈ t2
for every assignment h over A. We have similar notions for quasi-equations. Given a
class K of Σ-algebras, the equational consequence relation associated with K, denoted
by
K
Σ
⊆ 2EqΣ(X) × EqΣ(X) is defined by Ψ
K
Σ
t1 ≈ t2 if, for every A ∈ K and every
assignment h over A, we have that A, h  r1 ≈ r2 for every r1 ≈ r2 ∈ Ψ implies
A, h  t1 ≈ t2.
Contrary to many-sorted equational logic, in many-sorted behavioral logic, the
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set of sorts is explicitly divided in the visible sorts and the hidden sorts. A hidden
many-sorted signature is a tuple 〈Σ, V 〉 where Σ = 〈S, F 〉 is a many-sorted signature
and V ⊆ S, called the set of visible sorts. The subset of hidden sorts is denoted
by H = S \ V . A hidden subsignature of a hidden many-sorted signature 〈Σ, V 〉 is a
hidden signature 〈Γ, V 〉 such that Γ is a many-sorted subsignature of Σ. Given a hidden
subsignature Γ of Σ, a Γ-context for sorts s is a term t(x : s, x1 : s1, . . . , xm : sm) ∈ TΓ(X),
with a distinguished variable x of sort s and parametric variables x1, . . . , xm of sorts
s1, . . . , sm respectively. We denote by C
Γ
Σ[x : s], the set of all Γ-contexts for sort s, and
by EΓΣ[x : s], the set of all Γ-experiments, which are the Γ-contexts of visible sort. When
Γ is clear from the context we just write context and experiment instead of Γ-context
and Γ-experiment. Given c ∈ CΓΣ,s′[x : s] (this set denotes the set of Γ-contexts of sort s
′
for sort s) and t ∈ TΣ,s(X), we denote by c[t] the term obtained from c by substituting
x by t.
LetA be a Σ-algebra, Γ a hidden subsignature of Σ and s ∈ S. We say that a, b ∈ As
are Γ-behaviorally equivalent, in symbols a ≡Γ b, if for every ǫ(x : s, x1 : s1, . . . , xn : sn) ∈
EΓΣ[x : s] and for all 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ As1 × · · · × Asn , we have that ǫA(a, a1, . . . , an) =
ǫA(b, a1, . . . , an). Equivalently, two objects are behaviorally equivalent if they cannot
be distinguished by any experiment. Given a Σ-algebra A, an assignment h over A
and an equation t1 ≈ t2 of sort s ∈ S, we say that A and h Γ-behaviorally satisfy the
equation t1 ≈ t2, in symbols A, h Γ t1 ≈ t2 if h(t1) ≡Γ h(t2). And we say that A
behaviorally satisfies t1 ≈ t2, in symbols A Γ t1 ≈ t2 if A, h Γ t1 ≈ t2 for every
assignment h over A. We define similar notions for quasi-equations. Given a class K
of Σ-algebras, the behavioral consequence relation over Σ associated with K and Γ,
K,Γ
Σ
⊆ 2EqΣ(X) × EqΣ(X) is defined by Ψ
K,Γ
Σ
t1 ≈ t2 if, for every A ∈ K and every
assignment h over A, A, h Γ u1 ≈ u2 for every u1 ≈ u2 ∈ Ψ implies A, h Γ t1 ≈ t2.
Let Ψ(x : s) be a set of equations with a distinguished variable x of sort s, then we say
that Ψ is a compatible set of equations for
K,Γ
Σ
, if {x1 ≈ x2}∪Ψ(x1)
K,Γ
Σ
Ψ(x2). We
denote by CompK,ΓΣ (Y ) the set of all compatible sets of equations for the consequence
relation
K,Γ
Σ
whose variables are contained in Y ⊆ X.
Given a hidden signature 〈Σ, V 〉, a class K of Σ-algebras is a hidden variety if
there exists a set E ⊆ EqΣ(X) of equations such that K contains exactly the Σ-
algebras that behaviorally satisfy all equations in E. Given a class K of Σ-algebras,
the hidden variety generated by K is the smallest hidden variety containing K and it
is denoted by HV (K). We can similarly define the notion for hidden quasivariety by
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considering quasi-equations instead of equations.
Given a many-sorted signature Σ = 〈S, F 〉, we defined an extended signature Σo =
〈So, F o〉 such that So = S ⊎ {v}, where v is to be considered the sort of observations
of formulas. The indexed set of operations F o = {F ows}w∈(So)∗,s∈So is such that:
• F ows = Fws if ws ∈ S
∗;
• F oφυ = {o};
• F ows = ∅ otherwise.
Roughly speaking, we extend the signature with a new sort v for the observations
that we can perform on formulas using operation o. The extended hidden signature
obtained from Σ, that we also denote by Σo, is the pair 〈Σo, {v}〉, where v is intended
to represent the only visible sort of the extended hidden signature. Given a signature
Σ = 〈S, F 〉, a subsignature Γ of Σ and a class K of Σo-algebras, BhvK,ΓΣ designates
the logic 〈EqΣo ,
K,Γ
Σ
〉, where
K,Γ
Σ
is the behavioral consequence relation over Σo
associated with K and Γ. We can define the logic BEqnK,ΓΣ = 〈EqΣ,
K,Γ
Σ,bhv
〉, where
K,Γ
Σ,bhv
is just the restriction of
K,Γ
Σ
to Σ. The set of theories of BEqnK,ΓΣ is denoted
by ThK,ΓΣ .
Now we define some notions of matrix semantics to the behavioral setting. Thus, a
many-sorted logical matrix over a many-sorted signature Σ is a tuple M = 〈A, D〉 where
A is a Σ-algebra and D ⊆ Aφ is the set of designated values. We define a consequence
relation over Σ, denoted by ⊢M, in the following way, for every T ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ LΣ(X);
T ⊢M ϕ iff for every assignment h over A, we have that h[T ] ⊆ D implies h(ϕ) ∈ D.
We say that a matrix M is a model of a logic L if, for every T ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ LΣ(X), T ⊢L ϕ
implies Γ ⊢M ϕ. In this case, D is called an L-filter of A. The set of all L-filters of A
is denoted by FiL(A) and the class of all matrix models of L is denoted by Mod(L).
A congruence on a Σ-algebra A is an S-sorted set {θs}s∈S such that, for every
s ∈ S and every θs is an equivalence relation on As and, for each f ∈ Fs1...sns and
each 〈a1, . . . , an〉, 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 ∈ As1 × · · · ×Asn , we have a1 ≡ b1(θs1), . . . , an ≡ bn(θsn)
implies f
A
(a1, . . . , an) ≡ f
A
(b1, . . . , bn)(θs). Let Γ a subsignature of the signature
Σ = 〈S, F 〉 then a Γ-congruence over a Σ-algebra A is an equivalence relation θ over
A such that, for every a1 ≡ b1(θs1), . . . , an ≡ bn(θsn) and f : s1 . . . sn → s ∈ Γ, we
have that fA(a1, . . . , an) ≡ fA(b1, . . . , bn)(θs). We denote by Con
Σ
Γ(A) the set of all
Γ-congruences over a Σ-algebra A. It is a complete sublattice of the complete lattice of
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equivalence relations on A, EqvΣ(A). We note that the difference between this notion
and the standard notion of congruence over A is that a Γ-congruence is assumed to
satisfy the congruence property just for contexts generated from the subsignature Γ.
A Γ-congruence θ over a Σ-algebra A is compatible with a set Φ ⊆ Aφ if for every
a1, a2 ∈ Aφ, a1 ≡ a2(θφ) and a1 ∈ Φ implies a2 ∈ Φ. A matrix Γ-congruence over
a matrix M is a Γ-congruence θ over A compatible with D, i.e., θ is a Γ-congruence
over A and for every a, b ∈ Aφ, if a ∈ D and a ≡ b(θφ) then b ∈ D. A Γφ-congruence
over a Σ-algebra A is a φ-reduct of a Γ-congruence over A. It is always an equivalence
relation θ over Aφ which satisfies the condition: if a1 ≡ b1(θ), . . . , an ≡ bn(θ) and f :
φn → φ ∈ DerΓ,φn,φ then fA(a1, . . . , an) ≡ fA(b1, . . . , bn)(θ). We denote by Con
Σ
Γ,φ(A)
the set of all Γφ-congruences of A. A matrix Γφ-congruence over a matrix M is the
φ-restriction of a matrix Γ-congruence.
For each T ∈ Th(L), there is the largest Γ-congruence compatible with T denoted
by ΩbhvΓ (T ) which we call behavioral Leibniz congruence. Obviously, we can defined
the behavioral Leibniz operator on the term algebra has a function ΩbhvΓ whose domain
is the set Th(L) and it associates to each T ∈ Th(L), the largest Γ-congruence over
TΣ(X) compatible with T . We also define a Γ-behavioral Leibniz congruence of M
as the largest matrix Γ-congruence over M, which we denote by ΩbhvΓ,A(D) . Given a
matrix M = 〈A, D〉 over Σ, we have that, for every s ∈ S, a ≡ b(ΩbhvΓ,A(D))s iff for
every c(x : s, x1 : s1, . . . , xn : sn) ∈ C
Γ
Σ,φ[x : s] and every 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ As1 × · · · × Asn
we have that cA(a, a1, . . . , an) ∈ D iff cA(b, a1, . . . , an) ∈ D. We denote by Ω
bhv
Γ,A,φ(D)
the restriction of ΩbhvΓ,A(D) to the sort φ. As we cannot perform quotients, since the
behavioral Leibniz congruence is not a congruence (in general), we extend the signature
and the algebras over the extended signature. Given a matrix Γφ-congruence θ over a
matrix M, consider the Σ-algebra Aoθ such that A
o
θ|Σ = A, (A
o
θ)v = Aφ/θ = {[a]θ : a ∈
Aφ} and oAo
θ
(a) = [a]φ. Thus, we use the visible part (A
o
θ)v to simulate the quotient.
A Γφ-congruence θ over A is said to be a K-Γφ-congruence if A
o
θ ∈ K and we denote
by ConKΓ (A) the set of all K-Γφ-congruence over A.
7.2 The Behavioral Leibniz Hierarchy
We do not describe the Leibniz hierarchy for many-sorted logics because it is a particu-
lar case of the behavioral Leibniz hierarchy taking the subsignature Γ as the signature
Σ, i.e., Γ = Σ. We follow the same order as we have done for the standard case,
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i.e., first we study the class of behaviorally protoalgebraic logics, then the behaviorally
equivalential logics and we finish with the class of behaviorally weakly algebraizable
and behaviorally (finitely) algebraizable logics.
Definition 7.2.1. Let L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 be a many-sorted logic and Γ a subsignature of Σ. We
say that L is Γ-behaviorally protoalgebraic if, for every T ∈ Th(L) and ϕ, ψ ∈ LΣ(X),
we have
ϕ ≡ ψ
(
ΩbhvΓ (T )
)
implies T ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ ψ and T ∪ {ψ} ⊢ ϕ.
We say that a logic L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 is behaviorally protoalgebraic if there exists a subsig-
nature Γ of Σ such that L is Γ-behaviorally protoalgebraic.
A set ∆(ξ1, ξ2, z) ⊆ LΓ({ξ1, ξ2, z}), where z = 〈z1 : s1, z2 : s2, . . . 〉 is a set of
parametric variables with sort different from φ and at most one variable of each sort, is
said a Γ-protoequivalence system for a many-sorted logic L if it satisfies the following
conditions:
⊢ ∆(ξ, ξ, z) (Reflexivity)
{ξ1} ∪∆(〈ξ1, ξ2〉) ⊢ ξ2 (Modus Ponens)
where ∆(〈ξ1, ξ2〉) := {δi(ξ1, ξ2, z) : i ∈ I, z ∈ LΓ(X)}. Note that there are no para-
metric variables in protoequivalence system for a single-sorted logic (defined at the
beginning of the Chapter 3). Here we cannot remove parametric variables because
substitutions must respect each sort. However, if a behaviorally protoalgebraic logic is
standard then we obtain a Γ-protoequivalence system without parameters.
A set ∆(ξ1, ξ2, z) ⊆ LΓ({ξ1, ξ2, z}), where z = 〈z1 : s1, z2 : s2, . . . 〉 is a set of
parametric variables, is said a parameterized Γ-equivalence system for a many-sorted
logic L if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) ⊢ ∆(ξ, ξ, z) (Reflexivity)
(ii) ∆(〈ξ1, ξ2〉) ⊢ ∆(〈ξ2, ξ1〉) (Symmetry)
(iii) ∆(〈ξ1, ξ2〉) ∪∆(〈ξ2, ξ3〉) ⊢ ∆(〈ξ1, ξ3〉) (Transitivity)
(iv) {ξ1} ∪∆(〈ξ1, ξ2〉) ⊢ ξ2 (Modus Ponens)
(v) ∆(〈ξ1, ξ2〉) ⊢ ∆(〈c[ξ1], c[ξ2]〉) for every c ∈ C
Γ
Σ,φ[ξ :φ] (Single Replacement)
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In the following theorem, we give a characterization of behaviorally protoalgebraic
logics as we have seen in the case of single-sorted logic, in Chapter 3.
Theorem 7.2.2. [Gon08, Theorem 3.2.9] Let L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 be a many-sorted logic and
Γ a subsignature of Σ. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) L is Γ-behaviorally protoalgebraic;
(ii) The behavioral Leibniz operator ΩbhvΓ,φ is monotone on Th(L);
(iii) There exists a Γ-protoequivalence system for L;
(iv) There exists a parameterized Γ-equivalence system for L.
The proof of the above theorem is similar as in the case of single-sorted logic.
Now, we define behaviorally equivalential logics.
Definition 7.2.3. Let L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 be a many-sorted logic and Γ a subsignature of Σ.
We say that L is Γ-behaviorally equivalential if there exists a Γ-behavioral equivalence
set of formulas, that is, a set ∆(ξ1, ξ2) ⊆ LΓ({ξ1, ξ2}) of formulas such that for every
ϕ, ψ, δ, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ LΣ(X):
(i) ⊢ ∆(ϕ, ϕ) (Reflexivity)
(ii) ∆(ϕ, ψ) ⊢ ∆(ψ, ϕ) (Symmetry)
(iii) ∆(ϕ, ψ) ∪∆(ψ, δ) ⊢ ∆(ϕ, δ) (Transitivity)
(iv) ∆(ϕ, ψ) ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ ψ (Modus Ponens)
(v) ∆(ϕ1, ψ1)∪· · ·∪∆(ϕn, ψn) ⊢ ∆(c[ϕ1, . . . , ϕn], c[ψ1, . . . , ψn]) for every c : φ
n →
φ ∈ DerΓ,φ (Replacement)
We say that a logic L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 is behaviorally equivalential if there exists a subsigna-
ture Γ of Σ such that L is Γ-behaviorally equivalential.
Note that the main difference between this behavioral version of equivalential logic
and the standard notion is that in the former the set ∆ is not assumed to define a
congruence, i.e, an equivalence relation compatible with all operations.
We define the set T Γξ1,ξ2 := {ϕ(ξ1, ξ2, z) : ∅ ⊢ ϕ(ξ1, ξ1, z)} as the set of formulas that
becomes theorems of L after the identification of the variables ξ1 and ξ2 in ϕ. In the
following proposition and theorem, we give a characterization of class of logics as we
have seen for single-sorted logic (c.f. Chapter 4).
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Proposition 7.2.4. [Gon08, Proposition 3.2.16] Let L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 be a many-sorted logic,
Γ a subsignature of Σ and ∆(ξ1, ξ2) ⊆ LΓ({ξ1, ξ2}) a set of formulas. Then,
(i) if ∆(ξ1, ξ2) is a Γ-behavioral equivalence set for L then, for every T ∈ Th(L)
and ϕ, ψ ∈ LΣ(X), we have that
ϕ ≡ ψ
(
ΩbhvΓ,φ(T )
)
iff ∆(ϕ, ψ) ⊆ T.
(ii) Herrmann´s Test: suppose L is Γ-behaviorally protoalgebraic. Then, ∆(ξ1, ξ2) ⊆
LΓ({ξ1, ξ2}) is a Γ-behavioral equivalence set for L iff it satisfies,
∆(ξ1, ξ2) ⊆ T
Γ
ξ1,ξ2
and ξ1 ≡ ξ2
(
ΩbhvΓ,φ
(
CnL(∆(ξ1, ξ2))
))
.
Theorem 7.2.5. [Gon08, Theorem 3.2.17] Let L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 be a many-sorted logic and
Γ a subsignature of Σ. If L is Γ-standard then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) L is Γ-behaviorally equivalential;
(ii) The behavioral Leibniz operator ΩbhvΓ,φ is monotone and commutes with inverse
substitutions on Th(L).
Herein, we study the class of behaviorally weakly algebraizable logics and the class
of behaviorally (finitely) algebraizable logics.
Definition 7.2.6. Let L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 be a many-sorted logic and Γ a subsignature of Σ. We
say that L is Γ-behaviorally weakly algebraizable if there exist a class K of Σo-algebras,
a set Θ(ξ, z) ⊆ CompK,ΓΣ (X) of φ-equations and a set ∆(ξ1, ξ2, w) ⊆ LΓ({ξ1, ξ2, w}) of
formulas such that, for every T ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ LΣ(X) and for every set Φ ∪ {ϕ1 ≈ ϕ2} of
φ-equations,
(i) T ⊢ ϕ iff Θ[〈T 〉]
K,Γ
Σ,bhv
Θ(〈ϕ〉);
(ii) Φ
K,Γ
Σ,bhv
ϕ1 ≈ ϕ2 iff ∆[〈Φ〉] ⊢ ∆(〈ϕ1, ϕ2〉);
(iii) ϕ ⊣⊢ ∆[〈Θ(〈ϕ〉)〉];
(iv) ϕ1 ≈ ϕ2
K,Γ
Σ,bhv
Θ[〈∆(〈ϕ1, ϕ2〉)〉].
We say that a logic L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 is behaviorally weakly algebraizable if there exists a
subsignature Γ of Σ such that L is Γ-behaviorally weakly algebraizable.
As in standard AAL, conditions (i) and (iv) jointly imply (ii) and (iii), and vice-
versa.
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Theorem 7.2.7. [Gon08, Theorem 3.2.15] Let L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 be a many-sorted logic and
Γ a subsignature of Σ. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) L is Γ-behaviorally weakly algebraizable;
(ii) The behavioral Leibniz operator ΩbhvΓ,φ is monotone and injective on Th(L).
Definition 7.2.8. Let L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 be a many-sorted logic and Γ a subsignature of Σ.
We say that L is Γ-behaviorally algebraizable if there exist a class K of Σo-algebras, a
set Θ(ξ) ⊆ CompK,ΓΣ ({ξ}) of φ-equations and a set ∆(ξ1, ξ2) ⊆ LΓ({ξ1, ξ2}) of formulas
such that, for every T ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ LΣ(X) and every set Φ ∪ {ϕ1 ≈ ϕ2} of φ-equations,
(i) T ⊢ ϕ iff Θ[T ]
K,Γ
Σ,bhv
Θ(ϕ);
(ii) Φ
K,Γ
Σ,bhv
ϕ1 ≈ ϕ2 iff ∆[Φ] ⊢ ∆(ϕ1, ϕ2);
(iii) ϕ ⊣⊢ ∆[Θ(ϕ)];
(iv) ϕ1 ≈ ϕ2
K,Γ
Σ,bhv
Θ[∆(ϕ1, ϕ2)].
We say that a logic L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 is behaviorally algebraizable if there exists a subsigna-
ture Γ of Σ such that L is Γ-behaviorally algebraizable.
As in standard AAL, Θ is called the set of defining equations, ∆ the set of equiv-
alence formulas and K a behaviorally equivalent algebraic semantics for L. If the set
of defining equations and the set of equivalence formulas are finite and without pa-
rameters, we say that L is finitely Γ-behaviorally algebraizable. The difference between
behaviorally weakly algebraizable logic and behaviorally algebraizable logic is that in
the former both the set of equivalence formulas and the set of defining equations may
have parametric variables.
Theorem 7.2.9. [Gon08, Theorem 3.2.18] Let L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 be a many-sorted logic and
Γ a subsignature of Σ. If L is Γ-standard, then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) L is Γ-behaviorally algebraizable;
(ii) The behavioral Leibniz operator ΩbhvΓ,φ is monotone, injective and commutes
with inverse substitutions on Th(L).
As in the Chapter 5, we give a sufficient condition on the behavioral equivalence
set for a behaviorally equivalential logic becomes behaviorally algebraizable.
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Corollary 7.2.10. [Gon08, Corollary 3.3.2] Let L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 be a many-sorted logic and
Γ a subsignature of Σ. A sufficient condition for L to be Γ-behaviorally algebraizable
is that it is Γ-behaviorally equivalential with Γ-behavioral equivalence set ∆(ξ1, ξ2) that
also satisfies:
{ξ1, ξ2} ⊢ ∆(ξ1, ξ2) (G-rule)
In this case, ∆(ξ1, ξ2) is the set of equivalence formulas and Θ(ξ) = {ξ ≈ δ(ξ, ξ) : δ ∈
∆} the set of defining equations for L.
In the behavioral algebraization process we cannot have a uniqueness result because
it is parameterized by the choice of the subsignature Γ. Nevertheless, it is interesting
to note that, once the subsignature Γ is fixed, we can prove the uniqueness result as
Blok and Pigozzi have proved in [BP89, Theorem 2.15].
Theorem 7.2.11. [Gon08, Theorem 4.1.2] Let L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 be a Γ-behaviorally alge-
braizable many-sorted logic, where Γ is a subsignature of Σ, and let K and K′ be two
Γ-behaviorally equivalent algebraic semantics for L such that ∆(ξ1, ξ2) and Θ(ξ) are the
equivalence formulas and defining equations for K, and similarly ∆′(ξ1, ξ2) and Θ
′(ξ)
for K′. Then,
K,Γ
Σ,bhv
=
K
′,Γ
Σ,bhv
, ∆(ξ1, ξ2) ⊣⊢ ∆
′(ξ1, ξ2) and Θ(ξ)
K,Γ
Σ,bhv
Θ′(ξ).
Thus we can consider the largest Γ-behaviorally equivalent algebraic semantics,
denoted by KΓL. But contrarily to the case of standard AAL, in this approach K
Γ
L
is not the class of algebras that should be canonically associated with L. Indeed, it
is a subclass of KΓL that will allow us to generalize the standard results of AAL (c.f.
[Gon08]).
Moreover, if L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 is a many-sorted finitary and finitely Γ-behaviorally alge-
braizable logic for some subsignature Γ of Σ and if K and K′ are two Γ-behaviorally
equivalent algebraic semantics for L then K and K′ generate the same Γ-hidden qua-
sivariety, i.e., K and K′ Γ-behaviorally satisfy the same quasi-equations. Therefore,
this Γ-hidden quasivariety is also a Γ-behaviorally equivalent algebraic semantics for L
and we can construct a basis for the quasi-equations of this unique equivalent Γ-hidden
quasivariety semantics given an axiomatization of L, in the following theorem.
Theorem 7.2.12. [Gon08, Theorem 4.1.3]
Let L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 be a finitary many-sorted logic defined by a set of axioms AX and
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a set of inference rules IR and consider Γ a subsignature of Σ. If L is finitely Γ-
behaviorally algebraizable with the set of defining equations Θ(ξ) and the set of equiv-
alence formulas ∆(ξ1, ξ2), then the unique equivalent Γ-hidden quasivariety semantics
for L is axiomatized by the following equations and quasi-equations:
(i) Θ(ϕ), for every theorem ϕ of L;
(ii) Θ[∆(ξ, ξ)];
(iii) Θ(ψ1) ∧ · · · ∧Θ(ψn)→ Θ(ϕ) for every 〈ψ1, . . . , ψn, ϕ〉 ∈ IR;
(iv) Θ[∆(ξ1, ξ2)]→ ξ1 ≈ ξ2.
The following theorem is a semantic characterization of behaviorally algebraizable
logics.
Theorem 7.2.13. [Gon08, Theorem 4.2.8]
Let L = 〈Σ,⊢〉 be a many-sorted logic, Γ a subsignature of Σ and K a class of
Σo-algebras.
1. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) L is Γ-behaviorally algebraizable and K is the Γ-behaviorally equivalent al-
gebraic semantics;
(ii) For every Σ-algebra A we have that ΩbhvΓ,A,φ is an isomorphism between the
lattices of L-filters and K-Γφ-congruences of A, that commutes with inverse
substitutions.
2. Assume L is Γ-behaviorally algebraizable with K the Γ-behaviorally equivalent
algebraic semantics. Let Θ(ξ) be the set of defining equations for K. For each
Σ-algebra A and Γφ-congruence θ of A define:
HA(θ) = {a ∈ Aφ : γA(a) ≡ δA(a)(θ), for every γ ≈ δ ∈ θ}.
Then HA restricted to the K-Γφ-congruences of A is the inverse of Ω
bhv
Γ,A,φ.
We have seen that all the classes of logics can be characterized by properties of the
Leibniz operator. Thus, we present, in the following figure (c.f. [Gon08, figure 3.2]),
the behavioral Leibniz hierarchy.
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Figure 7.1: A view of the Behavioral Leibniz Hierarchy
7.3 Examples
Herein, we only present some examples of behaviorally algebraizable logics which ap-
pear in [Gon08, Chapter 5].
Example 7.4 (First Order Classical Logic). The problem of algebraizing predicate
logic is of a different character than the problem for propositional logics because the
standard deductive systems for predicate logic are not structural. Indeed, the individual
variables may be free or bound variables and it is due to the process of substituting
terms for the free occurrences of an individual variables in a formula. Thus, there are
different approaches to the algebraization of First Order Logic (FOL). One give rise
to the variety of cylindric algebras (c.f [BP86, Appendix C] and [CG07]) and the other
to polyadic algebras. In the cylindric approach, FOL is view as a single-sorted logic
(i.e., as a structural propositional logic), called PR, where atomic formulas of FOL
have to be represented as propositional variables in PR and PR is algebraizable with
the variety of cylindric algebras has an equivalent algebraic semantics. But we can
see FOL as a two-sorted logic, with a sort for terms and a sort for formulas. Thus,
FOL can be shown many-sorted algebraizable with the variety of two-sorted version of
cylindric algebras as equivalent algebraic semantics. ♦
Example 7.5 (Paraconsistent Logic C1 of da Costa). The logic C1 = 〈ΣC1 ,⊢C1〉, where
the single-sorted signature ΣC1 = 〈{φ}, F 〉 is such that Fφ = {t, f}, Fφφ = {¬},
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Fφφφ = {∧,∨,→} and Fws = ∅ otherwise; is the paraconsistent logic of da Costa. A
logic is said to be paraconsistent if its consequence relation is not explosive with respect
to a negation connective ¬ (that is, if for all formulas ϕ and ψ, {ϕ,¬ϕ} ⊢ ψ). More-
over, C1 is a non-truth-functional logic, namely it lacks congruence for paraconsistent
negation connective with respect to the equivalence ↔ that algebraizes the Classi-
cal Propositional logic fragment. In general, it may happen that ⊢C1 (ϕ ↔ ψ) but
0C1 (¬ϕ ↔ ¬ψ). It was proved in [LMS91] that this logic is not algebraizable in the
standard sense (it lack congruence for paraconsistent negation) but it is behaviorally al-
gebraizable by taking as subsignature Γ all connectives without paraconsistent negation
(c.f. [Gon08, Example 2.3.26] and [CGM09, Theorem 19]). The algebraic counterpart
is the class of the so-called da Costa algebras. ♦
Example 7.6 (Carnap-style presentation of modal logic S5). The logic S5 = 〈ΣS5 ,⊢S5〉
where the single-sorted signature ΣS5 = 〈{φ}, F 〉 is such that Fφφ = {¬,2}, Fφφφ =
{∧,∨,→} and Fws = ∅ otherwise; is the modal logic S5. This logic can be seen
as an extension of CPL, with the modality 2. Although S5 is non-algebraizable in
the standard sense (it lack congruence of its modal operator 2), we can identify an
algebraizable fragment of it, namely CPL. The logic S5 is Γ-behaviorally algebraizable
with a subsignature Γ that does not contain the modal operator 2 and the behaviorally
equivalent algebraic semantics is a class of algebras based on Boolean algebras which
is the algebraic counterpart of CPL. ♦
Since the class of behaviorally protoalgebraic logics coincides with the class of pro-
toalgebraic logics, we have that the {∧,∨}-fragment of CPL (c.f. Example 6.2) is not
behaviorally protoalgebraic. Consequently, it is not behaviorally algebraizable. Thus,
this generalization does not trivialize the notion of algebraization.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we studied several classes of logics. We initiated with the wider
class of protoalgebraic logics which coincides with the class of non-pathological logics
defined by Czelakowski. This class admits various characterizations, namely by Leibniz
operator properties, by the existence of a parameterized system of equivalence formu-
las, by properties of the class of reduced matrices models and by the existence of a
parameterized local deduction-detachment theorem. Another characterization of this
class is when the Suszko operator coincides with the Leibniz operator. Since, for us,
a logic 〈FmL,⊢S〉 is not necessarily finitary, we examine, throughout this thesis, some
properties concerning finitary logics.
Afterwards, we examined the class of equivalential logics defined as the logics having
a system of equivalence formulas. Obviously, it is a proper subclass of protoalgebraic
logics. Herrmann´s test gives conditions for a protoalgebraic logic becomes equivalen-
tial. When the system of equivalence formulas can be taken finite, we have finitely
equivalential logics. The class of finitely equivalential logics is a proper subclass of
equivalential logics. For both classes, we also have characterizations using properties
of the Leibniz operator and properties of the class of reduced matrix models.
We also analyzed the class of weakly algebraizable logics which contains the class
of algebraizable logics and the class of finitely algebraizable logics. As in the other
classes, we can give a characterization using properties of the Leibniz operator. A
paradigmatic example of finitely algebraizable logic is the CPL for which the class
BA can be associated with a meaningful relationship.
Although, most of the classes investigated in the literature are protoalgebraic logics,
there are many others logics which are non-protoalgebraic. Among them, we have some
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logics which belong to the class of truth-equational logics. This latter class is consti-
tuted by logics for which the class L∗Su(S) has its filters equationally definable. Thus
it contains some non-protoalgebraic logics and the class of weakly algebraizable logics.
Besides, we have seen logics which are neither protoalgebraic nor truth-equational.
All classes of logics that we have studied, can be characterized by properties of the
Leibniz Operator. This common point, enables the elaboration of a Leibniz Hierarchy.
Figure 8.1: Leibniz Hierarchy and some Examples
We have examined each class for single-sorted logics. However, we have seen that
this study of classes can be generalized for many-sorted logics. In order to capture some
phenomena of behaviorally algebraization, we use the behavioral Leibniz operator for
characterizing each new class. For instance, the Paraconsistent logic of da Costa is not
algebraizable in a standard sense but it is behaviorally algebraizable.
8.0.1 Future work
There are still many open problems in this area: some classic ones and many others
that have emerged through the behavioral approach. For example, we have seen that
a logic S is finitary and finitely equivalential iff the class Mod∗(S) of reduced matrix
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models is a matrix-quasivariety (Theorem 4.3.1). Consequently, the class Alg∗(S) of
algebraic reducts of the reduced matrix models is also a quasivariety. But the fact that
the classAlg∗(S) is a quasivariety does not imply that the logic S is finitary and finitely
equivalential. As a counter-example, we have that
−→
Kr is a finitary equivalential logic
which is not finitely equivalential (c.f. Example 4.5); however, the class Alg∗(
−→
Kr)
is a variety, namely the class of modal algebras (c.f. [Wo´j88, Theorem 3.6.5]). We
may investigate conditions, weaker than finitely equivalential, which Alg∗(S) must
be a quasivariety. Obviously, this new class includes the class of finitary and finitely
equivalential logics.
In the behavioral approach, the class of behaviorally finitely equivalential logics has
not been considered yet. However, we have already obtained similar results to the ones
on the standard case, namely the class of behaviorally finitely algebraizable logics can
be characterized by the property of Behavioral Leibniz operator being continuous on
FiS(A) for every algebra A. This class can capture some phenomena occurred within
modal logics (c.f. [Mal89] and [BM]).
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